Trump thinks he’s negotiating peace. Putin is building underground drone cities

Just two weeks after President Donald Trump’s envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner left Kyiv, calling their talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “very meaningful,” Russia is investing in the industrial infrastructure to sustain a war that Washington is trying to end. The contrast deserves more attention.The Sept. 6 meeting was part of the Trump administration’s effort to revive negotiations. Witkoff described the discussions as “substantive” and “important,” while Kushner called them encouraging. Yet while diplomats search for a settlement, Russian factories are being expanded, hardened, and moved deeper into the country. The clearest example is Alabuga, the Tatarstan industrial complex responsible for much of Russia’s production of Shahed-derived Geran attack drones. Satellite imagery shows new production blocks under construction, adding to an industrial site that Moscow has already expanded significantly during the war.More striking is what is happening underground. Recent satellite imagery indicates that Russia has constructed roughly 42,000 square meters of underground space at Alabuga for what analysts assess could become additional drone-production facilities. The precise purpose of the structures has not been independently established, but the construction is consistent with a basic lesson of the war: production that can be found can be attacked, so production must become harder to destroy. Russia is simultaneously expanding the materials needed to manufacture those drones. The Rosatom-owned Alabuga-Volokno facility is planning 500 tons of additional carbon-fiber capacity annually by 2029. Analysts estimate that the additional material could support approximately 28,000 more drones each year. The significance is not simply the number of additional drones. Moscow is investing in the supply chain behind them, reducing a vulnerability created by dependence on foreign inputs.But Russia’s industrial response extends far beyond drones.In Biysk, in Russia’s Altai region, the Perm Powder Plant is developing a new military-industrial complex roughly 3,000 kilometers from Ukraine. Russian government documents reviewed by investigators describe a project with 60 planned buildings, including 38 principal structures covering nearly 49,000 square meters. The project is backed by more than 65 billion rubles in financing and is scheduled to reach full production capacity by November 2026.The location is not incidental. Moving missile-component production deep into Siberia increases the distance between critical industrial infrastructure and Ukraine. The project documents also reportedly provide for protection against unmanned aircraft, including air-defense systems. Russia is therefore adapting not only how much it produces, but where and how that production can survive.This is why the industrial side of the war deserves a place alongside the diplomatic one.Russia’s government has already articulated a long-term strategy for expanding domestic unmanned-aircraft production, with a 2025 draft envisioning more than 130,000 unmanned systems by 2030 and roughly 350,000 by 2035. The strategy also emphasizes technological sovereignty and replacing foreign components with domestic production.These investments do not prove that Moscow has abandoned diplomacy or that negotiations are doomed. States prepare for multiple outcomes simultaneously. But they do reveal what Russia wants to have available regardless of which outcome emerges.A ceasefire could stop the fighting, but it would not erase a new factory in Siberia, underground production space at Alabuga or expanded domestic supplies of critical materials. If diplomacy succeeds, Russia could emerge with a larger and more resilient defense-industrial base. If diplomacy fails, those same investments could allow Moscow to sustain a higher level of weapons production.UKRAINE IS HEADING FOR A HARD WINTER. PUTIN THINKS IT WILL BREAK THEM — THAT’S HIS MISTAKEFor Washington, that distinction matters. The diplomatic calendar can change in weeks; industrial infrastructure is built to last for years.The United States should therefore judge Russia’s diplomatic posture alongside the physical capabilities Moscow is creating while negotiations proceed. Russia’s construction projects cannot tell us exactly what Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to do, but they can tell us what he is preparing to be capable of doing.Maksym Panchokha is a senior at Bard College studying Economics and Global & International Studies, with experience in research and policy analysis at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations, and the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute.