Without allies and partners, the US risks being alienated from the global intelligence networks it built

WASHINGTON—This week, Jay Clayton marked one month as the US director of national intelligence (DNI). One of his responsibilities is navigating intelligence cooperation with allies and partners, along with broader management of the intelligence community, which is in considerable turmoil. At his confirmation hearing, however, Clayton’s opening statement to congressional committees neglected to identify foreign intelligence cooperation as a priority or concern, continuing the administration’s go-it-alone tone, even if by omission. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is examining military “intelligence architectures and infrastructure that enable U.S. global power projection,” during its force posture review of Europe, raising concerns that military intelligence relationships could be assessed based on subjective political considerations. US allies and partners are reassessing their intelligence needs and vulnerabilities—and the trend is toward greater autonomy. The Swedish parliament recently approved legislative amendments necessary to create a new civilian foreign intelligence agency to improve strategic warning, build human intelligence, and better integrate intelligence in the wake of the Ukraine war. Swedish policymakers have reportedly based their revised community structure on Estonia’s model, underscoring a tilt toward regionalized intelligence cooperation and best practices. Such steps likely reflect both the realities of a more contested geopolitical environment and allies’ diminishing confidence in the US intelligence system to provide information without conditions or filters. Changes in intelligence cooperation dynamics are visible within Five Eyes, the enduring intelligence partnership and information-sharing structure among the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Allegations last year that former DNI Tulsi Gabbard, Clayton’s predecessor, ordered the intelligence community to withhold details on the Russia-Ukraine peace negotiation process raised concerns about US capriciousness. While working-level cooperation appears to persist, some observers in the United Kingdom were jarred, too, when a veteran intelligence official was reportedly passed over, after drawing the ire of Trump supporters, raising concerns of politicization of a deeply intricate and vital bilateral intelligence relationship. For the first time since World War II, Japan is creating a centralized intelligence body, which analysts argue lays the groundwork for a foreign intelligence agency that would capture human, signals, and other intelligence sources. For decades, malign actors exploited the nation’s weak espionage laws and supply chain vulnerabilities, with stolen Japanese technology reportedly making its way to the Russian side of the battlefield in Ukraine. Although not without domestic controversy, this move has the potential to render Japan’s intelligence structures more autonomous and presents an opportunity for the United States to gain access to new intelligence sources, if the relationship with the reformed Japanese system is managed well. Of course, intelligence sharing goes both ways, and the reluctance to share intelligence may be happening in the other direction as well. Late last year, the United Kingdom and Canada reportedly halted intelligence sharing on drug boats in the Caribbean, believing that US strikes violate international law. Meanwhile, in Australia, intelligence experts have flagged “ongoing US intelligence community dysfunction” as a key concern, with some calling for the nation to conduct a classified internal audit to identify areas of dependency on Washington to develop sovereign capabilities. The fear of politicized intelligence, concerns about US unilateralism eroding sensitive channels, and general divergences from US policy priorities have fostered growing unease among core allies. US intelligence cooperation with Ukraine has reportedly improved, which is welcome news, but Ukraine and its allies now know that it can be taken away at any time. In addition to enabling more aggressive Ukrainian strikes on Russia, the United States stands to gain from Ukraine’s intelligence on Russia. But the damage was never solely about the interruption itself. By demonstrating that intelligence sharing could be paused and resumed with shifting political priorities, the episode injected uncertainty into an active battlespace that depends on consistency and trust. Although operational security remains critical, such decisions risk alienating allies and weakening intelligence cooperation, undercutting the valuable information and context the US intelligence community receives from its partners. The Iran war produced another example. The United States and Israel allegedly failed to notify Gulf partners in the opening days of the conflict. In the Gulf, questions about the United States’ reliability as a security guarantor have reportedly amplified intra-Gulf cooperation, including intelligence sharing. The emergence of more regionalized intelligence-sharing constellations is not inherently problematic or unexpected. What is troubling is the incentive behind them: If allies create them because they doubt US reliability, then the United States risks being gradually sidelined from networks that have long served as a force multiplier for US intelligence collection and analysis. There are few scenarios where a more fragmented or siloed intelligence picture makes the United States safer. To malign actors, a US intelligence community with weakening ties to allies and partners signals opportunity. Whereas the United States is seemingly turning away from foreign partners, core US adversaries are working in concert against the United States. The drones Iran once sent to Moscow to fuel its war effort in Ukraine, for example, have been returned to Iran with battle-tested upgrades and are supported by reported Russian targeting intelligence on US facilities in the region. China, meanwhile, has exported dual-use technology to Russia in exchange for military intelligence and training, potentially in preparation for an invasion of Taiwan. The present geopolitical environment leaves little room for a disjointed US intelligence community—and definitely not for a diminished intelligence picture. Clayton takes on the DNI role at a pivotal moment in the future of the global US intelligence enterprise. As he leads the US intelligence community, allies will continue to weigh their dependence on US intelligence against other arrangements. As adversaries deepen their coordination and increasingly translate that cooperation into new threats against the United States, including those accelerated by artificial intelligence, Clayton and the US intelligence community should prioritize preserving US reliability as an intelligence partner, not least to prevent Washington’s own intelligence needs from being sidelined to its detriment. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official positions or views of the US government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government authentication of information or endorsement of the authors’ views.