Ukraine at 35: Can the Strategic Partnership With the US Survive?

In 2008, I took part in drafting the first Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the US. At the time, it was difficult to imagine that less than two decades later I would be seriously asking whether Ukraine is in danger of losing its principal strategic partner – and at the most critical moment in our country’s modern history. To be sure, warning signs appeared long before Russia’s full-scale invasion. One of them was the Obama administration’s weak response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Barack Obama proceeded from the assumption that Ukraine will always be “vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do.”JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Joe Biden made important adjustments to the Democratic Party’s approach, arguing that supporting Ukraine was in the US’ “vital national interest.” Ukraine managed to withstand the initial stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion largely thanks to the assistance provided by the anti-Putin coalition created and led by the US. (Biden’s inconsistency and his obvious miscalculations are a subject for a separate discussion.) Serious doubts about the future of our strategic partnership emerged with Donald Trump’s second presidential term, although the roots of his skeptical – and at times openly negative – attitude toward Ukraine can be traced back to his first administration. That period was marked by his unsuccessful attempts to obtain compromising information about Joe Biden and by the political trauma of his first impeachment. Other Topics of Interest Does Ukraine Still Have Hope? Reflections on Ukraine’s 35th anniversary of the restoration of independence. Despite Trump’s undisguised admiration for the Russian dictator, military cooperation with Ukraine continued during his first term, and Kyiv received its first lethal defensive weapons. This happened largely because Trump’s administration still included what were often described as the “adults in the room” – military leaders and experienced policymakers who clearly understood the threat Russia posed to US national security. Such people are no longer needed for Trump to pursue the objectives of his second presidency. Expert advice and institutional assessments have been replaced by the president’s instincts, his intuition and his belief in his own ability to strike deals on virtually any issue. The US has witnessed an unprecedented personalization of foreign policy, with decisions increasingly determined by whether the anticipated outcome serves Donald Trump’s personal interests, those of his inner circle, and his own preferences and inclinations. As a result, US policy toward individual countries is increasingly shaped by Trump’s personal relationship with their leaders. From the very beginning of Trump’s return to office, Ukraine and its political leadership found themselves under maximum pressure – something that could have been anticipated from his campaign rhetoric. His hostility toward Ukraine, and toward President Volodymyr Zelensky, personally, was reinforced by his efforts to portray Joe Biden as the president who had squandered American resources on supporting Ukraine. This tendency reached its peak during the now infamous Oval Office meeting. Despite Trump’s volatility and frequent emotional swings, the fundamental principles underlying his policy toward Ukraine have remained consistently unfavorable for our country. First, Trump wants to end the Russia-Ukraine war as quickly as possible, regardless of the conditions and with little regard for Ukraine’s national interests or the fact that Russia is the aggressor. In Trump’s worldview, these considerations are of secondary importance. His so-called peace initiatives cast him as a mediator rather than Ukraine’s partner. Whether presented as “28 points” or “20 points,” these proposals are not designed to deliver either a just or a lasting peace for Ukraine. Can we expect the current US administration to come forward with proposals that are more acceptable to Ukraine as negotiations evolve? Time will tell, but there are ample reasons for skepticism. Second, Ukraine is neither important nor particularly interesting to Donald Trump – neither personally nor from the standpoint of US security or economic interests, at least as he understands them. Perhaps the only tangible interest he sees in Ukraine is the so-called minerals agreement, which, despite subsequent revisions, he still appears to view primarily as a mechanism for extracting maximum benefit: “We’ll go in whenever we want and take practically whatever we want.” Third, despite Vladimir Putin’s brazen behavior, his broken promises, and even actions as scandalous as assisting Iran during its confrontation with the US, Trump remains determined to preserve the possibility of dealing with him as a partner. He appears to hope for the realization of grandiose – and largely illusory – economic projects, as well as a radical revision of the rules governing world politics, under which “strong” and “weak” states would be subject to different standards. Keeping these realities in mind helps explain why every expectation that Trump might eventually shift toward a policy more favorable to Ukraine has repeatedly ended in disappointment. Time and again, his administration has returned to positions that clearly contradict both the letter and the spirit of the Charter on Strategic Partnership. The current US administration regards one of its greatest achievements as ending military assistance to Ukraine and replacing it with commercial arms sales. One can only hope that, even under these new circumstances, the Presidential Drawdown Replacement and Replenishment (PURL) mechanism will continue to function, and that the Graham-Blumenthal sanctions bill will not only be adopted, but also fully implemented. In both cases, however, the decisive word belongs to the President of the US. We must be prepared for the possibility that this situation is unlikely to change fundamentally before January 2029. Until then, US support for Ukraine may well depend on the emotions, priorities and intentions of a single individual occupying the world’s most powerful office. That said, the prospects for renewing and restoring the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the US will ultimately depend on more than the occupant of the White House. They will also be shaped by the consistency of support for Ukraine among American policymakers, by the attitudes of the American public, and by the condition in which Ukraine emerges from this phase of its struggle against Russian aggression. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.