Ukraine destroyed the Crimean Bridge. Putin has vowed to retaliate, but Russia has repeatedly failed to bring down bridges in Ukraine. Can Moscow deliver?

Ukraine destroyed the Crimean Bridge. Putin has vowed to retaliate, but Russia has repeatedly failed to bring down bridges in Ukraine. Can Moscow deliver?

Ukraine’s attack on the Crimean Bridge showed that destroying structures like this with strikes launched from hundreds of kilometers away, in the face of active enemy air defense and electronic warfare, is possible. Before this, Russia had spent several months proving the opposite: every attempt to put the Dnipro bridges out of commission for any length of time had failed. But now Putin is once again threatening Ukraine with “far more painful” consequences in response from the Russian military.Both Ukraine’s success and Russia’s failures in striking bridges can be explained. It has been known since World War II that destroying permanent structures from a distance is a difficult task. Inflicting truly serious damage requires both a powerful warhead and a highly accurate delivery vehicle. But in an era when precision weapons have become widespread, even this problem is solvable. The catch is that the weapons needed to destroy dozens of bridges are so expensive that the cost may not justify the goal of the strikes.In the early hours of November 17, Ukraine’s armed forces struck the Crimean Bridge across the Kerch Strait with a massive barrage of cruise missiles and drones, destroying one span of the road section, bringing down the arch over the shipping channel and blocking it with debris, and damaging the railway section of the crossing.At the same time, Russian forces struck the cable-stayed Northern Bridge in Kyiv. At least three Iskander-M ballistic missiles hit the structure, damaging the road surface, and one exploded just meters from where the cables are anchored. The bridge remained standing but was closed to car traffic, as it had been several times before.Why are bridges hard to destroy? And why has the Russian military failed at it?Road and railway bridges are built to withstand heavy loads. World War II experience shows that damaging the road surface alone does not put these structures out of commission for long. To destroy crossings in the rear — for example, to cut off supplies to an entire combat zone or a military production facility — strikes need to target the piers, cables, and other load-bearing structures.In the 1940s, experience showed that destroying large bridges was a highly complex task, especially when a bridge was protected by adequate air defenses. Air campaigns aimed at putting bridges out of commission for long periods often failed, regardless of how many sorties were flown.The most frequently cited example is Germany’s attempt to destroy the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine after the Allies captured it in 1945, using days of aerial bombardment and V-2 rocket strikes. The bridge survived and allowed the Allies to significantly speed up their advance into Germany. None of the weapons Germany used combined the accuracy and power needed to destroy it.British aviation had some success using ten-ton Grand Slam bombs against bridges, which could damage piers with near misses. In 1945, the Americans used precision-guided weapons to destroy a bridge for the first time: AZON bombs, guided by radio from a bomber, destroyed Bridge 277 over the Khwae Yai River on the China-Burma road behind Japanese lines.But even in the era of precision weapons, destroying large bridges protected by air defenses fully proved difficult. The U.S. Air Force carried out dozens of strikes on the Dragon’s Jaw railway bridge in central Vietnam but could not fully destroy it for years. Vietnamese crews quickly repaired the structure after each raid. In 1972, the U.S. finally put the bridge out of commission for an extended period using the most precise weapons of the era: laser-guided bombs.Since the 1970s, the U.S. Air Force made laser-guided munitions its standard weapon for destroying large bridges because of their accuracy. The munitions have a drawback: they require an aircraft or a ground spotter to illuminate the target with a laser beam, meaning the illuminator must have a direct line of sight to it, which can jeopardize the operation’s safety. In most cases, though, U.S. aircraft and forward observers faced no resistance, partly because the Air Force had already established air superiority and suppressed enemy air defenses beforehand. Weather — fog or low cloud cover — could also interfere with laser illumination.Alternatives emerged in the 1980s, including bombs and missiles guided by satellite navigation receivers or television cameras. In 1999, glide bombs equipped with JDAM kits, which use corrections from the military equivalent of GPS, destroyed several bridges over the Danube.Since then, many of the United States’ potential adversaries — Russia in particular — have worked to develop means of jamming and spoofing satellite navigation signals. During the Russia–Ukraine war, this kind of electronic warfare has grown effective enough to substantially reduce the accuracy of satellite-guided munitions. American media have reported, for instance, that the accuracy of HIMARS rocket systems supplied to Ukraine had already declined by 2023. There are also documented cases of Russian glide bombs (equipped with UMPK kits, the Russian equivalent of the American JDAM) missing their targets, along with cruise and ballistic missiles that rely on satellite corrections. A video published recently showed a miss at a bridge over the Dnipro River in the city of Dnipro.Both warring armies are looking for ways to improve the accuracy of their long-range munitions. One of the main methods is television-guided correction, in which an operator — or the munition’s own computer — visually guides the missile or drone onto the target using a video camera.When an operator guides a drone or missile, the connection between them must stay uninterrupted and relatively free of delay. The Starlink satellite system can provide that link. Ukraine’s armed forces have long used Starlink terminals (and their military counterpart, Starshield) on munitions carried by aerial and naval drones. The Russian military did the same until Elon Musk’s company cut off its smuggled terminals. Russian forces then replaced satellite communications on drones and small cruise missiles with mesh networks made up of many relay drones that position themselves between the operator and the target to relay the signal. Ukrainian specialists said this fall that they had learned to jam such networks, though that claim remains unconfirmed.For strikes on bridges, according to reports from Ukrainian sources, the Russian military uses different systems. Iskander-M ballistic missiles carry warheads with optical and radar guidance: there is no operator at all, and instead the missile’s computer compares the image it sees with templates preloaded before launch. American and, later, Russian cruise missiles have used similar systems for decades. Today, drones combine optical sensors with computer vision to hit even mobile targets such as vehicles.If these reports about the Russian missiles are accurate, the weapons lack sufficient accuracy — a deviation of around a meter. Over several weeks of continuous strikes, the Russian military has managed only to damage the road surface of bridges, not their load-bearing structures. Some bridges could eventually be destroyed through cumulative damage from such strikes, but doing so would require a large number of missiles. Cutting off western Ukraine from the east entirely could require more missiles than Russia produces annually, according to unverifiable data from Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, which estimates Russia’s annual production at around 800 Iskander-M missiles and more than 100 other ballistic missiles.Ukraine, by contrast, has carried out just one massive strike so far — and has already achieved greater success.How did the Ukrainian military manage to destroy the Crimean Bridge?Video shot from onboard cruise missiles — something neither side had shown before — indicates that at least some of the munitions had a link to an operator, though exactly how that communication was organized remains unknown.Starlink, in theory, still operates over Crimea, unlike over Russian territory. But Ukraine says the United States recently imposed — and has not lifted — a restriction on using Starlink and Starshield terminals at speeds above 160 kilometers (99 miles) per hour. If true, the missiles could not have used the terminals directly; they may instead have picked up a signal relayed from a terminal-equipped drone flying nearby at a lower speed. Ukrainian sources neither confirm nor deny this theory.Ukraine’s armed forces may have adapted Russia’s approach, setting up their own mesh network of drones linked to operators somewhere in southern Ukraine. The nearest Ukrainian positions, near the well-known town of Mala Tokmachka in the Zaporizhzhia region, lie more than 250 kilometers (155 miles) from the target in the Kerch Strait, and the operators were, of course, even farther from the front line. Western media have reported this theory, citing Ukrainian sources, but the scenario looks doubtful: transmitting signals over modem-based networks is too vulnerable to electronic warfare to support an operation involving dozens of missiles and drones.While how communication with the missiles was organized remains unclear, the methods Ukraine used to overcome the Russian air defense and electronic warfare systems protecting the Crimean Bridge are evident. As in previous strikes deep inside Russia, Ukraine’s armed forces relied above all on the sheer size of the salvo to overwhelm air defenses, which can track and engage only a limited number of targets.Ukrainian planners also conducted a reconnaissance-in-force operation the day before, launching drones at the bridge. Satellite images show they scored three hits that caused no major damage, which likely helped identify sectors free of electronic warfare interference. According to data from the Flightradar24 website, an American RS-135U radar reconnaissance aircraft spent several hours flying over the Black Sea near the Crimean Bridge several hours before the main strike. That aircraft is designed, among other things, to detect the positions and operating sectors of radio-emitting air defense and electronic warfare systems.Do the strikes on bridges have military value that justifies the resources spent?Since 2023, the Russian military has shifted supply lines for troops operating in southern Ukraine, in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, away from Crimea — the peninsula from which Russia launched its invasion in February 2022 — toward a “land corridor” running west from the Rostov region along the Sea of Azov. In fact, creating this corridor was the strategic purpose of seizing southern Ukraine in the first place. Military engineers built a special rail branch from Donetsk into the Zaporizhzhia region because, until the end of 2024, the main route ran too close to the front line near Vuhledar. After capturing Vuhledar, Russian forces gained control of an extensive rail network capable of supplying the army while bypassing Crimea. They even ran test trains on the network, but never opened it for regular service, citing safety concerns.It’s unclear whether the Russian military uses the railways in the land corridor, but it does use the roads there to supply its “Vostok” and “Dnipro” troop groupings operating in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.After receiving many medium-range drones equipped with Starlink terminals last spring, Ukraine’s armed forces began striking the main highway of the land corridor. That significantly complicated deliveries of civilian cargo — fuel in particular — to Crimea. The strikes, however, have not visibly affected Russian military capabilities in southern Ukraine: Russian forces continue trying to advance in the western Zaporizhzhia region.Unlike civilians, the military has greater logistical flexibility: it can make effective use of secondary roads and can camouflage and disperse its vehicles. It’s also easier for the military to coordinate with air defense units and the mobile fire teams that hunt drones, and, most importantly, military forces can and are willing to take on more risk than civilian carriers. For Crimean residents, though, the ongoing strikes on the land corridor and the destruction of the bridge in Kerch foreshadow even harder times ahead.Ukrainian sources, however, told Western media that the main purpose of the strike on the bridge was to pressure Vladimir Putin, who had traveled to Beijing at the time for talks with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping.Russian strikes on bridges over the Dnipro will carry real military value only if the Russian military manages to put a large share of them out of commission for an extended period. (Ukraine has just under 20 bridges over the Dnipro, not counting pedestrian bridges and those already destroyed by demolitions in the Kherson region; some crossings run along the crests of hydroelectric dams, which makes them even harder to hit.) Destroying one or two bridges in Kyiv would not significantly affect supplies to Ukraine’s armed forces on the Dnipro’s eastern bank.It would, however, create enormous problems for civilians in a city split in two. Already, after every Russian strike on the bridges — none of which has caused catastrophic damage — Kyiv has experienced serious transportation problems. Still, as with the isolation of Crimea, civilian hardships are unlikely, for now, to affect the outcome of the war.At Meduza, we are committed to transparency about our use of artificial intelligence in the newsroom. The story you’re reading was written by one of our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an AI model configured to follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is the result of extensive testing and refinements to ensure our English-language coverage is timely and accurate. A Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.If you find any errors in this translation, please contact us at [email protected].To read Meduza’s exclusive content in English, please subscribe to our newsletter.Meduza’s Explainers desk

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