Time for the West to plan ahead for post-Trump 2029

America’s mid-term congressional elections on November 3rdwill mark the beginning of the final two years of the Trump administration and thus the nearing of a potentially historic moment of reckoning for that country’s estranged allies. The reckoning may seem like a long way ahead, but in what historians will see as just the blink of an eye those members of the former West will face an awkward choice: Will they greet whoever is elected as his successor in November 2028 as a friend, as if nothing had changed in the previous four years? Or must the bitter, painful experience of Trump’s hostility mean that they must hold their former friend at arm’s length, believing that something has changed permanently in their country’s relationship with the United States? Much could happen during those two years to affect this calculation, whether in America, the world, or in the internal politics of each of the allies, be they Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, France or any of the others. But now is nonetheless the time to start planning for that moment. Whether a government feels optimistic or pessimistic about its country’s future relationship with the United States, it must work to get itself into the strongest possible position for dealing with that new president and his or her administration. In fact, many are doing so already. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney has spoken eloquently of the need to accept that there has been a “rupture” in the international order and has outlined ambitious plans to diversify his country’s trading, technological and defense relationships away from the United States and towards closer collaboration with what he called Canada’s fellow “middle powers.” European leaders, led by France’s outgoing president, Emmanuel Macron, speak of the need to develop “strategic autonomy.” Yet, admirable and bold though such ambitions undoubtedly are, they should be taken seriously but not literally, to borrow a phrase that has often been used about Trump himself. Carney knows that two years is too short a time for him to have any chance of fulfilling his declared ambitions for Canada. His long-term strategy is in truth a short-term maneuver designed to make such a plan possible but, he hopes, not actually necessary. His first objective in following this course is to make sure that he will still be Canada’s prime minister in two years’ time, for by talking proudly and patriotically about Canada’s sovereignty he hopes to maintain his popularity and keep his job. His second objective will, however, be more important: to provide himself and Canada with as much leverage as he can for the moment when he takes his first call from, or holds his first summit with, the new American president in 2029. It is the same for European leaders. They have known since Vladimir Putin attempted his full-scale invasion of Ukraine nearly five years ago that they needed to take more responsibility for the defense and security of their own continent, which is why the European members of NATO have increased their annual defense spending by more than 90% in the ensuing period, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. They have also taken over the full financial and military burden of supporting Ukraine, given that Trump brought such American support to an end in early 2025. They know that, to borrow a term from the financial markets, the transatlantic relationship has been “repriced.” But they still want that relationship to continue and to be restored to something close and co-operative rather than the insulting, bullying relationship under Trump. To paraphrase a traditional saying from the European monarchies: the West is dead; long live the West. European and North American allies are, in effect, converging on Japan’s approach. Japan knows that it has no “plan B” that can substitute for its security alliance with America, in the face of pressure from China, Russia and North Korea, so it must work to make sure that “plan A” can work as well as possible with hopefully less gangster-like US presidents than Trump and to Japan’s benefit, not its detriment. Europe and Canada are not quite in the same position, as they do have alternatives. But they also know that those alternatives would be much worse than working alongside the world’s biggest economy and most powerful military force. They want to recreate the collaborative traditions of the West, but on new terms. One important element of those new terms will be a more equitable sharing of the burdens of collective activities, most notably defense. Japan, Canada and the Europeans are already making big strides toward that goal. In fact, with America’s own public debt burden likely to put constraints on its own ability to spend more on defense, constraints its allies have already been feeling for years, the Western partners’ situations are converging. What Canada and the Europeans also want, however, is to ensure that America cannot just take them for granted and push them around. One interesting idea for how the European Union could do this was published recently by two scholars at the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University in Italy, Daniel Gros and Nathalie Tocci. They propose that the EU should invite other likeminded countries, which would generally be democracies with open economies such as Japan, Canada and Australia but could include others, to come together to sign what they call CORE – the “Compact for Open and Resilient Economies.” Under this compact, members would pledge to consult each other before taking trade, industrial policy or other major decisions that might affect other signatories. This would not involve binding treaty commitments but would instead involve a political commitment towards collaboration, a bit like an enlarged, more open version of the G7 – or the old Western world. The aim, rather like Carney’s plans for Canada, would in theory be to open the way towards greater autonomy from the United States. In practice, however, CORE would make participating countries harder for a post-Trump America to push around while also making them look like a more attractive and potent bloc that America itself might benefit from aligning itself with. The dream scenario would be for America to join CORE, but even if that will remain unlikely CORE could still serve as a powerful influence on American decision-making. The strangest element of Trump-era geopolitics has been that while America has been treating its allies with contempt, China has been working to reinforce and widen its own partnerships with Russia, Iran and North Korea, however troublesome those allies may be. The lesson will not be lost on whoever takes over as US president in 2029: Just like during the Cold War, allies will again be a vital instrument through which to achieve American goals at a lower cost than going it alone. So when the moment comes to re-create the western partnership after the Trump estrangement, Japan, Europe, Canada and others must aim to be in the best positions possible to negotiate what will be the geopolitical equivalent of pre-nuptial agreements. Looked at in that light, those two years will look to be too short, not too long. This is the English original of an article published in Japanese by the Mainichi Shimbun. It is republished with permission.