Voices from the Arab Press: Why Arabs are betting on Eisenkot, and why they may be disappointed

NOVEMBER 7, 2026 20:41Russia & Africa: Partnership beyond geographyAn-Nahar, Lebanon, October 31For more stories from The Media Line go to themedialine.orgThe third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow cannot be viewed simply as another milestone in relations between Russia and African countries, or a routine gathering to exchange views and sign agreements. Its timing and the international circumstances surrounding it give the summit significance beyond bilateral cooperation, placing it within a broader contest among major powers to redraw the maps of political and economic influence.The summit gained additional importance from the participation of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who arrived in Moscow on Wednesday, October 28, and headed his country’s delegation the following day. Egypt is not merely another African participant. It is a geographical, political, and economic bridge between the Arab world and Africa, as well as a strategic Russian partner with longstanding ties in energy, trade, arms, and political cooperation. Discussions between Sisi and Russian President Vladimir Putin reflected this relationship, addressing the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Ukrainian crisis while emphasizing bilateral political coordination.For Russia, Africa represents a strategic arena with multiple dimensions. The continent possesses vast natural resources, expanding markets, and a geographical position overlooking vital maritime and commercial routes. Yet Africa is no longer simply a battleground for international competition. Its countries increasingly seek to use their resources and strategic positions to strengthen their political and economic independence.Moscow understands that lasting relationships with African states cannot rest on political considerations alone. They require tangible interests in energy, mining, agriculture, infrastructure, industry, and technology. Food security, grain and fertilizer supplies, and power plant development are practical areas that can give this partnership substance beyond political declarations.The summit’s outcomes reflected this approach, including its final declaration, the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum’s action plan for 2027-2029, and a separate document on cooperation in civilian applications of artificial intelligence. These measures signal a desire to expand relations into fields more directly connected to economic development and modern technology.Russian President Vladimir Putin addresses the newly elected parliament in Moscow Wednesday, 30th September 2026 (credit: Sputnik/Alexander Kazakov/Pool via REUTERS)But this rapprochement cannot be separated from the international context. Amid its continuing confrontation with the West and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, Russia is seeking to diversify its economic and political partnerships and reduce its dependence on traditional European relationships. African countries, meanwhile, are looking for multiple partners that give them greater room to maneuver without becoming dependent on a single international bloc.Russian-African relations should therefore not be understood simply as an attempt to replace Western influence with Russian influence. They are a test of African countries’ ability to turn international competition into opportunities serving their national interests. Africa does not need to exchange one form of outside control for another. It needs partnerships that respect sovereignty, strengthen productive capacity, and help address development and security challenges.The Middle Eastern dimension is no less important to Russia’s calculations. Relations with Egypt, Algeria, and the Gulf states, alongside Moscow’s involvement in regional affairs, provide Russia with a network of interests stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Gulf. The connection between Middle Eastern security and stability in the Horn of Africa makes the two arenas difficult to separate, particularly regarding energy, maritime navigation, food security, and counterterrorism.For Cairo, maintaining a balanced partnership with Moscow alongside its relations with the United States, Europe, and regional powers provides greater flexibility in security and development matters. Egypt’s participation in the summit therefore reflects its position within regional and continental calculations, not merely the future of its bilateral relationship with Russia.The third Russia-Africa Summit illustrates an increasingly important reality in international relations: influence is no longer measured solely by military strength or political presence, but also by the ability to build sustainable economic partnerships and offer alternatives in energy, food, technology, and development. Nevertheless, Russia faces the challenge of translating political influence into lasting investments and economic projects while competing against powers with greater financial resources.Ultimately, the summit’s value will depend on the projects, investments, and implementable agreements it produces, not the number of participants or the ambition of its declarations. Africa is not searching for another partner in the struggle between international blocs so much as a more influential role in shaping the international order. Russia, for its part, recognizes that expanding its African presence requires more than shared history and political positions. It requires mutual interests capable of standing the test of time.– Basel Alhaj JasemThe Karak tragedy and the question of religious immunityAsharq Al-Awsat, UK, October 31The Jordanian city of Karak has a painful history of encounters with extremism and terrorism. The pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh, whom ISIS burned alive, came from Karak. So did members of the terrorist group that barricaded itself inside Karak Castle in 2016 and killed 15 security personnel. A dispute recently emerged between the Syrian and Jordanian authorities, possibly because of Jordanian suspicions that ISIS influences originating in Syria had affected a cell in the village of Al-Judayyda in Karak.Such influences are possible, but they should not distract us from the fact that violent extremism has become a phenomenon within many of our societies over several decades. We can no longer console ourselves after every tragedy by claiming that terrorism was imported from another country or engineered by foreign conspirators.The roots of the Karak cell lie primarily in implanted ideas that have hardened into convictions, fostering hatred of people who differ in religion, nationality, culture, or outlook. This relatively recent ideological culture emerged over several decades, initially from fears that Western outsiders threatened religious identity. It passed through successive stages: calls for reform, attempts to achieve progress and overcome backwardness as defined by Western standards, political organization to preserve or recover identity, and finally a revolutionary identity determined to destroy the world. In recent years, we have entered a phase of withdrawal, isolation, and despair mixed with violence.There is no need to recount every idea and mechanism associated with these stages. During the revolutionary phase, violent organizations faced an international campaign in which Arab countries participated, inflicting devastating blows that fragmented their ranks and undermined their terrorist claims to religious legitimacy.Extremists consequently had to change their methods without changing their beliefs. Their teachers and ideological guides remained active, but large-scale organizational mobilization was no longer consistently possible. They therefore retreated into secrecy, operating individually or in small groups. This tense and vengeful phase of concealment altered not only their methods but also their targets.Four patterns have emerged over recent decades. The first is international terrorism, now far more difficult because of military defeats and preventive security measures. The second involves relocation and attaching themselves to other organizations, particularly in West Africa and elsewhere. The third is expanding alliances with the Houthis in Yemen and Somalia’s al-Shabaab movement in East Africa. The fourth involves isolated cells acting without direct orders against nearby targets, including state authorities and Christians.A BOY seen through a bullet hole at the site of 2016 clashes between police and Islamist gunmen in Karak, Jordan. (credit: MUHAMMAD HAMED/REUTERS)As these methods changed, so did the targets. In 1998, Osama bin Laden announced an alliance against Christians and Jews, using traditional religious terminology to describe a global confrontation that subsequently manifested itself in attacks in the United States, Europe, and against an embassy in Africa. Those ambitions have since diminished. Targets are increasingly determined by operational capabilities rather than grand strategy. As the movement retreated, it returned to its original, immediate enemies: state institutions and those regarded as different within local societies.Extremism is a deeply entrenched disease produced by prolonged exposure to radical teaching and indoctrination, particularly narratives portraying supposed enemies of religion both near and far. Some social media commentators seek to connect the Karak incident to the wars in Gaza and Palestine, citing anger and exhaustion. Nothing could be further from the truth. Neither al-Qaeda nor ISIS nor other extremist movements have demonstrated a meaningful commitment to Palestine or carried out their suicide operations in the occupied territories since their terrorist campaigns began within Arab societies in the 1970s.We must stop treating this phenomenon as temporary or assuming it will disappear on its own. It is a disease that has entered Islamic religious life through extremist education in numerous environments, and that indoctrination continues. Combating it must therefore continue as well.We might describe the problem as a weakening of religious immunity, something unfamiliar in our foundational texts and in our historical or modern experience of religious life. Weak immunity leaves religion vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation, and abuse. These tendencies are visible throughout our societies in different forms and still attract supporters, although the prevailing pattern increasingly involves isolation, withdrawal into family life, and violence against nearby individuals or authorities. These are troubled, vengeful minds that regard even their brothers, spouses, or children as enemies of religion.Above all, what can we say to our Christian fellow citizens who have suffered this profound wound? And what can we say to young people who confront us with President Donald Trump’s statements about destructive immigrants, or [former secretary of defense] Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks a quarter-century ago about extremists hijacking Islam and well-meaning Americans helping us supposedly moderate Muslims reclaim our religion?– Radwan al-SayedIsrael after the elections: Consensus or confrontation?Al-Ittihad, UAE, October 31Despite predictions that Israel’s parliamentary elections would produce no fundamentally new political reality and would merely extend the pattern established by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s previous governments, some within Israeli society, particularly former military officers, see a deeper problem. They believe Israeli voters remain heavily influenced by the domestic media and are unable to assess their country’s position within a complicated regional environment where Israel continues to face rejection and hostile developments that undermine its interests.From this perspective, the electorate has failed to adopt a different approach to the challenges confronting Israel. This requires a serious reassessment, particularly because no incoming government will easily repair the country’s internal divisions. Instead, it will operate through familiar coalition arrangements and complicated political calculations, pursuing compromises designed to satisfy its supporters rather than confronting the larger questions of Israel’s future, its ability to preserve past achievements and the need to rebuild a society facing a profound crisis.The likely outcome reflects a bleak reality for a society unable to escape the pressure of the right, which will remain the dominant political force, or adequately absorb the changes taking place around it. Much of the electoral speculation centered on the composition of the next government and the emergence of new political figures from the military establishment, often without substantial political or economic experience.Yet Israel faces a structural crisis requiring more than a reshuffling of personalities. Any governing coalition should formulate new policies rather than perpetuate Netanyahu’s current approach under a different arrangement. The immediate challenge is therefore domestic, particularly amid fears that the religious right will retain its grip on power. Most of the politicians contesting these elections have familiar records and offer little prospect of genuine change.Israel’s difficulty is not simply forming a government. The possible coalition scenarios were largely anticipated before voting began, reflecting established party structures and the electorate’s response to them. Netanyahu’s departure would not, by itself, solve the problem. Nor would a government headed by former general Gadi Eisenkot necessarily rescue Israel from the profound crisis that has brought it to the edge of the abyss.President Isaac Herzog has warned about the consequences for Israeli security and even the possibility of civil war, alarming the public and encouraging at least superficial agreement in response. Israel must therefore use the post-election period to restore consensus and build renewed national resilience, regardless of the results or whether the individuals in power change. This requires reorganizing political priorities and reconsidering the policies governing coalition relationships.Israel’s party history, however, suggests that producing policies acceptable to all forces inside and outside a coalition will be extremely difficult. The country needs genuinely cohesive coalition agreements, rather than repeated warnings that its political factions cannot work together.Netanyahu has repeatedly called for a national-unity government bringing Israelis together, an idea raised shortly before the elections. Eisenkot, however, declared that he would not enter a coalition with Netanyahu and would pursue a different course. This suggests that meaningful agreement may remain elusive until Israel’s entire party landscape is reorganized, rather than simply determining whether Likud can prevail over emerging rivals. Likud’s accumulated political experience will also influence the calculations of competing parties.After the elections, Israeli policy toward its regional neighbors is likely to remain shaped by military considerations, including an expansionist strategy and security arrangements imposed in areas Israel regards as strategically sensitive. At the same time, efforts will continue to unite the Israeli public around perceived threats, particularly by reviving the Iranian question and maintaining Hezbollah and the Houthis as adversaries.Domestically, genuine change is equally unlikely. Israel’s internal crisis will take years to overcome, especially if controversial legislation continues, including measures concerning the ultra-Orthodox community, military obligations, loyalty, and national cohesion. An electorate already confused by competing pressures has had limited opportunities for genuine choice under the influence of the media, powerful institutions, and political forces seeking to preserve the existing order for their own purposes. The election may change the composition of the government, but without a fundamental reconsideration of Israel’s domestic and regional policies, the underlying crisis will remain.– Tarek FahmyArabs & Israel’s elections: A one-sided love affairIndependent Arabia, UK, October 29One of the stranger phenomena these days is the eager anticipation with which Arabs are following Israel’s elections. Without exaggeration, interest may be greater than in the American midterm elections. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may win or lose, but that is not the important point. What deserves attention is the enthusiasm among some Arabs for the opposing camp led by Gadi Eisenkot, sometimes even because of his Moroccan Jewish background and the prospect that, if victorious, he would become Israel’s first Sephardi prime minister.In short, this support is motivated by hostility toward Netanyahu and what some regard as the crimes committed by “Mr. Bibi” against Gaza’s population, alongside the continuing bombardment of Syrian and Lebanese territory.This is hardly the first time Arabs have supported one Israeli political camp against another or anxiously awaited an Israeli election result. The irony is that many of those following, supporting, or opposing particular candidates refuse to recognize Israel itself.In 1992, when Arabs hoped for Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin to defeat the right-wing prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, their anticipation was justified. Rabin won, subsequently paving the way for the 1993 Oslo Accords and the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel the following year. Even Netanyahu, whose defeat some now eagerly await, previously attracted Arab support against Ehud Olmert after the first Gaza war. That support was not born of affection for Netanyahu but anger over Olmert’s military campaign.Such rapid political wagers are emotional. The eventual outcome has been the collapse of Israel’s peace camp and an expansion of settlements since 2010 on a scale surpassing what came before.The reality is that Eisenkot does not differ from Netanyahu in opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state. He is no advocate of peace. During his election campaign, he even sought to outflank Netanyahu by criticizing earlier indications that “Mr. Bibi” might accept Palestinian statehood. The candidate some Arabs hope will win is therefore someone who reproaches Netanyahu for having been open to granting Palestinians rights. This contradicts Eisenkot’s own promises to protect West Bank Palestinians from settler attacks and halt settlement expansion.Eisenkot is also associated with the “Dahiya doctrine” from the 2006 war against Hezbollah, a military approach that permits overwhelming force against civilian infrastructure in areas associated with the organization.Anyone reviewing three decades of Israeli elections will find that Arab expectations rarely involve reading between the lines. Instead, one camp is applauded simply to spite another. The only occasion on which Arab observers truly won this electoral lottery may have been Rabin’s victory in 1992.In Lebanon, a popular saying goes: “If Likud wins, pack your bags and run.” My fear is that an Eisenkot victory could strangle what remains of the Palestinian dream. He may not win, of course, and that currently appears the more likely outcome.Arab anticipation of Israeli election results, and the hope invested in one candidate over another, amounts to an acknowledgment of Israel’s existence and a belief that a prime minister might eventually pursue reconciliation, grant rights to the land’s original inhabitants, halt settlement construction, and recognize a Palestinian state.Chinese culture offers a famous story illustrating contradiction, reportedly recorded some 2,000 years ago. A weapons merchant in the ancient state of Chu displayed his wares at a market. Holding up a shield, he declared: “Buy my shield! It is so strong that no spear can penetrate it.” He then raised a spear and announced: “Buy my spear! It is so sharp that it can penetrate any shield.” A wise man approached and asked: “What would happen if we struck your shield with your spear?” The meaning lies in the wise man’s question.– Adhwan al-Ahmari ■Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.Follow us on Google