The war over Hormuz must not replace the fight against a nuclear Iran - opinion

ByMAJ.-GEN. (RET.) AMOS YADLINJULY 30, 2026 08:16Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington yesterday stood out primarily for what it lacked: a joint press statement and a photo op alongside US President Donald Trump. These images are particularly crucial for Netanyahu ahead of the elections in Israel, but their absence also reflects the growing sensitivity in the White House toward Israeli attempts to influence its policy on Iran.The meeting took place against the backdrop of the de facto ceasefire between Iran and the United States. The relative calm of the last days does not necessarily mean that the confrontation is nearing its end. Rather, it reflects a stalemate. Neither Washington nor Tehran is prepared to accept a low-intensity conflict born of their conflicting interpretations of the memorandum of understanding, yet neither is willing to pay the price of an all-out war.In both capitals, two approaches are competing for influence. In Tehran, one faction believes the regime needs an agreement to ease economic pressure and ensure its survival. Opposing them are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other actors trapped in a narrative of victory, who believe Iran can secure military gains against the US and the Gulf states that would dramatically improve its strategic standing.A similar debate is taking place in Washington. Proponents of negotiations seek to end the war and cut losses, fearing that further escalation will exact a heavy political, economic, and historical toll on Trump. Hawks, by contrast, argue that only additional military pressure will yield a better agreement. They do not necessarily desire total war but rather limited military achievements that strengthen American leverage at the negotiating table.Yet the mechanisms are asymmetrical. While Iran has multiple centers of power, the IRGC holds significant sway over the limits of compromise and ultimately presses the launch buttons for missiles and drones.IRGC commander Hossein Salami tours the new ''missile city'' at an undisclosed location in Iran, January 11, 2025 (credit: IRGC/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS)In Washington, by contrast, the final decision rests largely with one man: Trump. Consequently, the current halt could be a chance to let diplomacy work, or it could simply be a tactical intermission before another one-man decision – especially if the Iranians come to the table insisting on their own interpretation of the MOU.Throughout the crisis, a deeper problem has sharpened: The United States struggles to understand Iranian decision-making, while Iran thoroughly comprehends US vulnerabilities – an aversion to prolonged wars, fear of rising energy prices, domestic political pressures, and sensitivity to casualties.Tehran does not need to defeat the United States; it suffices to gradually raise the cost of the campaign until Washington seeks an exit. From Tehran’s perspective, regime survival is itself a victory.Following the collapse of the initial understandings, it seemed that pro-agreement voices in Washington had weakened and that Trump would opt for escalation. Yet Trump, despite his threats, wishes to avoid an endless war. Critics often describe this behavioral pattern with the acronym TACO – Trump Always Chickens Out: He threatens, raises the stakes, and then seeks a deal allowing him to claim victory.While simplistic and often mocking, the label identifies a core element of Trump's decision-making: the desire to wield power without getting sucked into the ongoing costs of war. American public opinion also denies him a blank check; recent polls point to a widespread desire to end the campaign, growing doubts over the utility of continued fighting, and mounting congressional criticism regarding the lack of clear objectives.It is possible that the campaign over the Strait of Hormuz has indeed persuaded the Iranians to show some flexibility. Military pressure, the naval blockade, and the fear of further infrastructure damage have incentivized Tehran to return – via Oman and other intermediaries – to talks on opening the strait and broader regional arrangements. Yet here lies the catch: The memorandum of understanding signed in June is less an MOU and more an MOM – a memorandum of misunderstanding.The document comprises 14 clauses and a preliminary 60-day window for talks on freedom of navigation, the nuclear file, missiles, and sanctions, but its ambiguous phrasing allows each side to read a different agreement into the text. For Washington, freedom of navigation means safe, unconditional passage through an international waterway. For Tehran, it may signify movement under Iranian-approved conditions.The US views the memo as a stepping stone toward a nuclear deal; Iran can view it as a framework for a ceasefire, economic relief, and ongoing talks without surrendering its core assets. This very ambiguity, which enabled the parties to sign it in the first place, is what complicates its implementation and threatens to trigger escalation.From Tehran and Washington to JerusalemThe primary danger for Israel is that the confrontation will cement in the global consciousness as the "War of Hormuz." Once freedom of navigation is restored – even partially – intense pressure will mount on Trump to declare mission accomplished and move on.Yet Israel's core strategic threat is the nuclear program, not control of the strait. While the outcome of the Hormuz struggle will impact America's standing against China and Russia and its leverage over Tehran, the maritime issue must never substitute for the nuclear file.Israel’s challenge is to ensure that success in Hormuz does not become a substitute for confronting the nuclear threat. But to speak plainly, Israel is not a central player in the current campaign. Even if Netanyahu has political or security reasons to favor renewed strikes, it is unclear what additional strategic objective could now be achieved. Previous attacks neither toppled the regime nor eliminated Iran’s ability to recover.More importantly, Trump is unlikely to allow Israel to drag him into an unwanted campaign. Recent reports already indicate Israel remains on the sidelines of diplomatic contacts, while Oman, Qatar, and other Arab capitals play pivotal roles.Netanyahu's leverage in Washington is lower today than in the past: The regime-change gambit missed its mark, the war is unpopular in the US, the White House dreads a global energy crisis, and Trump's regional channels run increasingly through Riyadh, Doha, Ankara, and Muscat rather than Jerusalem.Direct Israeli involvement would be justified in only two scenarios: if Iran attacks Israel directly, or if the United States requests specific, defined assistance. In such cases, contributing intelligence, defensive, and operational capabilities to weaken Iran's grip on the strait and bolster the US-led coalition is appropriate.A person holds a placard representing a US flag, with an image of Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on a billboard in the background, on the day of a ceremony marking 40 days since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed, in Tehran, Iran, April 9, 2026. (credit: MAJID ASGARIPOUR/WANA (WEST ASIA NEWS AGENCY) VIA REUTERS)However, Israel has nothing to gain from proactively initiating a war over Hormuz – especially when further strikes on nuclear sites hold no clear strategic payoff. Such a move might even compel Israel to support a weak settlement later simply for having military skin in the game.Israel’s proper role is diplomatic and quiet: repeatedly steering Trump back to the real issue – the nuclear program. Israel should support a broad coalition to protect energy arteries so the US does not shoulder the burden alone, while ensuring that a Hormuz settlement does not sideline the nuclear threat.Jerusalem must warn against a hollow deal engineered merely to supply Trump with a victory photo op and Iran with a breather, devoid of effective oversight, long-term limits, and a fix for Iran's breakout capability.If a good agreement is out of reach, Israel is better served by a state of "no agreement and no war": steering clear of all-out conflict while maintaining economic, diplomatic, and technological pressure on Tehran. Far from ideal, this option beats a global economic crisis, empowered extremists on both sides, and murky understandings. It also outranks a bad deal that buys the regime time, money, and legitimacy without sealing off the path to the bomb.Israel is not necessarily losing this struggle; it is simply sitting off the pitch where decisions are made. This signals a deep fracture in the strategic alliance with the US, but a fresh military strike will not fix it. Repairing trust, demonstrating clear contributions to American interests, and rebuilding political, technological, and regional bonds are essential.Still, Israel retains one non-negotiable red line requiring absolute freedom of action: an Iranian dash toward a nuclear weapon. If Tehran transitions from pressure tactics and threshold status to a verified, accelerated push for a bomb, Israel must stand ready to act alone.Until then, Israel must not confuse presence with influence, nor action with strategy. In the war for Hormuz, Israel plays no independent part; in preventing a nuclear Iran, its responsibility is irreplaceable.Follow us on Google