To be or not to be? Abortion and the question of moral ambiguity

The question asked isn’t just about a possible end to a life, but whether or not life is worth continuing. Hamlet, in the soliloquy, wrestles with the question of existence and uncertainty. Which is something we all must do. Which naturally brings us to baseball.The familiar phrase “the tie goes to the runner” has been around since the game began. But this isn’t actually the rule. The defense must establish that first base was legally touched before the runner arrived. This was an especially important rule prior to the advent of instant replay. How do you resolve what appears to be a tie? What seems to be a tie isn’t proof that the runner won or lost. A failure to establish that the runner is out is not the same thing as establishing that the runner is safe. The uncertainty itself has a consequence. The game has to resolve the ambiguity somehow, and the rule is designed to prevent an outcome from being declared when the evidence cannot establish it.There have been and currently are untold arguments about when a fetus becomes a person. The real question isn’t about when or whether we know a fetus is a person. That can be a debate over ambiguity forever. The question is whether not knowing gives us permission to act as if the fetus definitely isn’t a person. We could argue about what personhood is, but lack of agreement doesn’t establish that a fetus isn’t a person. If we can agree on uncertainty, then we might be able to agree that there is at least the possibility that having an abortion constitutes the killing of a being with rights. The consequence of this ambiguity is that uncertainty can’t simply be assumed to presume non-personhood. In effect, the tie goes to the runner as a way of resolving the unresolved question without pretending that the evidence has established something it has not. The baseball analogy is not meant to suggest that moral questions are governed by the rules of baseball. Rather, it illustrates a broader principle about uncertainty. When the evidence is insufficient to establish that the runner is out, we do not resolve the uncertainty by pretending that the runner was never there or that the defense definitely succeeded. We assign the consequence of that uncertainty according to a rule designed to avoid declaring an outcome that the evidence cannot establish. Moral questions involving irreversible consequences can present a similar problem. If we cannot establish that a fetus is a person, that does not by itself establish that the fetus is not a person. The uncertainty, therefore, becomes morally relevant, particularly when one possible error would involve the irreversible ending of a life that may possess rights. The question then is not whether baseball determines morality, but whether the principle of not treating unresolved evidence as proof of the opposite conclusion has a place in moral reasoning.What is the moral cost if we err? Consider the precedent that accused defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty. They are housed and provided meals, as well as medical care, at least until the case is resolved. Of course, abortion and crimes like capital punishment are not close to equivalent, which can’t be overstated. In the case of capital punishment, the consequence of being wrong is irreversible, which is why the possibility, however small, that the defendant is innocent is presumed to exist. If there is even a small possibility that a fetus is a person, should we not afford the same presumption, or does the ambiguity make the fetus morally irrelevant?Remember, we can’t establish if the fetus is a person. However, this is only one half of the moral equation, as it doesn’t account for the nine months of pregnancy or the life of the mother.There are a myriad of risks, complications, and costs associated with pregnancy. In effect, the woman is suffering the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. There is a cost associated with continuing the pregnancy, just as there is a potential cost associated with ending it. The uncertainty about personhood cannot make the cost to the woman disappear any more than the cost to the woman can make the uncertainty about personhood disappear.So, uncertainty about personhood is not equivalent with regard to competing possibilities. The possibility that the fetus is a person carries one kind of potential irreversible moral consequence, while the continuation of a pregnancy carries its own physical, psychological, and sometimes life-threatening consequences for the woman. Neither possibility can simply be treated as morally irrelevant because the outcome is uncertain.In fact, the moral ambiguity of a fetus does not resolve every abortion case. If a continued pregnancy would result in sacrificing a woman’s life, the uncertainty of fetal personhood doesn’t simply resolve the conflict. The more substantial the burden on the woman, the more difficult it becomes to justify asking her to bear that burden for an uncertain moral principle. But that does not make the fetus morally irrelevant either. The pregnancy imposes a cost on the mother, and abortion imposes a potentially irreversible cost if the fetus is, in fact, a person. Both possibilities have consequences. The question is how much certainty is necessary before we are willing to accept one of those consequences.THE UN CAN SAY IT A THOUSAND TIMES — ABORTION STILL ISN’T INTERNATIONAL LAWOf course, this is a ham-handed analogy. The point is not that a woman is a host and a fetus is a prisoner. The point is that, in either direction, there is a cost to resolving the uncertainty. Continuing the pregnancy means that the woman bears the physical and mental strain, the medical risks, and the demands of nine months of pregnancy. Ending the pregnancy means accepting the possibility, however uncertain, that a being with moral rights has been killed. Neither cost can be wished away simply because the underlying question of personhood remains unresolved.The question becomes whether to take an irreversible action or to live with the physical and mental strain of pregnancy for an uncertain moral principle. How much certainty is needed before a woman acts? Does uncertainty give moral permission? The most difficult question is what happens when a decision has to be made before certainty is possible, and afterward, there is no way to return to the moment when the decision was still open. To that end, there is a wonderful play by Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead. Near the end of the play, Guildenstern says, “There must have been a moment, at the beginning, where we could have said — no. But somehow, we missed it.”Andrew Moore is a small-business owner and author of the Primus Aeternus series.