More Offensive, Fire Over the Baltic, Ballistics and Ball Bearings

More Offensive, Fire Over the Baltic, Ballistics and Ball Bearings

The Russians kept on attacking with little success this week, while the Ukrainians put in another super-complicated attack on St. Petersburg, resulting in many fires and several Russian helicopters lost in murky circumstances. Also, the Americans did more doofus peace stuff and probably throttled Starlink again. The front RUSSIAN ASSAULTS IN DONETSK REGIONJOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. These assaults are continuing. Drone units from the front are reporting record daily Russian casualty figures. There is fairly strong evidence this is not so much packs of Russian infantry attempting to infiltrate forward, as it is Ukrainian drone units seeking out Russian infantry assembly areas 20-30 kilometers (12.4-18.6 miles) behind the lines and attacking the occupants. This is being reported by multiple brigades within 1st Corps from the Dobropillia and Druzhkivka sector, as well as by drone units operating in that area. The evidence is very strong – I would say it’s already not possible to contest it – that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has concentrated Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) drone brigades in this sector – mass defensive firepower (drones) along the unbelievably predictable main Russian attack axis (paths towards total Russian control of the Donetsk region). Russian losses, per Ukrainian claims, are averaging more than 2,000 men a day for every day in November. In simple terms, this is the result of all the drone units, reduced foliage, and Russia’s continuing obsession with getting “advances” in the Donetsk region. In the images, two graphics illustrate how that’s playing out geographically; the numbers of losses are only confirmed ones and so shown as lower than they actually are, but they are still good indicators of how the Russian military leadership is burning through soldiers’ lives. Other Topics of Interest Swarms of Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs winged their way to southwestern Russia and torched yet another refinery and set more fuel storage reservoirs ablaze. LYMAN SECTOR – 3RD CORPS Hard fighting is still in progress here with the Ukrainians holding the initiative. Russian sources are reporting Ukrainian infantry across the Zherebets River in the vicinity of Yampolivka, and across Chornyi Zherebets River, within the central part of the village of Torske. The strength and intent of Ukrainian forces here isn’t really clear but seems stronger than patrols. Become the bush: Infantry scouts from 20th Infantry Brigade “Liubart” blend in with their surroundings. Image published by unit on Nov. 11, 2026. In the vicinity of Zarichne – the key to control of east-west movement in this sector – there’s house-to-house fighting going on with Ukrainian forces, reportedly holding the central and southern parts of the village, and making attacks to push further south toward Yampil and north to the Russian-held part of the village. Also, there is fighting in the forests between Zarichne and Yampil. The General Staff reported troops were even in combat “in the Kreminna” direction, which is a good 6-8 kilometers (3.7-5 miles) east from the last place we know Ukrainians are in strength. The defending force here reportedly is the 25th Combined Arms Army. The reports from the Russian side say the Ukrainians have the initiative, but it’s not for sure yet what they plan to do once they master the Zherebets River crossings. ZAPORIZHZHIA SECTOR – 7TH + 8TH AIR ASSAULT CORPS In the Hulyaipole/Zaporizhzhia sector, a Wednesday report from 7th Air Assault Corps said much the same thing: “Number of Assaults Triples as Enemy Increasingly Attempts to Move in Single-Person Groups.” The key thing is to understand that in the AFU parlance, when describing Russian combat activity, a single Russian soldier walking towards Ukrainian positions is by definition an “assault,” which is not quite as silly as it sounds, as the basic Russian attack tactic for more than a year has been to push small groups of infantry into an area and hope to accumulate enough for further advances. The 7th Corps reports were much the same as 1st Corps, to wit, the drone troops weren’t waiting for the Russians to accumulate but heading to their side of the lines and hunting for targets. Over the past weekend there was a big leak of Russian casualty data from Rosstat that had been reported on in fragmentary form before; the basic bottom line was that the Ukrainian estimate of 1.5 million Russian casualties seems fairly plausible, and 450,000-600,000 deaths seems also plausible. The OSINT community has been going through the figures and among the data points they’ve settled on is that yes, the Russian offensive towards and past Pokrovsk by far has been the single bloodiest thing the Russians have attempted in the entire war. Note that these numbers are just through August. Watermark is the source. This is an excellent graphic representation of where the most intense fighting has been in the war, and parallel with that, where the Russians have been trying hardest to gain ground. The outliers are the Krynky operation near Kherson and the Sudzha operation in Russia’s Kursk region where the Ukrainians attacked and inflicted very heavy casualties on the Russians, who eventually regained that ground. As above, source is watermarked. KHERSON/DNIPRO RIVER – UKRAINIAN MARINE CORPS A 34th Marine Brigade spokesman on Saturday told Radio Liberty that Ukrainian marines have landed on the Dnipro River left bank and that they are operating in several locations there and conducting “offensive operations” inland. I take that to mean patrols. The marines told Radio Liberty there are permanent marine positions on the left bank, that some of them are in villages, and that troop rotations take place regularly. The report did not say specifically – but implied strongly – that most of these amphibious operations are taking place in the lower Dnipro, which is a maze of canals, islands, reeds and swamps. Other reports say the marines are set up on islands in the river delta. As some readers remember from October 2023-July 2024, the AFU and the marines held a toehold on the left/south bank of the river around the village Krynky, but were forced to abandon it because Russian artillery and air strikes made the positions untenable and almost impossible to supply. Ukrainian capacity to supply troops in isolated positions has advanced geometrically since then, and it’s entirely reasonable to assume that now, marine positions on the left bank can be sustained almost indefinitely because the supply drones would keep on delivering beans and bullets and the observation and strike drones would prevent Russian ground forces from approaching within kilometers. But even though we can assume that’s taking place, what we can’t assume is that the Ukrainians will build a pontoon bridge and break through to Crimea next; for that they would need conventional air superiority or at least sufficient air defense to keep the Russian air force at bay. Which brings the discussion right back to Patriot interceptor missiles. DTEK Images of damage done by Russian strike on power substation, Saturday, collage by me. Russia bombards Ukraine On Saturday, Nov. 7, Russia launched another substantial ballistic missile and drone attack with a reported 36 missiles and 180 or so drones. The targets appear to have been power distribution stations in the middle of the country, the idea being to limit Ukraine’s ability to switch electricity to big cities. Also hit was the southern bridge across the Dnipro in Kyiv; road surface damage, power lines cut, trolley track broken. There were reports overnight via the US that currently Russian “peace talk” delegates are saying that Ukraine must accept all Russian terms; otherwise, Russia will destroy all of Ukraine’s power grid infrastructure along with transport nodes and bridges. Russia doesn’t have the firepower to do that, but that still seems to be their intent. Over the weekend, the Kyiv districts I was monitoring had six to eight hours of electricity a day, otherwise blackout. By the end of the week, the situation seemed about the same, possibly a little worse. On Sunday in Komyshuvakha, Zaporizhzhia region, the death toll rose to 55 people as rescue workers continued to dig through the remains on an underground protected site with hundreds of people the Russians bombed last week. As excavations were in progress, the Russians sent a first-person-view (FPV) drone to attack rescue workers. Drone shot down over Kyiv overnight Wednesday-Thursday (Nov. 11-12) was packed with anti-personnel steel balls and lies on street in Right Bank district of the city. Image source is watermarked. Overnight Wednesday to Thursday, Nov. 11-12, the Russians launched a medium-sized attack with mixed ballistic and anti-ship Zircon missiles, numbers not announced, and drones. Around 130 weapons were launched. Air defenses claimed 94 shootdowns, including 51 jet-powered Shaheds and five Banderol/Dan-T semi-cruise missiles, but no ballistic missiles. Strikes were reported at 17 locations. In Kyiv, a drone hit a nine-story apartment building in the Solomianskyi district, starting a fire and killing one woman and injuring five. On Friday, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said Ukrainian air defenses will benefit from new 20mm cannon shell deliveries to arm F-16s that fly to hunt Russian drones, but Patriot interceptor missiles are in critically short supply and so are NASAMS air defense missiles. Right now, on average, the AFU shoots down about 83% of jet-powered Russian drones and 91% of propeller-powered. Right now, the AFU is expanding its “cheap” means of stopping Russian drones, i.e. gun teams, interceptor drones and jammers, he said. St. Petersburg Kirishi oil refinery burns furiously following a Ukrainian drone strike on Saturday. The facility was already offline; the strike was meant to keep it that way and to determine where Russian air defenses were and weren’t in the area. Four days later, the Ukrainians would launch a bigger and even more effective attack on Ust-Luga port, Russia’s main oil loading terminal on the Baltic. NASA image cropped by me. Ukraine bombards Russia On Tuesday, the international news agencies (Reuters et al.) came out with new estimates of Russian refinery capacity: about 30% of the Russian Federation’s ability to process fossil fuel products is now offline thanks to what the Ukrainians are often calling “long-range sanctions,” i.e., setting the refinery on fire with a drone strike. Most affected have been the refineries in Ryazan, Yaroslavl, the Volga region and, to start off this week’s operations, the Kirishi refinery outside St. Petersburg, on Saturday. The most recent set on fire, as of Friday, were refineries in Volgograd and Samara. On Thursday it was the turn of Omsk oil refinery, 2,550 kilometers (1,585 miles) from Ukraine’s borders; the drones set multiple fires. This was the third time in 2026. Volgograd oil refinery burns after a drone strike early morning, Friday, Nov. 13, 2026. Image from Russian internet. As a result, for the first time in the war, widespread limits seemed to be in effect for automobile fuel purchases in Moscow – one report said 50 liters (13 gallons) per vehicle in the tank, +20 liters (5.3 gallons) if you have a jerrycan. This is still distinctly better than in Sevastopol where, Ukrainian channels say, fuel stations are dry except for police cars, ambulances and automobiles operated by government officials of sufficient status. On Wednesday, Nov. 11, the Ukrainians went beyond simply burning oil refineries. A big and quite complicated strike hit Ust-Luga, Russia’s main Baltic oil export port, west of St. Petersburg in the Leningrad region. Subsequent reports identified the Alpha special operations unit of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) as carrying out the attack. Specifically hit were petroleum storage tanks, a hydrocracking unit (one of three), air-cooling equipment, a pumping station, and a pier. Also hit was a wood products loading terminal and an LNG terminal, both of which were set afire. Allegedly, this is from a video recorded by a Russian helicopter over the Gulf of Finland, shortly before being shot down, of a Ukrainian drone releasing an air-to-air anti-aircraft missile on Wednesday, Nov. 11. This is not confirmed and other reports said the Russians lost three helicopters in airspace around St. Petersburg due to friendly fire. The image source is watermarked. Even worse for the Russians, there are credible reports that during the air battles on Wednesday, Nov. 11, defending those sites, St. Petersburg air defenses shot down a Ka-52 attack helicopter, an Mi-8 general-purpose helicopter, and a third aircraft, sometimes called a MiG-31 interceptor and sometimes another helicopter, in the confusion. All crew aboard all aircraft killed. Video has appeared showing one helicopter getting shot down at low altitude over the port. If confirmed, this would be the worst blue-on-blue incident suffered by the Russian Air Force since at least World War II. However, the next day Russian officials said, OK there were lost aircraft, we admit it, but it wasn’t Russian air defenses firing on friends. What it was, wasn’t made public. Later on Thursday, Nov. 12, another video surfaced purportedly showing a Ukrainian drone firing air-to-air missiles at a helicopter over the Gulf of Finland. There were even a few reports, unconfirmed, of the nefarious Ukrainians flying in a jammer aboard a drone that messed up Russian Air Force friend-or-foe electronic protocols. Russian air search radar purportedly in the St. Petersburg region allegedly taken out in the early phases of Wednesday strikes against Russian oil-loading facilities and warships. Image published on Friday, Nov. 13, 2026; source is watermarked. In some wars, that would sound like silly science fiction, but in this war, well, who can say the Ukrainians didn’t do it, because for sure the Ukrainians have been thinking about it. Still, all in all, I lean towards the missile-toting drone version of events. A wrinkle in the speculation is that the very quick public release of what should have been secure Russian air battle video (i.e., a cam on a Russian air force helicopter recording a, well, hostile drone launching a missile at it) is certainly a possible indicator that someone in NATO with excellent EW capacity was intercepting the data feed. One suspects both Estonia and Finland are countries more willing to stick it to the Russian military, and generally more capable in electronic warfare, than say the Italians or Greeks. So maybe someone in Tallinn or Helsinki got tired of all the jamming of civil aviation from Kronstadt Island and decided to retaliate somehow. Maybe even someone seditious or near retirement in the NSA pulled it off behind the White House’s back. Nor was that the end of it. During the same attack/air battle over the eastern Baltic Sea, a “special operation” conducted by either the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) or the Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck and damaged a Russian Navy Buyan-M missile boat some 180 kilometers (112 miles) west of St. Petersburg in the Gulf of Finland, about equidistant from Finland and Estonia near an island called Gogland. Damage to the vessel named Naro-Fominsk was reported, along with killed and injured. Supposedly, she was still under power and en route to Kronstadt. See the pattern? First, the Ukrainians hit a target near the main objective to gauge the strength and location of the air defenses and wear them down. Next, a little later (in this case 96 hours) the Ukrainians return with a bigger attack against the highest-value target (oil tanker loading facility) in the vicinity and the strike seems well-calculated to stress the local air defense network to the maximum. At the same time, a high-value secondary target under the responsibility of the general Russian area air defense command was hit (a missile boat), to take advantage of Russian air defenses being distracted. At the same time, i.e., at the moment of maximum Russian confusion, the Ukrainians unveiled an unexpected new battle technology (interference with Russian IFF, or drones carrying air-to-air missiles, or both, or something else). Long-time readers of this review will see this is another page from a Ukrainian playbook used for years: they are very much inclined towards complex, multi-step operations that stack the odds heavily in the Ukrainians’ favor. This is a fuel train derailed in far northern Russia in the Arkhangelsk Region on the Cheremukha– Viled section of the line. The bridge goes over the Viled River and it’s pretty much the only practical way to move heavy freight between civilized Russian locations like Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan, and northwestern Russia locations like Syktyvkar, Ukhta and godforsaken places like Pechora and Vorkuta in Komi Region. All those places are huge oil centers that the Ukrainians would love to cut off from Russia’s oil exports. Image is a screengrab from Russian state TV. For most countries, that would have been more than enough effort for a single week’s long-range strike operations. The second-most interesting Ukrainian strike of the week took place on Tuesday, Nov. 10, when a series of explosions hit the 123rd Aviation Repair Plant in Novgorod region. This is a rare site that repairs heavy Russian Air Force aircraft, including the A-50, which is the Russian AWACS. That plane is critical to Russian air force capacity; most analysts think there are only six or seven. The Ukrainians have been hunting them all war and probably have destroyed two in the air and at least one on the ground, and each time it was a typical Ukrainian combined operation with all manner of prep work and stacking odds, so when the actual strike went in it was effective. This is a historically significant image: Ukrainian commando salutes crowd of civilians in Kherson on Nov. 11, 2022, following liberation of that city from Russian occupation. In Ukraine, Kherson watermelons are highly popular and considered the tastiest, and for most, a preferred fruit over Mediterranean and Central Asian imports. What’s known for sure is the site was hit; the General Staff confirmed it and said an A-50 was targeted, while the Novgorod governor said there was insignificant damage from “falling debris” and all the Ukrainian drones were shot down. When the Ukrainians last hit this site, on March 17, they claimed they blew holes in a hangar servicing an Il-76 heavy cargo, L-410 twin turboprop and an A-50 long-range radar detection (AWACS) aircraft inside, damaging all three. In that strike, the Ukrainians used drones This is a stock photo of the main workshop of 123rd Aviation Repair Plant in Novgorod. They fix heavy jets for the Russian military and air transport industry. Ukraine considers this site a prime target because Russian AWACS planes get repaired here. This time in the wake of the strike, no less than TASS reported that US-made AGM-188A ‘Rusty Dagger’ cruise missiles carried out the attack and that four had been shot down, and then a few hours later, that official announcement was taken down and the TASS position changed to the strike on Novgorod hadn’t happened and there never were any American weapons. The Ukrainian OSINT crowd got busy and decided that if the Ukrainian air force really tried hard and decided to risk several MiG-29 or F-16 fighters, a Rusty Dagger launched by one of those planes might just have the range to reach Novgorod, but it would be a serious risk. Ukraine’s General Staff confirmed the strike took place and said it was effective, but no info on what they used. The Novgorod governor said there was a “massive” drone attack, but everything was shot down, and there was no damage. So AGM-188A use here is far from confirmed. In other Ukrainian strike news, Khmara, on Friday, said that the AFU so far has destroyed 12 Iskander-M ballistic missile launchers. This is a still from video published by 412th USF Brigade “Nemesis” recorded by an FP-2 drone in the terminal phase of a strike against a reinforced concrete shelter built for Shahed drones at Donetsk airport. The Ukrainian drone operator appears to be aiming their attack so that their aircraft bypasses the reinforced concrete walls by flying through the hangar door. Image and video were published by the unit on Tuesday, Nov. 10, 2026. Starstupidity On Thursday, Nov. 12, Ukraine’s military leadership announced the Americans are again slowing down Starshield so that terminals operating on it won’t work if moving at speeds above 160 kph (99 mph). This seems to be geographical in effect, i.e., in Russia-occupied parts of Ukraine and along the front lines it wasn’t working, but deeper inside Ukraine everything was OK. As before, it wasn’t working over Russian Federation territory as it never has. No comment from the US side as of Thursday evening. Most speculation is that the “neutral American mediators” turned off the link to pressure the Ukrainians into capitulating to Russia. (See peace talks). Within hours, the 105-member bipartisan House Ukraine Caucus put out an open letter demanding answers from the Trump admin and SpaceX over the loss of Starshield access, and immediate restoration of service. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine was working to figure out what happened. He also pointed out that his impression was that “someone in the US” is treating Ukrainian sovereign territory occupied by Russia as Russian Federation territory and so making it non-operational for SpaceX coverage. Over the week, there were three reports, with video, of Ukraine’s mid-range drone forces carrying out impressive strikes against Russian drone launch sites in Crimea and the Donetsk region. Interestingly, at least one of those air raids (on Donetsk airport by the 412th USF Brigade “Nemesis”) used FP-2 drones, which are bigger aircraft normally used for long-range strikes but – wait for it – don’t operate on Starlink/Starshield, but rather on GPS and radio. Bigger warheads too. Some video showed sharp images of rows of reinforced concrete Shahed drone hangars that the Nemesis pilots were attacking by flying through the hangars’ open doors. Also, evidence is accumulating that the Ukrainians are operating a European-Israeli alternative to Starlink which is less capable than Elon Musk’s product, but neither he nor Donald Trump nor Pete Hegseth can mess with it – article on that is here. US envoy Steve Witkoff (left) and US envoy Jared Kushner (right) display Russian national team ski jackets gifted to them by a Russian apparatchik (center) in Moscow on Thursday, Nov. 12, 2026 prior to a round of Russia-Ukraine War-related talks with the Kremlin. Some might say the optics of the photograph undermine the US team’s claim that it is a fair broker between Russia and Ukraine. (Image is a screengrab from CNN video published on Nov. 12, 2026) Peace talks Russo-Ukrainian peace talks theoretically “brokered” by the US started off in the United Arab Emirates on Wednesday, Nov. 11 ended on Thursday, Nov. 12, after which the Americans flew to Moscow and kowtowed to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian state media had a field day showing the US negotiators embracing the Russian negotiators, and then showing Putin telling the Americans – surprise – Russia hasn’t backed off a jot on its demands, and for sure Russia is winning. Putin even told US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to their faces that Kostiantynivka is under Russian control, and I am here to tell you I monitor multiple soldier chat groups from units deployed there, all of which are Ukrainian. So, in other words, an American clown show and truly embarrassing behavior by a country that calls itself the leader of the developed world and a democracy. In general, the main US move was to suggest a “deal” by which the war would end by Ukraine turning over to Russia all territory Russia occupies and formalizing new international borders along existing battle lines. This kind of proposition has been rejected by Ukraine for years; the Ukrainians said that, going into the talks, they wouldn’t even consider an offer like that, and that making an offer like that would be a waste of time. The Americans formally tabled the idea, and the Ukrainians rejected it. Noteworthy is that, as before, the Americans pitched no concessions by Russia whatsoever, as far as can be told from news reports. Zelensky, perhaps attempting to make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, so to speak, said that there had been a bit of progress in that the Americans have accepted the Ukrainian version of the front line (i.e., the accurate one), over the Russian version (i.e., a fictional one claiming Russian troops hold a lot of Ukrainian territory the Ukrainians very obviously control). Note that less than 24 hours later, Putin told the Americans no: the official Russian frontline trace is real; everything else is lies. The Ukrainians tabled their counterproposals, to wit an energy ceasefire ending attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure, a maritime ceasefire ending attacks on each other’s merchant shipping, and a grain ceasefire ending attacks on each other’s grain transportation and storage infrastructure. Compared to the US-Russian suggestion on land, the Ukrainian pitch was more sensible in that it incorporated concessions and benefits, roughly equal, to both sides. The Russians rejected it immediately and said they preferred either a grand agreement rewriting the European security rules, or just more fighting. Putin rejected it on Thursday, Nov. 12 and said no change to any of Russia’s peace conditions. From the Ukrainian perspective (and probably the Russian as well), US-sourced reports that “peace is near” seem absolutely ludicrous; only an ignorant fool would suggest it. NATO non-action If you thought NATO would go a week without looking like it’s incapable of carrying out its main job and base mission – preventing Russian attack on NATO – you need to think again. Overnight Tuesday-Wednesday, Nov. 10-11, so simultaneously with the giant Ukrainian strike vs. greater St. Petersburg, NATO air defense networks first reported four drones approaching from Belarus, of which one flew into Lithuania and travelled north. Authorities issued a “red” air threat alert, closed local airports, and scrambled fighters. Three attempted intercepts failed, once because civilian buildings were too close, and twice because the fighter engaged the drone but couldn’t hit it. There weren’t early reports on whose drone it was, but emergency response teams found (extremely expensive) NATO air-to-air missile debris near a village called Birža. The drone meanwhile flew into Latvia. The same night, Latvian air defense forces reported they detected three drones entering national airspace, two crossing the country’s eastern border near the village Ludza and the third entering from Lithuania. Latvian forces activated interceptor drones, ground-based air-defense units and fighter jets but failed to engage any of the drones, in part because of “civilian safety.” The third drone flew on to Estonia. The same night, but a bit later, Estonia detected a single drone approaching and then entering Estonian airspace from the south, and crossing Estonia to fly (back into) Russia. Other drones “involved in the Ukrainian attack on Ust-Luga” flew close to Estonia or crossed into Estonia airspace over the Gulf of Finland. Turkish NATO fighter jets based in Estonia monitored the drone but didn’t engage it, nor did ground-based Estonian air defenses. According to the Estonians, most likely this was a Ukrainian drone, and therefore Estonia’s Defense Ministry wrote a mean letter to the Ukrainians telling them it’s not OK to use Estonian airspace to attack places in Russia. On the one hand, this for Ukraine was a positive outcome; at least one and possibly four drones that went on to attack Russia were not interfered with by NATO air defenses. On the other hand, just to take the single drone, early on Wednesday morning an illegal aircraft flying at about 160 kph (99 mph) flew about 450 kilometers (280 miles) across Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, in the process triggering the launch of four to six NATO fighter jets to intercept, and the entire NATO air defense network so mobilized wasn’t able to shoot down that one single drone. Meanwhile, the same night, the Russians launched something on the order of 200 drones at Ukraine, of which an actual air defense network that actually is effective – you know, the Ukrainians across the border – shot down or otherwise destroyed 163 Russian drones, including 40-50 jet-powered drones. With no irony whatsoever, NATO on Wednesday, Nov. 11, announced it was seriously considering “reprioritizing continental defense” over expeditionary operations. This, after nearly five years of war in Ukraine and all the stuff Russia has been doing for the past 15 years or so. Also, the Afghanistan War’s been over for five years. Chief Navigator of Russia’s 6th Air Force Colonel Dmitry Lobodin died in a St. Petersburg car-bomb explosion typical of Ukrainian special operations assassinations of senior Russian officials for complicity in air strikes against civilians in Ukraine. Undated stock image, Russian internet. Another one bites the dust Apologies for the ironic section title but seriously, this isn’t stopping and people need to acknowledge it. On Thursday, Nov. 12, the Chief Navigator of Russia’s 6th Air Force, Colonel Dmitry Lobodin, 51, died in a car bombing typical of Ukrainian special operations assassinations of senior Russian officials, on Kolpinskoye Highway in St. Petersburg. Local media swarmed the site, and local social media thoroughly reported details. As it turned out, the blast killed him about 400 meters (1,312 feet) from his home at about 7 a.m. It was still dark. A bus carrying 30-40 passengers was caught in the shockwave, which shattered two of its windows; none of the passengers were injured. Lobodin, in the Russian hierarchy of alleged war crimes, was a senior operator and technical planner because the 6th Air Force based in western Russia has attacked civilian targets frequently, and theoretically all of those strikes he would have signed off on, if not organized. By afternoon, Russian news channels were passing around the photograph of a young man, with dreadlocks, identified as “Yan,” who purportedly set the bomb in Lobodin’s inexpensive Chinese sedan. The story is that a 31-year-old resident of the Pskov region who got a job a block away from Lobodin’s home watched the Colonel go back and forth to work for a month, then rigged the bomb to his car and flew away to Turkey, and then to Moldova. Reports aren’t clear as to his nationality, and again, there is no reliable confirmation of any of this. However, assuming “Yan” somehow was a Ukrainian secret agent, if I were a conspiratorial type, I might point out that the Ukrainians have been making all manner of trouble with the operation of St. Petersburg’s major airports for the better part of two weeks, but on Thursday, Nov. 12, they took a break. Probably a coincidence, and we really have no confirmation that Yan is even real. This is “Yan,” a 31-year-old the Russian internet thinks carried out an assassination of a Russian colonel who helped bomb Ukraine. Not at all confirmed. Image source is watermarked. The most notorious air attacks linked to 6th Air Force are: (1) Intense bombing of civilian targets in Sumy between March 5-10, 2022 with more than 100 civilian structures including residential buildings, schools, kindergartens and a health complex damaged or destroyed by Russian bombs, 15 civilians including children killed (2) Epicentr hypermarket bombing in Kharkiv on May 25, 2024, the building was hit by three guided bombs dropped by a 6th Air Force Su-34, 19 civilians including two children killed, 46 injured. I have written it before, and I write it again: all these peace talks are silly. Look how the Ukrainians are going after people they consider Russian war criminals; is it reasonable to think the Ukrainians are going to stop hunting these people just because (someday) there is a ceasefire on the front line? The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

Original Source

Read the full article at Kyivpost →

KhanList aggregates and links to publicly available news content. We do not host full articles from third-party sources. Always verify important information with original sources.