Cuba at the end of Trump

Cuba at the end of Trump

With the Republican Party’s defeat in the U.S. midterm elections, the final and perilous stage of Donald Trump’s presidency begins. Perilous because the president now finds himself in the minority in Congress, because the Democratic gains amount to a rebuke of his policies, and because the battle over the 2028 presidential succession could become considerably more difficult if the Republican leadership decides to distance itself from him in search of a candidate better positioned to take on the opposition.As opposition to the war in Iran gains ground in Congress and Washington’s rapprochement with the government of Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela recedes as a political issue, one card remains in the administration’s hand: Cuba. The reelection of the three Cuban American members of Congress from Florida showed that the promise of the “liberation of Cuba” still carries electoral weight, even if signs of voter fatigue are becoming apparent. The latest threats of invasion are Washington’s response to discontent in Miami.The question is whether that promise will take on a different form from the one that has prevailed over the past year. Since the military operation in Caracas, the arrest of Nicolás Maduro, and the executive order that tightened the oil embargo on Cuba, the Trump administration has pursued a strategy that combines threats of a full-scale invasion or a targeted military operation with an escalating sanctions regime, ostensibly aimed at weakening the economic and political power of Cuba’s ruling elite.The latest crackdown on independent journalists and activists on the island has made clear that that power remains intact. The Cuban government has failed in its efforts to persuade allies such as Russia or Mexico to break the energy blockade, but it has proved effective at maintaining internal control and preventing a social uprising, despite living conditions that are arguably worse for much of the population than during the Special Period of the 1990s or the pandemic years at the start of this decade.The punitive logic behind Washington’s sanctions on Cuba has always pursued one of two possible outcomes: either the regime’s internal collapse or negotiations with the United States. An invasion, which has remarkably regained the broad support it enjoyed among the historic Cuban exile community of the 1960s, would effectively eliminate both possibilities at once. The lesson of this year, when the United States has been in its strongest geopolitical position to confront Cuba militarily since the Cold War, is that if there is neither external military action nor an internal rebellion, the only feasible outcome is negotiation.What kind of negotiation? In the various feelers exchanged this year, the Cuban government has made its position clear: it wants limited economic opening, even at the risk of making the system more oligarchic, unequal, unproductive and dependent, but without undertaking the political reforms that many sectors on the island and in the Cuban diaspora consider both necessary and achievable at relatively low cost. The Trump administration, and especially the State Department led by Marco Rubio, has shown no willingness to accept that deal.In practice, Cuba has become more structurally dependent on the United States than at any other point in its history. But that does not appear to be enough for Washington, or, above all, for Miami. Beyond the electoral dynamics of the Cuban-American community, still tied to the promise of the “liberation of Cuba,” Donald Trump and Marco Rubio may be trying to devise an arrangement that their Cuban-American supporters would perceive as something close to “regime change.”If that is the case and negotiations resume in the coming months, the process will have to contend with at least three constituencies: the sector of the Cuban-American community most committed to a confrontational approach; hard-line factions within Cuba itself; and Havana’s more ideological international support network, which, in the name of “solidarity,” not only strongly opposes any negotiation with the United States but also rejects the island’s recent market-oriented reforms.That anti-opening reaction is not new among any of those three groups, but today it is weaker than ever. With the decline of Trumpism, the confrontational wing of the Cuban exile community is losing influence. Within Cuba itself, the most hard-line defenders of continuity, at least in the economic sphere, no longer wield the same clout. And Cuba’s potential international allies — China, Russia, Brazil and Mexico — are not challenging Washington over the island. Concrete international support is limited to long-standing solidarity networks that champion democracy, markets and good relations with the United States in their own countries, but not in Cuba.Although weaker, these reactions may achieve what they have always achieved: derailing negotiations and preserving the status quo. In essence, the latter would mean more of what Cuba experienced in 2026, to the detriment of the island’s low-income majority: sanctions and more sanctions from Washington, alongside an unrelenting increase in poverty, inequality, shortages and repression in Cuba.Sign up for our weekly newsletter to get more English-language news coverage from EL PAÍS USA Edition

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