Following his visit to the White House to meet with President Donald Trump in August of last year, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung had good reasons to believe the strategic alliance was in strong shape. Despite their ideological disagreements, the two leaders held a cordial first summit that in subsequent months led to a resolution of their trade frictions, a $150 billion investment in shipbuilding, substantial investment in commercial projects in the United States, and even a surprise announcement that Trump would help Seoul build nuclear-powered submarines. One of Lee’s key commitments was to increase South Korean defense spending to 3.5% of GDP — the Trump administration’s minimum target for Asian nations.But what a difference a year can make with Trump. On October 21, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Steel publicly described the relationship as experiencing “turbulence.” Lee’s government, for its part, has tried to downplay recent tensions, arguing that overheated domestic politics in both countries need not undermine the strong foundation of the alliance. As South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told Parliament in late October, “When you’re in turbulence, fasten your seat belt and it won’t be a problem.”In truth, some of the turbulence is of Seoul’s own making. In March, for example, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young publicly identified a North Korean uranium enrichment facility, potentially compromising sensitive sources and methods. The Lee government insists that the information was already public, but Washington disagrees and has retaliated by restricting certain satellite-derived intelligence about North Korea and excluded Seoul from a trilateral meeting on North Korean cyber threats. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has complained about intelligence sharing broadly with Seoul, and South Korean Ambassador Kang Kyung-wha acknowledged as recently as last month that his government had not fully addressed Washington’s concerns. South Korea has also been slow in deciding how to invest its pledged $350 billion, angering Trump in the process. For instance, Trump wants Seoul to invest roughly $54 billion in the Alaska LNG pipeline project, but Lee’s government has questioned its commercial viability. Although he has expressed confidence that South Korea will eventually follow through, Trump has made vague threats to resume tariffs if the deals remain stalled. Separately, South Korean regulators imposed a fine of $423 million on Coupang, a U.S.-listed e-commerce company, following a massive consumer data breach. The Trump administration and congressional Republicans were outraged by the move, calling it discrimination against American companies, while the Lee administration justified the measure to protect consumer privacy data.But the Trump administration shares much of the blame for the increasingly contentious bilateral relationship. For one thing, even though Washington and Seoul already agreed in June 2025 to reduce tariffs from 25% to 15% in 2025, Trump periodically threatens to raise tariff rates again to 25% when he gets angry about something. This has surprised and frustrated South Korean officials, who may no longer see Washington as a reliable strategic ally. And perhaps neither do the South Korean people. According to a Pew Research survey from August, 55% of them hold an unfavorable view of the United States — the highest such mark in more than 20 years. North Korea poses a bilateral challenge as well. To be sure, both Trump and Lee want to prioritize renewed engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un rather than deterrence. But the Trump administration’s preferred approach differs from Seoul’s. Trump surprised South Korea by shortening the annual bilateral military drills, known as Ulchi Freedom Guardian, just hours before they began. He argued that they were unnecessarily provocative toward Kim, whom Trump hopes will join him in a summit. Although he publicly accepted Trump’s decision to cut back combined military exercises, Lee would rather derive diplomatic leverage from enhanced military preparedness against North Korea, and the deterrence that comes with it, prior to negotiations. Trump further blamed South Korea for not contributing to the U.S. naval operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, in turn questioning why Washington continues to defend South Korea on the peninsula. Deepening disagreements over China represent yet another irritant. The Trump administration clearly seeks greater “flexibility” in how it uses the approximately 28,500 U.S. troops deployed to South Korea. Rather than focusing exclusively on North Korea, Washington has publicly intimated that China could be the target of their future military operations, and that Seoul would be expected to support that mission. Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge “Bridge” Colby, for example, visited Seoul in January and gave a speech at the Sejong Institute that curiously did not mention North Korea at all, and instead, replaced it with multiple references to countering China. To the shock of South Korean officials, Trump’s National Security Strategy, released last November, neglected to mention North Korea either and focused instead on the need for South Korea to help the U.S. and Japan secure the First Island Chain — a clear reference to containing China. Although Trump’s National Defense Strategy from January did reference North Korea, it avoided stating that denuclearization was still a U.S. priority and put the responsibility to deal with the regime more squarely on Seoul, with limited American support.Trump’s submarine and shipbuilding deals are also in limbo. On the submarines, Trump wants them built at the South Korean defense firm Hanwha’s shipyard in Philadelphia, but the Lee government argues that South Korea offers more appropriate shipyards because they are already outfitted with advanced submarine-building capabilities. There is also the question surrounding the enriched nuclear fuel and associated sensitive technologies, which Seoul wants Washington to provide. But rules governing the bilateral relationship currently do not permit such transfers without specific exemptions or additional authorizations. When the submarine deal was first announced in October 2025, none of these issues had been properly considered by the Trump administration, provoking the current disputes. And on broader shipbuilding, South Korea’s $150 billion financial commitment has largely stalled. Indeed, the president’s Make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA) initiative has yielded zero concrete projects, embarrassing Trump, who wants to reenergize the U.S. defense industrial base and add manufacturing jobs. Progress on MASGA has also been hampered by a mix of legal, political, and financial obstacles.Finally, the fallout from the September 2025 ICE raids on South Korean workers at the Hyundai-LG battery plant in the United States continues. Although Seoul wrapped up its internal investigation without retaliating against the U.S. government, attorneys representing more than 300 of the workers, who were allegedly shackled and abused during the ordeal, are now pursuing administrative damages, possibly a precursor to civil lawsuits, against the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and others. The political rhetoric surrounding the case became heated on both sides as the legal process continues to unfold.Despite the growing tensions between them, South Korea and the U.S. remain staunch allies, and in fact, the Trump administration has referred to Seoul as a “model ally,” especially because of its increased defense spending. Lee and Trump reportedly spoke about future diplomatic engagements on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in China this week. But difficulties remain, and the next two years under Trump and Lee could prove even more turbulent when it comes to trade, investment, military cooperation, and foreign policy.Additionally, while many have interpreted the midterm elections as a rebuke of Trump’s foreign policy, they are unlikely to affect U.S.-Korea relations in substantive ways. The president typically has the lead on foreign policy, and lame-duck presidents tend to intensify their focus on it to secure their legacy. For South Korea, this likely means more, not less, of Trump, adding to Seoul’s urgency to somehow figure him out and stop making unforced errors.
Trump’s honeymoon with South Korea is over
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