Ukraine’s ‘Sudden’ Victory in Lyman-Kharkiv: 5 Things to Know

Ukraine’s army, according to recent reports in domestic media, supposedly scored a victory of some sort in the northeastern Kharkiv sector and pushed Russian forces back fairly significantly. Here are five Kyiv Post questions and answers about that. 1. What actually changed on the ground and who was responsible? Estimates of the territory formerly under Russian control that is now under Ukrainian control, vary from 150-250 square kilometers (95-135 square miles) of territory liberated by Ukrainian forces north of the city Lyman, which had been and remains a lynchpin of Ukrainian defenses in the northern-Donetsk/southern-Kharkiv sector since the start of Russia’s second invasion.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Ukrainian news and military information platforms are reporting up to 10 villages liberated and elements of two Russian Motor Rifle Divisions – the 2nd and 14th – cut off and partially surrounded in that pocket of territory. There are no confirmed reports about how many Russian troops are cut off. Speculation puts the figure between a few hundred and several thousand. As a result of the Ukrainian advance, those isolated Russians are separated from supply and support by the Zherebets River, a north-south waterway that, aside from bridges, is difficult and in most places impossible to cross by vehicle. Russian forces not encircled, including elements of both those units, have been forced to retreat between 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) to an old defensive line to the east, along the Zherebets. Overall command has been under 3rd Army Corps and its commander, Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, a former civilian. Other Topics of Interest Russia Sets Eye on Zaporizhzhia's Orikhiv With 150,000-Troop Formations The troop numbers, if accurate, are comparable to the entirety of Russia’s 2022 invasion forces. Currently about five of the 10 villages are widely being reported as secured and fully under Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) control, and another five reportedly have strong Ukrainian forces in them mopping up, but operations to suppress hold-out defenders are still in progress. Several reports, unconfirmed, place the villages Kolodyazi and Zarichne at the east-most extent of the Ukrainian advance. Ukrainian and Russian milbloggers have identified Ukraine’s 66th Mechanized and 3rd Assault Brigades, both of 3rd Corps, as spearheading the attacks. Drone footage published by the AFU place two of the best-known and most-experienced Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) drone units – 20th USF Brigade “K-2” and 429th USF Brigade “Achilles” – as in support. Reportedly, flight operations are intense. 2. How did the Ukrainians do this and how long did it take? Ukrainian milbloggers and military media first reported limited counterattacks being conducted by 3rd Corps units in July. Biletsky subsequently confirmed those operations were taking place but said their scope was limited. On the granular level, the Ukrainian attacks have been methodical and have followed a fairly consistent template. The first step has been to mass drones in the vicinity of a targeted Russian defensive position or Russian-held village, using observation aircraft to maintain permanent surveillance and bomber and first-person-view (FPV) drones to hit targets. Wider-ranging drone sorties search for Russian artillery, logistics, and communications with the objective of isolating the targeted location and inflicting casualties and damage. Russian supplies and replacements to frontline positions are considered high-priority targets, equal with the defensive positions themselves.Time required to carry out the wearing down process can take a week to a month. When the objective is adjudged sufficiently softened up, Ukrainian infantry moves in, sometimes by vehicle and sometimes by foot, to find remaining centers of Russian resistance and eliminate them. Once a position or village is secured the process is repeated. These tactics have been widely used in the AFU since early 2025. Proponents of the tactics said the goal is to take apart organized Russian defenses bit by bit while minimizing Ukrainian casualties. 3. Are the reports of this advance credible? Yes, they are. Probably the best evidence is hundreds of drone videos and Ukrainian soldier reports reaching open sources and, in some cases, media that sat on the story, that documented combat activity well to the east of Lyman and clear signs of 3rd Corps units making deliberate attacks. Some of the anecdotal evidence was so compelling and solidly documenting Ukrainian operations well to the east of Lyman, that AFU leadership called on media not to report on it. Kyiv Post was among dozens of Ukrainian news platforms aware of evidence of 3rd Corps offensive operations over the summer, and respecting AFU request not to publicize information about them. Pro-Russia milbloggers, by Sept. 7-8, were reporting the Ukrainian success as well, led by the very popular, Kremlin-sanctioned writer Mikhail Zvinchuk (handle: Rybar, 1.5+ million followers) and followed by Yury Podolyaka (2.7+ million followers) and Anatoly Radov (35,000+ followers), who on Sept. 7 warned against panic: “Everything is worse and worse in Lyman. I say again, the situation is very difficult, BUT THERE HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN ANY ORDER TO RETREAT. That is fake news. Our bloggers shouldn’t pass that on. Our guys (Russian forces) are defending themselves.” According to a Sept. 8 Radio Liberty report, Radov posted a recorded voice message purportedly sent by him to a Russian army officer about operations around Lyman – subsequently deleted – in which Radov criticized the Russian army chain of command for pretending to the Kremlin that the situation in Lyman isn’t collapsing. “Is there a guy among you – for f*ck’s sake – who can tell Uncle Vova [Russian President Vladimir Putin] that his picture isn’t actually all that pretty, or are you all just f*cking losers? I’ll tell him. Just bring me in, I’ll tell him it’s all gone to sh*t…we’re totally f*cked on the Lyman front.”Since Sept. 6, Western think tanks and analytical platforms have reported that the Ukrainian advance was real and roughly matched the parameters described by the AFU. These include the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Poland’s Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), French OSINT analyst Clement Molin, and Finland’s Emil Kastehelmi of the Black Bird Group. 4. How big of a deal is this Ukrainian advance? Is it just a local success or something more? It’s something a good deal more but it’s not a war-winning operation or an obvious sign the Russian army is cracking up soon. Compared to Ukraine’s greatest offensive success of the war thus far, the September 2022 Kharkiv counter-offensive, the recent Lyman battles are comparatively minor in scale and effect, and were achieved in a very different kind of war. In the roughly two week-long Kharkiv operation, Ukraine used surprise to exploit thin Russian lines manned by exhausted troops. The assault achieved a WWII-style breakthrough, liberating 8,500 square kilometers (3,280 square miles) of territory and a reported 380 villages. Fast-moving armor and even light automobile columns backed by conventional artillery spearheaded the advance. Russian forces were thrown back 50 kilometers (31 miles) on a wide front. So many Russian combat vehicles were abandoned by retreating troops that, by the end of the year, Russian Federation tanks captured by Ukrainian forces outnumbered tanks owned by Ukraine at the start of the war. Faced with a potential collapse of lines elsewhere, the Kremlin halted offensives elsewhere and mobilized reservists, a politically dangerous move that has splintered Russian society. During the July-August 2026 Lyman offensive, Kyiv’s gains were slow and incremental with Ukrainian forces taking their time to isolate, cut off, and eliminate centers of Russian resistance bit by bit. There have been no reports of broken Russian units or massed captures of Russian equipment. The scale of territory recovered by Ukraine in 2026 – 10 villages and maximum 250 square kilometers (97 square miles) – is 20 to 30 times smaller than the results achieved in 2022. 5. What are the outcomes? What might come next? The most tangible outcomes of the Lyman offensive are on the ground itself: First and foremost, Russian lines have been pushed away from the fortress city Lyman, which has been a bottleneck-stumbling block against Russian attempts to capture Ukraine’s Donetsk region since 2022. Thanks to the flow of the Zherebets River and reservoirs along its length, Russian troops immediately to the northwest of Lyman city are effectively cut off and nearly surrounded, unless they wish to abandon heavy weapons and make their eastward way to safety on foot. Based on the difficult Russian tactical situation, further Ukrainian advances in this sector seem likely. Two outcomes from the Lyman offensive on the equally important front of wartime messaging and narratives are also evident. First, the Kremlin and frequent Western narrative that the Russo-Ukraine War is stuck in a WWI-style stalemate has been proved false at least on the local level, with the AFU demonstrating with troops on the ground that Ukraine’s armed forces are capable of systematically gaining ground. Tellingly, the Ukrainians used not gee-whiz “boutique” NATO weaponry, but home-grown infantry tactics and mass-manufactured drones, to recover national territory lost to Russia and hold it. Second, the Kremlin narrative that Russia will inevitably capture the part of Ukraine it wants has been proven false by Russia’s own wartime definitions. Instead of being slowly ground down and forced to hand over parts of Ukraine to Russian forces, in the Lyman sector, it was the Ukrainians that held the initiative and wore down the enemy to capture territory and advance. Worse for the narrative of Russian inevitability was that the Ukrainian offensive lasted three months, meaning Russian forces had just as long to come up with a counter to the Ukrainian incremental attack tactics, but failed. A final outcome is about Ukrainian and Russian soldier morale. On the Ukrainian side, the Lyman success, within the AFU, seems mostly viewed as a validation of current drone+infantry careful assault attack tactics, and proof that well-led formations like 3rd Corps are fully capable of not just holding Russian attacks but launching systematic attack operations that recover ground. Within 3rd Corps, unsurprisingly, morale seems excellent. But anyone wishing to talk to a Ukrainian soldier or read AFU unit information feeds will find, still, soldier gripes aplenty about ammunition shortages, civilian draft dodgers and unpopular commanders, and no evidence of an expectation of a Russian military collapse. On the Russian side the Ukrainian gains pushing Russian forces back to the Zherebets River in about 10 weeks reversed Russian advances bought at high cost in that sector since mid-2025 – meaning that if Moscow chooses to attempt to push the Ukrainians back, the Kremlin’s troops will have to fight for the same ground a second time. In most armies in most wars, soldiers are willing to sacrifice for visible progress towards victory, but far less ready to take heavy casualties to repeat attacks made more than a year ago, using tactics troops think wasteful. Official and inside-AFU sources report falling Russian offensive activity in the Lyman sector but it’s not clear if that’s because of weakening morale, troop shortages, or a change in Russian strategy. Following some of Russia’s bloodiest infantry-heavy attacks of the entire war, the 2023 Winter Offensive – throwing about 60,000 troops at the Donbas cities Bakhmut and Soledar – Kremlin forces – many of them mercenaries hired by the Wagner Group – in about three months of fighting captured about 100 square kilometers (38.6 square miles) of Ukrainian territory losing 30,000-40,000 men in the process. In June 2023 the Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, angry at the casualty-heavy Russian assault tactics employed at Bakhmut, sent his troops towards Moscow in a possible coup attempt. The Kremlin defused the crisis by agreeing to negotiate. Prigozhin later died in a plane accident. Infantry-heavy, casualty-intense Russian attack tactics have continued through the present.