Concerns about the dim economic prospects of Latin America have continued over the past several decades. Most of the developmental challenges that Latin America and the Caribbean face—vast inequalities, autocratic government, dependence on natural resources, exploitation by colonial or neo-colonial powers—are depicted in Diego Rivera’s murals of conquistadores landing in Veracruz in 1519, which are hosted at the National Palace in Mexico City. The social and economic ills that haunted the continent in the 16th century persist in the 21st century. But you might begin to doubt the pessimistic thesis that Latin America’s underwhelming economic performance is eternal once you compare the continent’s economic performance in the last quarter of the 20th and the first quarter of the 21st centuries. In the late 1980s, unsustainable government debt in Peru fueled price increases that peaked at nearly 3000% annually. But by the early 2000s, Peru had capably reduced the level and the composition of its public debt to the point where credit rating agencies classified its government debt as “investment grade.” When Mario Vargas Llosa, the great Peruvian novelist, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2010, you could argue the country had ascended the heights of economic and cultural excellence alike. Even more remarkable, during both periods of hyperinflation and economic stability Peru had the same president: Alan García. Clearly something had changed. Latin America’s experience of the past two and a half decades provides reasons for optimism for the next 25 years. As in the Peruvian example, the optimism stems in part from improved economic statecraft. Latin American countries weathered the 2007-2009 financial crisis better than most of the rich countries. And a mixture of changes in labor markets and aggressive and innovative anti-poverty policies led to historic declines in economic inequality. Yet our optimism should be cautious. In the spring of 2019, Alan García ended up taking his own life when police entered his Lima home to arrest him on corruption charges in a scandal that rocked many countries. A year later, COVID shut down the world, and the Latin American economies fared relatively worse compared to most other countries during the pandemic, in part because the prevalence of informal employment made it hard for people to self-isolate. Over the past quarter century, growth in many Latin American countries has been driven by a deepening dependence on commodities such as petroleum, copper, and soybeans, increasingly exported to China. That reliance has delayed the shift toward higher-productivity industries such as manufacturing—the path that led many Asian countries to rapid growth and development. Even as China’s average income level converges with that of the United States, Latin America is falling further behind. Meanwhile, new challenges have emerged that will demand an even greater mobilization of resources and talent.Reforms in Latin AmericaLatin America’s improved economic statecraft can be seen in its stronger fiscal performance: in taxation, spending, and the management of public debt. This progress is rooted in improved economic institutions and a pragmatic approach to ideology. Mexico’s economic reforms of the 1990s provide a telling example: entering the North American free trade area, granting autonomy to the central bank and the Supreme Court, and creating an autonomous electoral authority. Consider, too, the case of Chile: Copper makes up around 10% to 12% of the country’s GDP, and the fiscal rule Chile adopted in the 2000s helps buffer the country from exposure to wild swings in global copper prices. Such changes may not translate into immediate increases in economic growth, but they provide the basis for more sustainable growth over the long run. Recent decades have also seen the emergence of pragmatic approaches to economic policymaking in Latin America in what economist Javier Santiso has called “possibilist” states. Often, such states pursue orthodox macroeconomic policies—fiscal restraint, anti-inflationary monetary policy and cautious management of public debt—reassuring global capital markets. Yet this macroeconomic conservatism is paired with a progressive set of policies aimed at combating poverty and inequality in ways that Cold War-era governments were reluctant to pursue. The left-leaning governments of Chile’s Concertación coalition that governed the country from 1990 to 2010 after the end of Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship exemplify this pragmatism. They retained conservative macroeconomic policies inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship—policies the coalition’s leaders had once resisted at great personal risk—while reducing poverty through conditional cash transfers and universal pensions. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s governments in Brazil added a third element to the possibilist recipe: “neo-developmentalist” strategies intended to transform the structure of the economy itself, with the country’s colossal national development bank taking the lead. Neo-developmentalism reaches back to the ambitious developmentalist states of the 20th century, including Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira’s Brazil, Miguel Alemán Valdés’ Mexico, and Juan Domingo Perón’s Argentina. These leaders doubted the capacity of the global markets to bring about the changes they deemed necessary and changed the course of the continent in the process. Tomorrow’s challengesNeo-developmentalist states seek to avoid the fiscal mismanagement that too often undermined their predecessors. Possibilist and neo-developmentalist states are not only feasible but likely necessary to address the challenges ahead. Their tasks include transforming low-productivity economies dependent on commodities into high-productivity economies driven by manufacturing. They must also confront the emerging 21st-century challenges that Latin America’s first generation of developmentalists could scarcely have imagined. The first challenge is the green energy transition. The key obstacle is the sheer scale of the investment required. Estimates vary, but they suggest that investment in green energy across Latin America in the coming decades will need to reach five to ten times the roughly $20 billion currently being invested in the sector. The second is the familiar challenge of reducing the region’s extraordinary inequality, now complicated by the rise of artificial intelligence, which is already beginning to transform labor markets, global commerce, and our understanding of inequality itself. The third, and perhaps most fundamental, challenge is to establish a new model of social cohesion. Too many people in Latin America and the Caribbean live with a pervasive sense of insecurity. That insecurity is closely related to economic inequality: people with precarious incomes often move in and out of work in the low-productivity informal economy, and are poorly equipped to weather life’s ups and downs. But insecurity goes beyond unequal incomes. Increasingly, it is also a matter of being exposed to the threat of violence at home, on the street, or across the nation at large. This interlocking sense of physical and economic vulnerability is vividly evident in political discussions across the region, from Chile and Colombia to El Salvador, Mexico, and Haiti. The details vary widely from place to place, as do the measures required to enhance personal security and economic prosperity. Greater security and richer social cohesion can grow out of improved economic statecraft. A reasonably functioning system of taxation and public spending constitutes a form of social contract. In exchange for publicly provided goods and services—transport, education and health care—citizens agree not to evade taxes and may even support political parties that advocate raising more tax revenues. The converse is a broken social contract: a vicious circle of bad government, poor public services and low tax revenues. The shift from the bad to the good state of affairs remains tentative, but it is underway and political actors and international organizations should foster it. Only then can recent gains be translated into a foundation for lasting social transformation and finally dispel the reflexive pessimism of those who doubt Latin America’s potential for progress.
Why the Pessimists Are Wrong About Latin America
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