Trump’s adversaries are betting they can wait him out

On Tuesday, voters handed Democrats both houses of Congress. President Donald Trump now has 26 months to secure foreign-policy results that will survive his departure. America’s adversaries face a different calculation: whether they can preserve their strategic positions until Washington’s priorities change. The election has shortened Trump’s political horizon without diminishing his immediate capacity to act.That distinction matters. Congress can investigate executive decisions, contest appropriations, and complicate sustained commitments. It cannot command American forces or independently direct diplomacy. Republicans lost Congress in November 2006, yet two months later George W. Bush announced the Iraq surge despite congressional opposition. Political weakness does not necessarily produce military restraint.The strategic contest is therefore not simply between American power and authoritarian resistance. It is between the time Trump needs to achieve lasting results and the time his adversaries can afford to resist him. Waiting is a strategy, but not everyone can afford it Russia and China operate on strategic horizons extending well beyond any American presidency. Moscow’s war against Ukraine depends partly on whether Kyiv and its supporters can sustain the costs of resistance. Beijing’s ambitions concerning Taiwan, regional influence, and technological competition are similarly independent of Trump’s electoral fortunes.Yet neither government gains an automatic advantage from Democratic control of Congress. Congressional opposition could make concessions to Russia more politically costly, while bipartisan concern about China limits the significance of partisan turnover. American political divisions complicate strategic calculations without eliminating American military power or longstanding national interests.For Moscow and Beijing, time is a resource supported by substantial military, economic, and institutional capacity. Other adversaries face more immediate constraints.Iran’s military capabilities have suffered considerable damage from American and Israeli operations. Continued resistance preserves Tehran’s strategic options but exposes the regime to additional military and economic costs. Negotiations could reduce immediate pressure, although an agreement that merely postpones confrontation would leave Washington’s underlying objectives unresolved.Trump faces the corresponding problem. Additional strikes could impose greater damage without securing Iranian compliance. A temporary agreement might provide political relief without producing durable restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The difference between military success and strategic success remains decisive. I was in Caracas in April 2002, when chavismo lost its president for two days but retained much of its governing apparatus. The lesson remains relevant. Washington removed Nicolas Maduro in January, yet Delcy Rodríguez governs from Miraflores, Jorge Rodríguez leads the National Assembly, and Diosdado Cabello retains considerable influence over the security establishment.The approaching selection of magistrates to the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia will help determine whether Venezuela’s political transition changes the institutions that sustained Chavista rule. Candidates are undergoing review, with a slate scheduled for presentation to the National Assembly on Dec. 11. Published procedures and opportunities to challenge nominees matter only if they produce genuine judicial independence.Courts will influence electoral disputes, the enforcement of results, and the protection of political rights. A judiciary beholden to entrenched interests could preserve the existing power structure even after an opposition electoral victory. Holding an election and enforcing its outcome are separate achievements.Washington possesses leverage through oil licensing and economic cooperation. Those arrangements should be measured against institutional reform, not simply petroleum production or diplomatic access. If Caracas retains control over the judiciary and security while receiving the economic benefits of cooperation, removing Maduro will have changed the leadership without fundamentally changing the system. Havana has survived decades of American pressure and successive administrations. Its failing electrical grid, however, cannot be repaired through political endurance alone. Repeated blackouts undermine economic activity, essential services, and daily life.Chinese solar installations and potential Brazilian assistance can relieve particular shortages, but neither guarantees restoration of Cuba’s aging generating capacity. The relevant question is whether outside assistance arrives quickly enough to preserve essential functions, and whether economic deterioration begins to weaken the institutions sustaining Communist Party rule.Cubans have demonstrated their willingness to protest. But repression, mass emigration, and weakened independent organizations have limited the ability to convert dissatisfaction into organized political change. Economic collapse does not automatically produce regime collapse.The security apparatus remains central to that distinction. External assistance sufficient to maintain essential government operations could prolong the regime’s survival without restoring normal economic conditions. For Washington, pressure that devastates civilian life without changing the government’s capacity to retain power is not necessarily strategic progress.The real contest is over irreversible outcomes Military operations can destroy capabilities. Sanctions can impose economic costs. Removing a president can disrupt a political system. None automatically changes the institutions, incentives, or strategic objectives that produced the confrontation.Russia can continue pursuing its objectives despite battlefield losses. China can sustain competition across American administrations. Iran can absorb military damage without accepting enforceable nuclear restrictions. Venezuela can replace its president while retaining Chavista institutions. Cuba can suffer economic collapse while preserving its security apparatus.These are different circumstances illustrating the same problem: American power can impose costs more quickly than it can produce lasting political change.Trump’s remaining authority is formidable. A president facing limited domestic legislative opportunities may devote greater attention to foreign policy, whether through diplomacy or military action. But the approaching end of his presidency also increases the importance of distinguishing achievable political objectives from temporary demonstrations of power.America’s adversaries face a corresponding risk. Delaying concessions may preserve their positions, but it also exposes them to continued pressure from a president who retains substantial freedom to act. Time is not an unlimited resource, particularly for governments confronting military damage, institutional deadlines, or economic breakdown.TRUMP’S FOREIGN FOES BASK IN REPUBLICAN MIDTERM DEFEATThe election has not resolved these confrontations. It has made their competing timelines more important.Trump still has the power to act. His adversaries have reasons to endure. The question is whether American power can produce results that outlast both the pressure applied and the president who applies it.