To Disarm Hezbollah, Lebanon Need Only Enforce Its Own Laws

Hezbollah is testing whether Lebanese sovereignty is a slogan or has any real meaning. Last month, Lebanese authorities seized a Hezbollah explosives shipment at Dahr al-Baidar, a mountain pass that connects Beirut with the Bekaa Valley. The government’s subsequent enforcement actions have stalled amid procedural obstacles raised by Hezbollah and its allies. This prompted the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Japan on November 5 to call for a swift, independent judicial process free from political interference. But Lebanon does not need more diplomatic prodding or new legal initiatives. Its existing laws already provide sufficient grounds to restrict Hezbollah’s military activities. The Lebanese government now needs to enforce them over the group’s objections. Lebanese Law Provides No ‘Resistance’ Exemption Hezbollah has demanded that Lebanese authorities return the weapons seized at Dahr al-Baidar, arguing they are lawful “resistance” materiel because they were intended for use against Israel. But Lebanese law recognizes no independent Hezbollah right to wage war. The 1989 Taif Agreement ending Lebanon’s civil war called for all Lebanese and foreign militias to disarm and disband. Article 65 of the constitution vests decisions of war and peace in the government alone. On March 2, Beirut put that principle into practice by banning Hezbollah’s military and security activities and ordering it to surrender its arsenal. Lebanon’s international commitments reinforce the same rule. UN Security Council Resolutions 1559 and 1701 require militia disarmament and exclusive state control over the armed forces. Under the June 26 Framework Agreement reached with Israel and the United States, Beirut again committed to disarming nonstate armed groups, dismantling their military infrastructure, and asserting state control over Lebanese territory. Lebanon’s 1959 Weapons and Ammunition Law separately restricts the acts sustaining Hezbollah’s arsenal by penalizing unlicensed possession or transport of explosives. It therefore governs unauthorized weapons movements inside Lebanon, while Resolution 1701 also requires Lebanon to prevent cross-border weapons smuggling. Hezbollah Won’t Take ‘No Resistance’ for an Answer Lebanon’s military judiciary has charged 13 people over the Dahr al-Baidar shipment. Two remain detained, and 11 are at large. Hussein al-Abdallah, who directs Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Committee and handles contacts with state agencies, has reportedly pressed security and military officials to recover the weapons and halt the prosecutions, so far unsuccessfully. On November 5, al-Abdallah and a Hezbollah delegation urged Lebanon’s chief prosecutor, Ahmad Rami al-Hajj, to avoid convictions they said would cripple the “resistance.” Hezbollah has also sought to reverse the March 2 cabinet ban, conditioning renewed dialogue with President Joseph Aoun on its rescission. Aoun rejected that demand, conveyed through Hassan Choucair, director of Lebanon’s General Security agency. Rather than relent, Hezbollah is turning to the courts, where lawyers sympathetic to Hezbollah are challenging the ban. Maen al-Assaad, a lawyer who has publicly defended Hezbollah’s weapons and represents six at-large defendants, won a postponement of their questioning until November 17, after citing a separate lawsuit challenging the cabinet ban among his objections. That lawsuit, reportedly filed by May Khansa, another attorney with a history of pro-Hezbollah legal efforts, asks the Council of State, Lebanon’s highest administrative court, to strike down the decision altogether. If Khansa succeeds, the ban would be erased retroactively, undoing the government’s blanket prohibition on Hezbollah’s military activities and allowing challenges to enforcement actions and charges based on it. U.S. Must Help Lebanon Help Itself As a preliminary measure, Washington should continue insisting that Lebanon retain the weapons seized from Hezbollah. It should additionally urge Lebanese investigators to follow the current case up the chain — from the individuals who moved the explosives to anyone who ordered, financed, organized, protected, or facilitated the shipment — and bring those responsible to trial, with meaningful punishments for those convicted. Washington should also consider using targeted sanctions to facilitate this and future prosecutions of individuals involved in smuggling weapons for Hezbollah. That should include examining whether the conduct of Khansa, al-Assaad, and similar activist lawyers exceeds mere representation of their clients and crosses the line into knowingly helping Hezbollah evade disarmament or obstructing its enforcement.David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focused on Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon affairs. For more analysis from David, please subscribe HERE. Follow David on X @DavidADaoud. Follow FDD on X @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.