What Is Behind Bangladesh’s Continuing Law and Order Crisis?

On October 12, Human Rights Support Society (HRSS), a Bangladeshi rights organization, reported that between July and September this year, 17 people were killed and 1,227 injured in 183 incidents of political violence in Bangladesh. This was a 12 percent increase in the number of incidents in the same period last year. Mob violence also rose sharply from 98 to 137. These figures indicate that the Bangladeshi state is struggling to stabilize and normalize the law and order situation in the country since the revolutionary mobilization in 2024. So, the transition from the previous authoritarian ecosystem under Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League to the new democratic ecosystem has faced several challenges. According to data from the human rights organization, Ain o Salish Kendra, deaths from mob violence increased from 51 in 2023 to 128 in 2024 and 197 in 2025. Police say that registered murder cases increased from 3,023 in 2023 to 3,786 in 2025. Besides that, reports of incidents of extortion, political clashes, and armed violence have raised concerns about the deteriorating law and order situation in Bangladesh. After the fall of Hasina’s authoritarian regime in August 2024, public ire was directed against law and enforcement authorities; 450 of Bangladesh’s 639 police stations became nonfunctional following attacks, while approximately 30 percent of police positions were left temporarily vacant. Building trust in the police forces was a daunting task. There was little trust in the police force to begin with, thanks to the colonial policing culture that East Pakistan and then Bangladesh inherited, and even embraced. Successive regimes initially used the police as a tool not so much to enforce law and order as to stifle dissent. Political connections and corruption determined professional advancement within the police force. As a result, the Bangladesh police were hardly a professional force. Ahead of the 2024 national election, nearly 10,000 opposition activists were arrested, while politically motivated cases, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings became recurring instruments of repression. Police authorities were reportedly involved in almost 708 enforced disappearance cases. Some also threatened women with rape if they didn’t fall in line. The Hasina regime used the police to weaken its opponents, and as many officers became tools of the regime, the ladder to climb the ranks was less about hard work than about loyalty to the government and serving its agenda. For example, 349 police officers received awards, including one who received recognition for arresting photographer Shahidul Alam over his criticism of the government. This broken and untrustworthy ecosystem could not be fixed in a few days, weeks or even months. When the anti-Hasina protests ended, people guarded the streets as the whole police and law-and-order maintenance system broke apart. Even routine policing has become a challenge in Bangladesh. Officers who previously operated with strong political backing now face considerable risks when intervening in confrontations. Although the interim regime intervened to restore the law and order mechanism and revive the working of police stations, it has been difficult for people to trust the police. The color of police uniforms and the logo of the police force were changed twice, but these superficial adjustments had little impact on how the public perceived the police. Then came initiatives to rebuild the police force. However, a member of the Police Reform Commission that was set up post-2024 told The Diplomat that the recommendations for reforming the police have not been taken seriously by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government. It has not taken a single step towards reforming the police force, he said. As a result, public perception of the police force has not improved much. According to a survey by the International Republican Institute, 52 percent of respondents disapproved of the police’s performance, while 45 percent approved. Of all of Bangladesh’s public institutions surveyed, the police force secured the lowest public approval Another reason for the poor law and order situation in Bangladesh is the changing structure of political authority at the grassroots level. During the Awami League’s 15 years in power, local political and economic influence was largely concentrated within very systematized networks connected to the ruling party. Control over transport terminals, markets, construction contracts, land, and other economic resources was often exercised through internally negotiated and mutually established political patronage networks. So the division and the hierarchy were clear. The fall of the Awami League disrupted this hierarchy. Individuals and groups previously excluded from local power structures began competing for positions and resources formerly controlled by these networks. The clash for the new owner of the throne was on the table, and local political competition became intertwined with disputes over extortion, property, markets, and territorial influence. In May alone, Dhaka Metropolitan Police identified 1,280 active extortionists in the capital, including 148 armed criminals. Throughout the country, 600 incidents of political violence were documented between August 2024 and December 2025, resulting in 158 deaths and more than 7,000 injuries, where many confrontations involved struggles over local dominance and economic resources. These rivalries have continued after the BNP formed the government in February this year. Of the 183 political-violence incidents documented by HRSS between July and September this year, 69 involved internal BNP conflicts, while another 92 involved confrontations between BNP members and other political groups. Rival factions seeking influence within the same political organization have become an important source of conflict and violence at the grassroots level. So, post-2024, Bangladesh has entered an endless loop of conflicts as rival political groups compete for local authority. The government seems unable to control the police, even as the latter are weak and lack the moral authority to solve the problem. And most significantly, in this process, conflicts are reinforcing each other. It is time that the BNP government wakes up to the grave law and order situation in the country. Its immediate task should be to rebuild police authority without restoring political control over policing. The Police Commission Ordinance adopted in December 2025, which was intended to strengthen oversight and accountability, has since ceased to have effect. This means that the legal framework designed to regulate police conduct is no longer operative, leaving oversight mechanisms unenforced. Without institutional independence, the police risk becoming dependent on political patronage again, while competition over local resources continues to encourage violence. Establishing law and order in Bangladesh will need more than increasing police deployment or arresting individual criminals. It will require rebuilding public trust, insulating law enforcement from political influence, and preventing local groups from converting political connections into coercive economic power. Otherwise, the country risks replacing one system of politically controlled order with another, without establishing the rule of law that the July uprising promised.