What the Blue Tsunami Means for the Iran War—and for Pete Hegseth

War Stories By Enter your email to receive alerts for this author. Sign in or create an account to better manage your email preferences. Unsubscribe from email alerts Are you sure you want to unsubscribe from email alerts for Fred Kaplan? Nov 04, 20262:08 PM Kent Nishimura/ AFP via Getty Images Sign up for the Slatest to get the most insightful analysis, criticism, and advice out there, delivered to your inbox daily. Conventional wisdom holds that foreign policy doesn’t affect the outcome of American elections, but it cratered President Donald Trump’s party in this one, at least indirectly. High prices, which swelled the magnitude of the Blue Tsunami, were clearly the result of Trump’s tariffs and his war on Iran. One question now is whether the Democrats will be able to use their overwhelming majorities, in the House and Senate, to push back on those policies. Trump will probably resist the effort, claiming his powers, under Article 2 of the Constitution, as the armed forces’ commander in chief. He also threatened to veto bills that he considers “insane,” a term that he applies to anything that challenges his prerogatives and priorities. But a few caveats are worth noting. First, Democrats are projected to win at least 250 of the 435 seats in the House—just 40 seats short of the two-thirds needed to override a presidential veto. And given the widespread unpopularity of Trump’s war, tariffs, and other unilateral aggressions, it may not be so difficult to rally 40 Republicans to join an override campaign. A huge consequence of the Democrats’ victory—especially its scale and margin, even in states that had previously been seen as Republican sure things—is the evaporation of Trump’s biggest reservoir of power: the fear that kept the entire GOP in his thrall. After the defeat of so many candidates handpicked by Trump, his threat to throw primary challengers against disloyal party members no longer carries much weight. It is worth noting that the Vietnam War was ended in 1973 by a congressional amendment that cut off funding for any combat activities in the region. It’s also worth noting that the Senate at first narrowly defeated the measure but then passed it overwhelmingly a year later, after the 1972 elections—which widened the Democrats’ majority by two seats—and the deepening revulsion toward President Richard Nixon amid the Watergate scandal. The language of the bill, sponsored in the Senate by Republican Clifford Case and Democrat Frank Church, was very specific: None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam by United States forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriate under any other act may be expended for such purpose. Nearly identical language could be drafted this January, with a good chance of success, substituting the names of Iran and various other Middle Eastern countries. It’s also quite possible that the boundless supply of U.S. weapons to Israel—a nearly automatic reflex for decades—will soon be sharply restricted, if not cut off entirely. Even Trump has said that he would soon end military aid to Israel, though he didn’t foreclose the option of selling Israel arms that the country needed. (The fact that he said this the day before the election, as a last-minute appeal to voters, illustrates just how Israel’s star has fallen.) Meanwhile, Trump’s $1.5 trillion defense budget—a near-50 percent increase over the previous year’s allotment—is dead on arrival. (Signs of impending demise were flashing even before the election.) There will be pressure to boost some line items, in order to replace the vast stocks of U.S. munitions depleted and aircraft destroyed in the Iran war. Some will propose filling these gaps by cutting some of Trump’s cherished projects—the Golden Dome (which will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and still not provide defense) and the new fleet of battleships (which the Navy didn’t request and doesn’t want). Back in 2021, after Joe Biden ended Trump’s first term as president, Rep. Adam Smith, the then-new chairman of the Armed Services Committee, talked about “smart” ways to cut the defense budget, which at the time totaled $750 billion, by $100 billion. (Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine soon snapped those visions.) This January, Smith will regain the chair. Have he and his staff worked up a way to cut $500 billion from the current bloat? To put it another way: Will the Democratic Congress revive the sort of defense analysis that its committees once performed (to some degree), weighing the costs and benefits of various programs in the context of military missions and strategies? Or will it drop the ball, as recent Congresses have routinely done, and accept just about everything that the top generals and admirals request but freeze the budget’s size—neither boosting some programs nor slashing others, thus satisfying nobody? Whatever approach the Democrats take, the results of the midterms—the strong support for social programs and the broad opposition to the war in Iran—place a sizable defense-budget increase (or possibly any increase at all) off the table. At the same time, few Democrats in Congress are isolationists. They tend to support strengthened sanctions against Russia, vigorous support for Ukraine, and a friendly attitude toward allies—if just because Trump has taken the opposite stance on all three. It will be interesting to see how they reconcile these positions with fiscal priorities. Meanwhile, the Democrats are no doubt considering a more urgent Pentagon reform—getting rid of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Back in September, Rep. Thomas Massie, a Kentucky Republican, canvassed wide bipartisan support for an eight-point resolution of impeachment against Hegseth. House Speaker Mike Johnson ended the session, weeks ahead of schedule, in part to prevent the measure from coming up. Massie said on Monday that he would reintroduce the bill in the new Congress if Hegseth hasn’t been fired in the meantime. Hakeem Jeffries, who will most likely be elected the new speaker in January, chimed in that Congress would run Hegseth “out of town” if the Democrats took the majority. The Hill reported earlier this week that Senate Democrats have floated the idea of demanding Hegseth’s ouster as the price for passing any of Trump’s defense programs. Trump continues to tout Hegseth as a “great warrior.” But Trump has been known to throw even the loyalist of aides under the bus, if it serves his own interests. As the electoral losses piled up Tuesday night, Trump allowed in a Wall Street Journal interview that the war “was a piece of it.” The morning after, Vice President J.D. Vance went further, posting on social media, “The reason we lost is the war” and “everyone knows” it, adding, “The president himself said so last night.” Vance’s post might be seen as his opening bid to run for president in 2028—dissociating himself from Trump’s most disastrous policy but not from Trump. It’s a fine tightrope to navigate. What Trump does with Hegseth depends in part on what he wants to do in Iran. If he resumes bombing, as he said he might do after the midterms, then Hegseth provides useful cover. If he decides not to restart the war, as he also signaled might be the case a few days before the election, then Trump needs someone to blame for what he would now acknowledge is a mistake. Donald J. Trump doesn’t admit making mistakes. So, Hegseth would take the fall. Democrats Donald Trump Foreign Policy Iran 2026 Midterms