Trump cannot freeze the Iran war on his own terms

On Monday, US President Donald Trump appeared to rule out another major offensive against Iran, at least for now. After speaking with Qatar’s prime minister, he said Washington was maintaining the “status quo”. In a Truth Social post, he said Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait favoured continuing the naval blockade and “Operation Iron Gate”. Further escalation was “quite unlikely”, he suggested, although US forces remained “locked and loaded”. Days earlier, Trump had been considering new strikes. Now he appears to favour keeping Iran under economic and military pressure without risking another major war. The flaw is obvious: Washington can choose to maintain a blockade. It cannot decide how long Tehran will tolerate it. Also on Monday, Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, called Washington a “desperate gambler”, denounced reports of “imaginary talks”, and demanded that the US “surrender” to Iran’s conditions. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters Trump sees a manageable stalemate; Tehran sees an unacceptable siege. For the Islamic Republic, this confrontation is existential. An indefinite blockade would inflict mounting economic damage, without guaranteeing relief or protection from another attack. Meanwhile, Gulf producers continue selling whatever oil they can export. Iran is left bleeding while others continue business. Asymmetric warfare Falling prices compound Tehran’s predicament: Brent crude plunged six percent on Monday, diminishing the global economic pressure that had helped Iran deter Washington. Tehran has little incentive to let its adversaries enjoy lower energy prices while its own economy remains strangled. Iran could therefore intensify disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, target shipping, or conduct limited but damaging attacks against regional energy facilities. Such escalation follows a pattern already visible: Reuters reported continuing tanker attacks and limited US strikes, even as Trump advocated the status quo. The logic of asymmetric warfare is different. Iran need not defeat the US military. It needs only to impose costs sufficiently punishing to overcome Washington’s will to sustain the war. Trump may hope that sustained pressure will force Tehran to concede. But Iran's leaders could instead escalate to make the blockade intolerable Above all, Tehran wants to establish that another attack cannot occur without prolonged, enormous economic losses. That deterrent, not battlefield parity, is central to its strategy. Iranian escalation could force Trump to respond. Limited US strikes will not compel Tehran’s capitulation, as two wars have already demonstrated. An all-out offensive, meanwhile, could trigger the very regional catastrophe he hopes to avoid. The US can devastate Iranian targets, but destruction does not guarantee surrender. An assessment of six military options by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank underscores the dilemma. Limited strikes may achieve little; broader bombing invites retaliation; securing enriched uranium could require a dangerous ground operation; and regime change offers no guarantee of a stable successor. Previous attacks damaged Iran’s capabilities without compelling Tehran to surrender its uranium, accept Washington’s demands, or reopen Hormuz on American terms. For leaders who believe the regime’s survival is at stake, further punishment may strengthen the determination to resist. Structural vulnerability A slew of analysts suggest Trump might try to bury his electoral defeat beneath a massive offensive before the Democratic Congress convenes on 3 January. David Sanger, White House correspondent for the New York Times, notes that lame-duck presidents sometimes turn to military power to demonstrate undiminished authority, recalling former President George W Bush’s escalation in Iraq after the 2006 Republican defeat. The argument is that an offensive before 3 January could create a military fait accompli, making incoming lawmakers reluctant to interrupt a war already under way. But that is like an accountant meticulously entering prospective profits while leaving the losses column blank. Iran has warned that renewed attacks could bring retaliation against Gulf energy infrastructure, data centres and undersea cables. Conflict monitor ACLED documented at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across six Gulf monarchies between 28 February and 30 July, nearly half involving energy facilities. A Congressional Research Service report recorded more than 6,700 drones and missiles fired at Gulf states by 17 May, while industry estimates placed energy-infrastructure damage above $25bn by early April. The vulnerability is structural. Destroy one critical component, and a far larger network can be crippled; alternative export routes are vulnerable too. Damaged liquified natural-gas (LNG) installations may take years to restore, while attacks on Gulf production could jeopardise exports and drive crude above $130 a barrel, according to one analysis. The warning from Saudi Aramco itself is even more sobering. Early last month, CEO Amin Nasser said the crisis had already removed nearly three billion barrels of gross oil supply. “Until Hormuz fully re-opens and confidence returns, the crude reality is that pressure at both ends of the barrel will intensify.” He was referring not only to crude oil, but also to refined products, such as gasoline, diesel and jet fuel. This is precisely why Gulf governments fear paying for decisions made in Washington. A military fait accompli could produce an economic fait accompli of its own. Tehran’s aim would be to make that prospect so credible that Washington could not contemplate another offensive without reckoning with the lasting damage. Congress' power of the purse Trump’s military authority does not give him unlimited money to sustain a war. The distinction matters: a president may order operations using existing authority and resources, but Congress controls future appropriations and can legislate restrictions on how even previously appropriated money is spent. The federal funding extension expires on 11 December, creating a confrontation over government spending. Democrats can withhold support for a new extension unless it contains restrictions on funding offensive operations against Iran. The warning is no longer abstract. Senator Chris Van Hollen declared: “I’m not planning to vote for anything that provides any funding to fuel the war in Iran.” He added that if Trump chooses to shut down the federal government to continue the war, the responsibility would fall on the president alone. Separately, Republicans’ proposed $73bn defence-funding package is only a budget blueprint, not appropriated war funding. The House approved the resolution 216-214; a single Republican switching sides would have defeated it. Iran war: Trump can continue the same failed policies - or shape a historic legacy Read More » Any actual funding measure must still pass Congress. Republican defections over Iran war powers show that party unity cannot be assumed, particularly after the midterms. Four House Republicans and four Republican senators broke ranks in June; seven House Republicans supported a war-powers resolution in September. Those votes did not themselves stop the war, but they exposed the fragility of Trump’s congressional backing. Congress has wielded its financial power before, during the Vietnam War. In 1973, it prohibited the use of funds, including money already appropriated, for US combat operations after 15 August. Then-president Richard Nixon signed the legislation; the bombing of Cambodia ended on that date. Trump’s weakened position matters. NBC’s national exit poll found that 63 percent of voters said the decision to attack Iran was wrong. Moreover, an AP-NORC poll found that seven in 10 registered voters want Congress to prioritise ending the war, which it never authorised. An economic shock from a new war would hit a president already punished at the ballot box. Trump may hope that sustained pressure will force Tehran to concede. But Iran’s leaders could instead escalate to make the blockade intolerable, increasing the risk of miscalculation and an expanding conflict. The US could respond with limited attacks that fail to settle anything, or a larger war whose economic and political costs could devastate Trump’s presidency. Neither outcome resolves the nuclear dispute. A prolonged siege risks renewed war and, eventually, a more dangerous confrontation. The alternative is a negotiated compromise, requiring concessions neither side can extract by force. Trump can choose not to start another all-out war. He cannot choose to keep Iran bleeding indefinitely without a response. The status quo is not an exit strategy. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.