Why Putin’s Ratings Are Falling Despite Polling Manipulation

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating is falling sharply even according to the country’s state-linked polling agencies – institutions whose figures have long been treated with caution.The Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), which regularly conducts surveys for the Kremlin, recorded a five-percentage-point weekly drop in approval of Putin’s performance, from 71% to 66%. It was the steepest fall since Russia announced its partial mobilization in autumn 2022.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.The share of respondents who disapproved of Putin’s performance rose to 16%, its highest level since the full-scale invasion began. Trust in the president fell to 67%, while distrust reached 20%.The state-run Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) showed a similar trend. By mid-July, Putin’s approval rating had fallen for three consecutive weeks to 65.1%, down from 70.4% in mid-June. Trust had declined from 76.7% to 71%.The figures are striking not because they prove that only around a third of Russians oppose Putin. They are striking because a visible decline has broken through a polling system that may be structurally inclined to overstate support.How the polling method shapes the answerSince May, VTsIOM has used a combined sample for its weekly political ratings: half of the interviews are conducted by telephone and half through what it calls a “route sample.”In practice, the latter involves interviewers approaching respondents at their homes according to a predetermined route. VTsIOM itself acknowledges in its methodological notes that question wording and circumstances arising during fieldwork can introduce bias into survey results. Other Topics of Interest Putin Ready to Sacrifice Crimea Chief Aksyonov as Crisis Deepens, Partisans Say Moscow plans to blame Sergei Aksyonov for Crimea’s growing humanitarian and infrastructure crisis and replace him after September’s vote. Daniil Chebykin, a Russian opposition activist and founder of the Omsk Civic Association, told Kyiv Post that an in-person question about Putin is not politically neutral in an authoritarian state.“The respondent understands that the people asking the questions have his home address and other information,” Chebykin said. “Of course, he will not say: ‘No, I am against Putin. I am against the war.’”Speaking by telephone may feel less threatening, he said.However, when strangers arrive at a person’s home, critics of the government are more likely either to refuse the interview or conceal their views.This creates two possible distortions. The first is nonresponse bias: people with anti-Kremlin views may be disproportionately absent from the final sample. The second is fear-driven response bias: some respondents may give the answer they consider safest rather than the one they believe.Chebykin also argued that the timing and demographic composition of in-person surveys can make the sample more favorable to the Kremlin, particularly if interviewers are more likely to reach pensioners and habitual television viewers.“Such ratings are needed only to conceal the real decline,” he said.This does not establish the precise size of Putin’s actual support. It does mean that the published percentage should not be read as a clean measurement of freely expressed political opinion.Why the rating is falling anywayThe immediate explanation is that the war is becoming harder for Russians to experience as a distant television event.According to polling cited by Agentstvo and reported by Kyiv Post, fuel shortages were identified as Russia’s most important problem for a second consecutive week, mentioned by 19% of respondents. The war came second at 18%, followed by attacks on Russian territory at 14%.Economic confidence is also deteriorating. The independent Levada Center’s consumer sentiment index fell to 94 points in June – below the threshold at which negative assessments outnumber positive ones and its lowest level since October 2022.Thirty-five percent of respondents said their financial position had worsened during the previous year, while only 13% reported an improvement.Chebykin said that, until recently, many Russians were able to detach themselves from both the war’s morality and its practical consequences. Since the beginning of 2026, that separation has become increasingly difficult.Ukrainian strikes on refineries, transport infrastructure, and logistics hubs have contributed to fuel disruption and brought the war onto Russian territory. Economic anxiety and fears about the banking system have added to the sense that the state can no longer insulate ordinary people from the consequences of Putin’s decisions.“Before, most people did not feel a direct daily impact,” Chebykin said. “Now it has become impossible to ignore.”When the “good tsar” stops answeringChebykin described a second problem for Putin: the gradual failure of the familiar Russian belief that corrupt or incompetent officials are to blame, while the president remains a benevolent final authority.People record appeals to Putin, wait for a response, and then write to the Presidential Administration. Putin remains silent, or they receive a formal reply while the original problem continues.In the past, the ruler could appear after officials had brought a crisis partly under control and present the improvement as the result of his intervention. That becomes harder when the state has no rapid answer to Ukrainian strikes, fuel shortages, or worsening economic expectations.Putin cannot credibly promise to prevent Ukraine from hitting another refinery or logistics hub. Nor can he easily discuss the damage without acknowledging that the war he launched is imposing growing costs inside Russia.The result, according to Chebykin, is not yet an open revolt. Direct criticism of Putin remains dangerous. Disillusionment instead appears as withdrawal: people may not be ready to condemn him publicly, but they are becoming less willing to express support.Chebykin called it a “muffled murmur” among the social constituency the Kremlin has long treated as its reliable base.The looming electionsOfficial ratings still show Putin with majority approval, while Putin’s United Russia remains heavily favored to retain control of the State Duma in the parliamentary election scheduled for Sept. 20.Yet the ruling party’s support also points to wider erosion. VTsIOM put support for United Russia at 35.3% in mid-July, well below the 49.82% it officially received in the 2021 party-list vote.Chebykin has also pointed to rising desertion as another sign of weakening consent. The Kremlin does not publish comprehensive figures, but independent estimates cited by the European Union Agency for Asylum suggest that more than 50,000 Russian soldiers have deserted since the invasion began in 2022.The war’s economic reach is expanding at the same time.Ukrainian drones have repeatedly struck logistics centers belonging to Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer, as Kyiv says the company’s network has been used to supply sanctioned drone components, navigation equipment, and other materiel to Russian forces. Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian political scientist and analyst. A graduate of Lund University (MSc in European Affairs), she covers issues relating to international affairs, migration, and disinformation.