‘This Is Not About Meeting Halfway’ – Poland and Ukraine’s History Dispute

Below is an interview with Wojciech Konończuk, director of the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), on Ukraine’s historical disputes with Poland – and how reconciliation might take place. Michał Kujawski: What is the main point of contention in the Polish-Ukrainian dispute over the Volhynia massacres today? Is it the historical findings themselves, the way they are interpreted, or perhaps the emotions involved?JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Wojciech Konończuk: I think it is a bit of everything. Emotions are running high, as has been particularly evident since late May 2026, when President Zelensky named a military unit after UPA heroes. The root cause of the dispute, however, lies in an issue often presented as a debate between historians from the two countries, but that is an oversimplification. It is a dispute between Polish historiography, where there is a consensus, and the dominant strand of Ukrainian historiography over what happened between Poles and Ukrainians during WWII. Ukrainian historiography goes hand in hand with the official state narrative, which holds that there was a Polish-Ukrainian war and that both sides committed atrocities. According to this narrative, it was not a planned ethnic cleansing campaign but a fratricidal conflict. This is an attempt to create a false equivalence between the two sides. The Second Polish Republic’s policies towards the Ukrainian minority and Ukrainian citizens were not fair and were often outright discriminatory. There were also reprisals carried out by the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) in Volhynia. Other Topics of Interest Krakow Market Square Shooting Kills 6, Injures 15 A gunman killed six and injured 15 on Krakow’s Market Square on Saturday, prompting Donald Tusk to declare the mass shooting an act of terrorism. It is true that the Second Polish Republic’s policies towards minorities were as you describe them, but it is worth emphasizing that this is not a subject of controversy in Poland. Poles know about it, we write about it ourselves, and it is covered in school textbooks. There is no dispute about the false and discriminatory policy of interwar Poland towards ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians. There were also reprisals against the Ukrainian population during WWII. Were they coordinated, and did the military leadership approve of them? Actions targeting Ukrainian civilians were condemned and, above all, prohibited at the command level of the Home Army. On the territory of present-day Ukraine, the number of Polish victims was much higher. We are talking about 80,000-100,000 Polish victims and 3,000-4,000 Ukrainian victims. “Every victim matters, but this is not simply about numbers.” But if we consider what happened in what is now Poland, the number of Ukrainian victims was around 6,000-8,000, [and] Polish victims 4,000.Does focusing on the number of victims not ultimately lead to a public debate in which the two sides compete over whose suffering was greater? Every victim represents a tragedy, and definitions of ethnic cleansing do not make its classification dependent on the scale of the crime or the absolute number of victims. The actual figures vary depending on the methodologies used and the findings of individual studies.Yes and no. We are still talking about estimates. Professor Motyka, a leading researcher in this field, puts the number at 80,000-100,000 Polish victims.The figures are sometimes understated or overstated, particularly in political discourse and commentary. This ultimately turns into a numbers game. Every victim matters, but, for example, definitions of ethnic cleansing do not include a numerical threshold.Every victim matters, but this is not simply about numbers. Poland and Ukraine cannot find common ground on the facts, and more specifically, on the fact that this was a planned anti-Polish campaign.There are archival documents confirming the Ukrainian nationalists’ plan to remove the Polish population from Volhynia and Eastern Galicia. Legal criteria and terminology are important, but they are not the most important issue.The crux of the dispute is getting the dominant part of the Ukrainian side to acknowledge that this was a planned ethnic cleansing campaign. I stress the word “dominant,” because there are also prominent Ukrainian scholars, such as Professor Yaroslav Hrytsak, whose arguments are not far removed from Polish historiography. Those responsible for the mass killing of Polish civilians must be condemned.Looking at the debate in Ukraine, Professor Hrytsak appears to be in the minority.That is true. The dominant narrative is that of western Ukrainian nationalists. They are the ones promoting the idea of equal blame and a Polish-Ukrainian war. “After all, every nation has dark chapters in its past.” It is also largely thanks to this group that we hear claims that the OUN-UPA was the dominant national liberation movement, whereas the Ukrainian national liberation movement was, in reality, much broader.What explains the fact that the arguments and evidence presented by Polish historians are not accepted by a large proportion of Ukrainian historians, or at least by the dominant strand of Ukrainian historiography?Some arguments are discredited, while others are simply ignored.The extensive “Litopys UPA” series contains many documents that shed light on the UPA’s objectives and intentions. But there are many more archival records and testimonies of those who survived.For some people in Ukraine, this is inconvenient.Is the line between history and politics becoming blurred?In the case of certain figures, that line is indeed being crossed, particularly by historians involved in politics.Why is history so important to Poland? I encounter opinions that there is almost an obsession with it and that Poles want to portray themselves as victims.I don’t think it is an obsession. Rather, the Polish public is disappointed that Ukrainians, a close nation, are reluctant to recognize that part of their liberation movement is responsible for planned ethnic cleansing.Ukraine’s approach to historical policy will be a litmus test of whether the Ukrainian state has the courage to confront the darker chapters of its own history.After all, every nation has dark chapters in its past. Ukraine lacks publications that critically examine parts of its difficult history. Poland has been working through this process for decades and continues to do so. It is an ongoing process, not a permanent state of affairs. There needs to be a willingness in Ukraine to look in the mirror and confront the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations, but also the role of Ukrainian nationalists in the Holocaust. It is difficult to build a career working on these dark issues from the past. The false equivalence we discussed earlier will come to an end when these events begin to be examined critically in Ukraine.What is missing, then?A willingness to allow it. There are young Ukrainian historians who take a different view. I am not talking only about relations with Poland, but also about the way Ukraine approaches its own history.It is, however, an unrewarding field of study. It is difficult to build a career working on these dark issues from the past.The war is still ongoing. Is it not difficult to have these debates while the country is at war?It is difficult for Ukrainians to reassess the UPA today, seeing it not only as a national liberation movement but also as a formation whose members committed crimes. This requires courage.The Polish-Ukrainian dispute over history is growing. We are no closer to resolving it; if anything, we are further away. This is not a matter of political compromise or meeting halfway. At the historical level, the issue is about acknowledging the facts.Yet the issue is intertwined with politics and state-level commemorations. There are different levels of historical memory: individual, local and state. The way history is remembered in Lviv is entirely different from how it is remembered in Odesa. The policy of the central authorities is not yet clear on this issue. Much attention is being devoted to discussions about Ukraine’s National Pantheon, where considerable space is given to much more distant history, including the Cossack hetmans. The controversial figures we are discussing do not dominate the debate. How is this trajectory taking shape?That is true. Figures associated with the UPA may dominate the media, partly because of protests from the Polish side. Ukrainians very often view the history of the UPA primarily through the lens of what happened after 1944. “Reconciling these perspectives will not be easy.” Poles, in turn, focus on what the UPA did to the Poles in 1943-44. As a result, Ukrainians see these figures as steadfast fighters for Ukraine’s freedom who fought against Soviet occupation, whereas Poles see the UPA as perpetrators responsible for the ordeal suffered by the civilian population.We operate within different paradigms and focus on different periods of the UPA’s activity.What is needed, then? Greater awareness among the authorities in Kyiv of the significance and costs of pursuing a particular historical policy, as well as greater freedom for academics?Yes. What is needed is a change in the climate surrounding the critical interpretation of history, an understanding of the sensitivities of neighboring countries, and the courage to confront the darker chapters of the past – in this case, the history of the UPA.This does not mean dismissing the entire history of the formation or denying its heroic episodes, which it undoubtedly had after 1945, when it fought the Soviets. I have the impression that many people believe acknowledging the crimes could entail condemning the entire formation.I have encountered the argument that portraying the UPA as an entirely criminal organization closes the door to a possible compromise. It might be received differently if the discussion focused, for example, on particular units or commanders.It is difficult, however, to separate the responsibility of individual units from that of the UPA for what happened in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.The UPA commanders simply could not have been unaware of the massacres of civilians. On the Polish side, there is a need to acknowledge that after 1945 the UPA also had members who had not belonged to it previously, and that its struggle against the Soviets had a heroic dimension.Reconciling these perspectives will not be easy, however. The heroic record cannot be reconciled with the crimes that were committed.There are figures, such as Yevhen Konovalets, who are accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany but did not participate in crimes against civilians.That is true; he was a German collaborator. In the 1930s, the OUN received funding from Germany, and it collaborated with the Third Reich until 1942. The 1941 Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State (“Акт відновлення Української Держави”) contains a passage praising the Third Reich and Hitler.Let us return to historical memory politics. What does Poland expect?Poland’s expectations remain unchanged. They concern a green light for the exhumation and burial of Polish victims. Ukraine’s seven-year obstruction of exhumations and burials until 2024 was a grave mistake and did not generate goodwill in Poland. “Emotions have arisen around all of this, and they do not help resolve the issue either.” Ukrainian officials have repeatedly made statements about condemning the perpetrators and remembering the victims, but that is not the point. What matters is naming and condemning those responsible – namely, the UPA, which is unfortunately being glorified.Ultimately, this is a question for the Ukrainian state: With so many heroes of its own, does it really need these controversial figures or war criminals like Roman Shukhevych, and is it prepared to bear the cost of honoring them?Is an ongoing war a good time to reckon with history? Can this be done while the country is under air attack?I understand this point of view, but war is not a time for an uncritical, myth-making approach to history either.I fully understand that Ukraine has more pressing problems than the past. On the other hand, however, during this very war we have witnessed a historical policy that places on a pedestal figures who do not deserve to be there.Poland is primarily responding to various decisions made by Ukraine, such as the case of President Zelensky’s decision about “UPA heroes” or the Lviv region council’s decision to celebrate Shukhevych.Emotions have arisen around all of this, and they do not help resolve the issue either. Unfortunately, this Ukrainian approach to history, which ignores Polish sensitivity, makes it harder to build genuinely good and stable Polish-Ukrainian relations.