Washington’s dangerous miscalculation on Iran

Washington is at risk of making the same mistake with Iran that it has made for nearly five decades: believing that enough economic pressure will eventually force the Islamic Republic to change its behavior.Recent reporting suggests that CIA Director John Ratcliffe has advised President Donald Trump to maintain a “no war, no deal” approach, allowing economic pressure to push Tehran toward concessions or create enough internal instability to threaten the regime.If that reporting accurately reflects Washington’s thinking, it raises a troubling question: After everything we have learned about the Islamic Republic, why do we still believe that economic suffering will force its leaders to surrender power? The problem is not that sanctions are useless. They can damage Iran’s economy, restrict its financial resources, and weaken its ability to support armed groups across the Middle East. But weakening an economy is not the same as weakening a regime’s determination to survive.Iran’s rulers have demonstrated repeatedly that they are willing to let ordinary Iranians pay the price for their political ambitions. The leadership has survived wars, sanctions, international isolation, mass protests, and economic crises. Through it all, the regime’s first priority has remained the same: protecting its own power.There are three serious problems with Washington’s apparent approach.First, repeated military strikes followed by rushed negotiations undermine American deterrence.Military force can be effective when it serves a clear political objective. But if Washington repeatedly strikes Iranian targets, then quickly returns to negotiations without achieving lasting results, Tehran may begin to see American military action as a temporary inconvenience rather than a serious threat.The regime can absorb damage, rebuild what it loses, and wait for the next round of diplomacy.This is not how credible deterrence is established. The United States must convince Tehran that continued aggression carries consequences that cannot simply be negotiated away after every confrontation.Second, a prolonged “no war, no deal” strategy is not victory. It is an opportunity for Tehran.The Islamic Republic knows how to survive prolonged confrontation. It has spent decades doing exactly that. A strategy that relies on waiting for economic pressure to produce results could allow the regime to reorganize its security institutions, rebuild military capabilities, and strengthen its regional networks over months or years.Meanwhile, Washington risks becoming trapped in an endless cycle of sanctions, limited military operations, diplomatic pressure, and renewed negotiations.Tehran does not necessarily need to defeat the U.S. militarily. It only needs to survive long enough for Washington to lose patience, shift priorities, or accept another temporary agreement.Time is one of the regime’s most valuable strategic assets. An indefinite stalemate gives it more of that asset.Third, economic hardship alone will not bring about a popular uprising.This may be the most serious misunderstanding of all.When economic conditions deteriorate, ordinary Iranians suffer first. Families struggle to survive, young professionals leave the country, and political activists lose the financial independence needed to organize.The regime, meanwhile, retains its security forces, intelligence services, prisons, and institutions of repression.Expecting a population struggling to afford basic necessities to overthrow a heavily armed government simply because sanctions have made life unbearable is not a realistic political strategy. Economic desperation can create anger, but anger alone does not produce an organized revolution.If Washington wants to support meaningful political change, it must do more than wait for sanctions to work. It should provide consistent moral and political support for the Iranian people, help protect access to independent information, expose human rights abuses, and support their right to determine their own political future.That does not mean the U.S. can or should manufacture a revolution. The future of Iran belongs to Iranians. But Washington should not confuse the suffering of the Iranian people with the weakening of the institutions that oppress them.There is another reality American policymakers must confront: The Islamic Republic is not a conventional government driven primarily by economic interests.Its political system was built around Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology, which places the preservation of the Islamic Republic and its religious-political mission above the economic well-being of the population.The regime’s ideological institutions have long promoted resistance, sacrifice, and martyrdom. Some hard-line currents also invoke religious expectations surrounding the return of the Twelfth Imam. This does not mean every Iranian leader seeks an apocalyptic war, but it does mean that conventional assumptions about economic incentives cannot fully explain the regime’s behavior.Iran’s leaders can make tactical concessions when necessary. They have done so before. But tactical concessions are not the same as abandoning the regime’s long-term objectives.This distinction matters enormously.A temporary nuclear arrangement, a pause in regional attacks, or another diplomatic agreement may reduce immediate tensions. But none should automatically be treated as evidence that the Islamic Republic has fundamentally changed.Washington must stop measuring success by whether Tehran returns to the negotiating table. The real measure should be whether Iran’s ability to threaten American interests and regional security has been durably reduced.The U.S. needs a strategy that combines economic pressure with credible military deterrence, stronger enforcement against the regime’s financial networks, and sustained support for Iranian civil society.Most importantly, Washington needs a clear political objective.If the goal is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the administration must establish enforceable conditions and credible consequences for violations. If the goal is to weaken the regime’s regional military networks, Washington must be prepared for a sustained effort rather than occasional strikes. And if the goal is to support political transformation, it must recognize that such change requires the participation and leadership of the Iranian people.These objectives are related but not interchangeable. A strategy that tries to achieve all of them through economic pressure alone is unlikely to accomplish any of them decisively.The greatest danger is not that Washington lacks the military or economic power to confront Tehran. It is that American policymakers may once again underestimate the regime’s ability to endure pressure while overestimating its willingness to make lasting concessions.After nearly five decades, the Islamic Republic has learned how to survive sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic isolation. It has also learned that American administrations change, political priorities shift, and international pressure eventually fluctuates.BIBI QUITS! YOUR CLIP-AND-SAVE GUIDE TO THE ISRAELI ELECTIONWashington should have learned something equally important: A regime’s economic weakness does not automatically translate into political defeat.The U.S. cannot keep striking, negotiating, imposing sanctions, and waiting indefinitely while calling the process a strategy. Without a clear objective and the political determination to achieve it, the proposed “no war, no deal” approach risks becoming another formula for preserving the status quo. And for Tehran, survival is victory.Heyrsh Abdulrahman is a Washington-based senior intelligence analyst and former Kurdistan Regional Government official. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, Middle East security, Iraqi politics, and regional affairs. His analysis and commentary have appeared in major U.S., Middle Eastern, and international news outlets.