What Israel’s Election Could Change for Ukraine and Relations With Russia

Israelis head to the polls on Tuesday, Oct. 27, in the country’s first national election since the Hamas-led attacks of Oct. 7, 2023. The government that emerges could make consequential decisions for Kyiv, which has spent years seeking greater Israeli military assistance, and now has increasingly valuable experience to offer in return.Domestic concerns dominate the campaign. In a September Israel Democracy Institute poll, 41% of respondents selected the economy and cost of living among their two leading electoral considerations, while 38% chose foreign affairs and security. Conscription and relations between religion and the state also featured prominently.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.Russia’s war against Ukraine nevertheless enters the debate through a question Israelis understand directly: How to confront Iran and the countries helping it.Opposition leader Yair Lapid has explicitly connected that question to greater assistance for Kyiv. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has also acknowledged common interests, although warmer language has yet to settle the limits of military cooperation.A complicated storyWhen Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Israel attempted to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv while balancing its relationships with both.Then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett traveled to Moscow in March 2022, met Vladimir Putin and spoke repeatedly with President Volodymyr Zelensky. He subsequently traveled to Berlin to discuss the diplomatic effort with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The mediation did not produce a settlement. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Asks 5 European Allies for Patriot Missiles Ukraine also wants to double drone production by 2027 through timely funding and joint manufacturing with foreign partners as EU allies prepare winter aid. Israel provided humanitarian assistance, including a field hospital, while resisting Ukrainian requests for major Israeli weapons systems. Its caution reflected, among other considerations, Russia’s military presence in Syria and Israel’s determination to preserve its ability to strike Iranian-linked targets there.Netanyahu later signaled that he might reconsider military assistance. In a February 2023 CNN interview, he said he was “definitely considering” it. That statement, however, was not a commitment to deliver particular weapons.The regional circumstances have since changed dramatically. The Hamas-led attacks, subsequent fighting with Hezbollah, direct conflict with Iran, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria have altered the security calculations behind Israel’s approach to Moscow.Iran brings the two countries closerIsrael and Ukraine share a common enemy: Tehran.Iran has supported Hamas and Hezbollah while supplying Russia with Shahed attack drones and the technology behind their production. Ukraine has consequently accumulated years of experience detecting and intercepting weapons that also threaten Israel.In March 2026, a source in Zelensky’s office said Ukraine was prepared to share operational experience and domestically produced drones with Israel. Kyiv expected greater military assistance in return, including help with air defense.The potential exchange changes the relationship. Ukraine is seeking Israeli support while offering knowledge developed through daily combat against Iranian-designed weapons.Netanyahu acknowledged that common ground in an August letter marking Ukraine’s Independence Day, describing Iran as a threat to both countries. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar also expressed interest in deepening cooperation with Ukraine following contact with Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in July.What the politicians say about UkraineLapid has made one of the clearest statements about how policy could change after the election.In a September interview with the Russian-language outlet Ulpan Politika, reported by NAnews, he promised:“If we return to power, we will do much more than we did then.”He described Russia as “an ally of Iran,” linking closer ties with Ukraine to Israel’s own security. Lapid also pointed to Ukrainian technologies, particularly those used against drones, as a reason for expanding military cooperation.He did not identify weapons systems, quantities, or a delivery timetable. His position nevertheless goes beyond a general expression of sympathy – he is proposing greater cooperation as part of the policy his camp would pursue in government.Lapid also defended the caution of the government he served in during 2022, arguing that its decisions reflected Israel’s security requirements at the time. His argument now is that the circumstances have changed, including Russia’s relationship with Iran and Ukraine’s technological capabilities.Support for a stronger relationship is not confined to Netanyahu’s opponents.Amir Weitmann, a Likud member and vocal advocate of greater assistance to Kyiv, criticized his own government’s approach in a March interview.“I’m not happy with the behavior of the Israeli government toward Ukraine,” he said.Weitmann argued that weakening Iran would benefit Ukraine by damaging a supplier of Russian war material. His position demonstrates support within Likud for a stronger partnership, although it is not a government commitment or a party-wide pledge.Netanyahu’s recent outreach, meanwhile, emphasizes shared threats and closer relations. The distinction for Kyiv is between acknowledging that partnership and authorizing the assistance Ukraine has requested.Warmer relations have not erased the disputesDespite the common security interests, relations between the two countries have repeatedly encountered disputes.One of the sharpest concerns was grain shipments arriving in Haifa in April which Ukraine said had originated in Russian-occupied territory.The confrontation became public and bitter. Kyiv demanded action, while Israeli officials disputed the handling and supporting documentation of Ukraine’s requests. Sa’ar accused Kyiv of conducting “social diplomacy” – Ukrainian officials maintained that they had already pursued diplomatic channels.An Israeli importer ultimately rejected the cargo aboard the Panormitis. That decision prevented the shipment from being unloaded, but did not resolve the wider disagreement over how Israel should respond to trade involving occupied Ukrainian territory.For Ukraine, the issue was both practical and political: Russia was profiting from occupied land while Kyiv struggled to secure action from a potential partner.Those tensions will remain part of the next government’s inheritance, alongside the discussions about drones and air defense.Russia also enters the election through the internetMoscow’s relevance to the election extends beyond Israeli policy toward Ukraine.On Oct. 25, Channel 12 reported that a civilian cybersecurity company working alongside the Shin Bet had disrupted an alleged Russian influence operation involving roughly 80 fictitious social media accounts.According to The Times of Israel’s account, Channel 12 did not identify the company or disclose the source of its information. The Shin Bet had separately announced the removal of profiles linked to a foreign influence campaign, without publicly establishing in that statement the Russian attribution reported by Channel 12.An October INSS assessment also examined Russian-linked Doppelganger activity targeting Israeli audiences. Its central concern was the erosion of trust in institutions, the electoral process, and other groups within society, rather than evidence that the operations could deliver victory to a particular party.Ukraine’s experience investigating Russian influence operations offers another area for cooperation. Sharing information about fabricated stories, impersonated outlets, and coordinated accounts would not require the same political decisions as transferring sensitive weapons.What Kyiv will be watchingA source in Jerusalem said in August that major decisions concerning Ukraine were unlikely before the election and the formation of the next government.Tuesday’s vote determines the composition of the Knesset. Coalition negotiations follow, and could take weeks. Politicians advocating closer cooperation will still have to secure agreement from their governing partners.An opposition victory would not automatically deliver Israeli weapons to Ukraine. Another Netanyahu-led government would inherit the rapprochement already underway.Yet, it is the concrete decisions that will matter: whether discussions on drone defense produce agreements, whether assistance expands, and whether Russia’s support for Iran changes the limits Israel places on cooperation with Kyiv.Both countries will have to translate words into action.