FAA Ground Stop Blamed On Elon Musk—Here’s Why That’s Ridiculous

FAA Ground Stop Blamed On Elon Musk—Here’s Why That’s Ridiculous

Friday’s nationwide FAA ground stop followed a contractor’s router installation in Arkansas. Now the story is becoming about Elon Musk: a claim that DOGE cut FAA employees, oversight was loosened, and this led to the flight stoppage. There’s a real oversight question here. It long predates DOGE. In fact it goes back decades. And even there, the connection between specific oversight failures and what actually happened hasn’t been made. Anyone writing about this needs to at least know that an L3Harris contractor’s router configuration error caused a nationwide air traffic disruption in 2009, too. And federal investigators criticized the FAA’s oversight after that incident! FAA problems did not begin with DOGE. A Router Change Disrupted The National Network The November 13 nationwide departure stop began at 3:54 p.m. Eastern and lasted until 8:15 p.m. Aircraft already airborne continued landing. The FAA’s preliminary account describes excessive connection attempts flooding its telecommunications network. Instability affected 17 of 22 enroute centers and spread to approach facilities. L3Harris had installed a router at a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas. Investigators also identified a radar site in Amarillo, Texas. Blocking those sites stabilized the network, and officials disabled the relevant function on more than 60 similar routers. FAA Oversight Has Been A Problem, Long Before DOGE One Mile at a Time links the failure to DOGE, drawing on CNN’s reporting about a March 2025 maintenance memo. According to CNN, contractor maintenance shifted from requests requiring approval to notifications that could proceed without explicit approval. Liaisons were still supposed to evaluate the work, but there was a small staff handling thousands of notices. Bedford said the contractor was monitored and a risk assessment occurred. The technicians’ union says the FAA employee merely provided access. An FAA spokesperson later admitted that the escort doesn’t remain during work on L3 equipment. (To be sure, the union saying none of its members performing a risk assessment doesn’t mean nobody performed one.) Additional FAA review might have caught a problem the contractor missed. It’s speculative to suggest that FAA supervision, rathe rthan contractor supervision would have made a difference. And CNN itself describes a chronic technician shortage stretching back years – that I’ve written about several times – as a reason for the policy change. One Mile at a Time though says Elon Musk’s DOGE laid off hundreds of FAA employees, making for the biggest single year layoffs at the organization in history.In fact, the FAA fired 11,400 controllers in 1981. Here there’s no identified fired employee or eliminated review position connected to this installation. Moreover, the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists union announced that its 132 fired probationary employees were being reinstated with back pay, with a March 20, 2025 return date. There were other departures. And it’s plausible DOGE was counterproductive here. I disagreed with the effort overall and didn’t expect success. But there’s just not been anything more than insinuation that that effort was related to Friday’s ground stop. A Harris Router Caused A Nationwide Disruption In 2009 On November 19, 2009, a Harris technician’s router configuration error disrupted the FAA telecommunications network during a transition to fiber. The Transportation Department’s inspector general found that roughly 75% of network routes were blocked. Restoration took five hours. Monitoring failed, and technicians struggled to locate the source. It also found that FAA oversight should have been more effective. Investigators had already called for better equipment configuration controls in 2008. The 2009 outage primarily affected flight planning and data services. But contractor router work, a problem spreading through the network, slow fault detection, and inadequate FAA oversight were documented together in a federal report sixteen years ago with this network and this contractor. The FAA struggled long before the current administration. And maintenance problems go back even further: Government auditors documented a 1997–2000 Alaska experiment that lengthened maintenance intervals and relied heavily on running equipment until failure. A July 2024 aviation industry coalition letter traced a shift toward fixing equipment after it failed to the 2013 budget sequester. As I covered in March, Bob Poole’s reporting describes decades of technician cuts. His sources put the decline at more than 6,600 technicians to roughly 4,000. Insufficient staffing and poor implementation make fixing things after they fail the general path FAA appears to have taken. I Was Skeptical Of DOGE Before Any Of This Happened Musk himself warned about this exact network on February 27, 2025. He claimed an FAA assessment put it “single digit months to catastrophic failure.” He initially blamed Verizon, then corrected himself the same day (the deteriorating system was L3Harris’s). . Elon Musk’s February 27, 2025 correction identifying L3Harris’s legacy network It’s hard to blame Musk when he was literally warning about failure of this specific network. And it shows the FAA was aware of risk that predated the current administration. Indeed, DOGE was aware of the risk, and its titular head shouted it from the rooftops. I was skeptical that DOGE would fix the FAA when Duffy first invited Musk’s team in. It was asking for a cat, provided it barked. Government agencies behave as they do because of their incentives. Their problems aren’t generally that nobody smart enough or sufficiently determined has shown up to fix them. Cutting employees without changing procurement, funding, and accountability can leave the same dysfunctional institution with less ability to do its work. Singapore is an unusual example of building substantial state capacity, something of an outlier. Lee Kuan Yew deliberately recruited top talent into a prestigious public service, promoted on merit, strengthened corruption enforcement, and later added high pay. Its competence was built through institutions, rewards, and consequences. We get the government that we have for public choice reasons, and because of median voters. Three are companies that benefit from the way the system works, employees themselves, and both groups have much greater incentive to pay attention to the details than the average citizen. The programs we have, that many even deem wasteful, exist for a reason – not because of systemic incompetence. Someone benefits! The FAA Has Spent Decades Failing To Deliver Promised Upgrades The FAA was testing replacements for paper flight strips in 1983. It’s still rolling them out. Canada completed its commercial airport and terminal facility rollout by 2006, according to the Eno Transportation Center’s history of the two countries’ efforts. The inspector general’s review of NextGen shows more than $15 billion spent through 2024 and relatively little to show for it. And this administration is repeating familiar mistakes. In September, the Government Accountability Office found 11,389 separate project schedules for the latest modernization efforts, including installations at the same sites without coordinating them to minimize operational disruption. The FAA operates air traffic control and regulates its safety. Different offices handle those jobs, but they remain inside the same agency. The International Civil Aviation Organization guidance calls for independent oversight and separation of responsibilities. The FAA’s 2023 independent safety review found lack of that separation, noting that the oversight office needed the operating organization’s concurrence to gather information. The regulated operation could impede the regulator inside the same agency. I’ve laid out the Canadian alternative. NAV CANADA is a separate nonprofit with stakeholder governance and no equity shareholders. It charges users and finances investment with debt instead of waiting for Congress to fund each year’s portion of a long term project. Transport Canada regulates it. The Response To Failure Is Another Request For Billions One Mile at a Time is right to say “There obviously won’t be any accountability with this situation.” But this has been a problem across administrations. An organization that repeatedly misses its technology goals gets to use the resulting obsolescence as an argument for even more money. As I wrote this week, most of the $30.1 billion Modern Skies Act doesn’t even go to air traffic control (a majority goes to airports, primarily St. Louis – in the home state of the bill’s Senate sponsor). Now the administration wants $50 billion. Proposal Air Traffic Systems And Facilities Airport Projects $30.1 billion Modern Skies Act $12.1 billion $18 billion $50.1 billion administration request $30.1 billion $20 billion The new $50.1 billion request includes new control centers and towers as well as technology, but still bundles $20 billion in airport infrastructure and terminal spending into the response to a communications failure. Congress already supplied $12.5 billion last year. More investment may be needed. Users, not taxpayers, should be funding this. And real reforms are needed before handing the FAA tens of billions after their failed management processes squander the last tens of billions. Topics on this page

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