The prime UK sites at risk of Putin’s sabotage that are in every major city

The prime UK sites at risk of Putin’s sabotage that are in every major city

Where towns were once dominated by brick warehouses and factories which churned out goods to fuel the industrial revolution, now huge windowless steel monoliths are springing up to feed the AI-driven tech revolution. Data centres – essentially warehouses full of computers – are the new economic engines, and Andy Burnham has seized on Britain’s data centre boom as key to his pledge to deliver “growth in every postcode”. And it is true that the rapid increase in the facilities, which has turned the UK into one of the world’s data centre capitals with more than 520 sites, is helping to breathe life into the country’s flagging economic growth. But as such they are now prime targets in warfare. These sites are now so valuable to a nation’s security and economic fortunes they are becoming the new frontline in conflicts around the world, begging the question: how safe are the UK’s data centres from hostile attack? At the height of the Iran war earlier this year, Tehran bombarded cloud facilities belonging to Amazon Web Services (AWS) in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates with drones and missiles. Russia has also targeted Ukraine’s data centres while in turn, Kyiv last month bombed facilities owned by Yandex – the Russian version of Google – near Moscow. In all of these cases, services went offline for hours or days and, in the case of those Gulf states, the disruption is ongoing. The UK is not currently at war, of course. But experts have warned that Russia or another hostile state could target Britain’s data centre success story, either with drones or cyber attack, as part of its grey zone war against the West.Could Putin strike a UK data centre? Russia has small-range tactical drones that can fly up to 150 miles – meaning in theory an unmanned missile fired from one of its “shadow fleet” lurking in the Channel could reach one of Britain’s data centre hubs, such as Slough, which is around 50 miles from the south coast. This would be a high-risk tactic by Moscow, as any attack on Britain that could be blamed on Russia would trigger Article 5 of the Nato treaty. Yet Russia’s recent drone activity in Europe – including the attempted attack on cargo planes destined for Ukraine at Leipzig Airport in August – show how Vladimir Putin is increasingly blurring the lines between hybrid warfare and military conflict. Dan Bird, field chief technology officer at cyber security firm Horizon3, said: “Data centres are high-value infrastructure, and hostile groups and states will see them as a way to disrupt critical services for the NHS, financial services and government. “We’ve already seen drones over RAF bases and European airports, as well as Russian and Ukrainian drones straying into Nato territory. “Russia has the drone technology to cause considerable damage to UK infrastructure. A military drone picked up on radar before a huge explosion would point straight back to the actor. However small commercial drones carrying small explosives that start fires, for example, offer more deniability.” Joseph Jarnecki, senior research fellow in cyber and tech at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi), said the large size of data centres made them difficult to hide and therefore vulnerable. He said: “They are very large, they are very complex, and if bits of them stop working, such as power input or cooling, the whole thing can stop working. “If you know where to hit, or even if you hit a lot of things inside them, the cascading failure across the facility is, as far as we’ve seen in recent attacks across Ukraine, the Gulf, Russia, significant. “Using open source techniques, whether that’s satellite imagery or commercial maps, you can find them.” Are they vulnerable to cyber attack? The success of cyber attacks on supermarket fridges over the last few weeks underlined the damage hackers could wreak on essential infrastructure. Unlike retailers, however, data centres were classed as Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in 2024, meaning they are better protected both physically and through greater cyber security. But this does not make them impervious to hacking. Phil Tonkin, field chief technology officer at Dragos, said: “Cyber criminals see the potential for ransom, while state actors and activist groups recognise how central these facilities are becoming to the economy. “Much of the focus is on the servers inside, but data centres also rely on operational technology such as cooling, power distribution and backup generation. If the cooling or power fails, the whole facility fails, so those systems need the same attention as the IT.” Bird said that a cyber attack would be more difficult to attribute to a hostile entity than a physical drone assault. He said: “By the time a government is ready to name the culprit publicly, the damage is done. Taking a data centre offline could disrupt vital public and corporate systems all at once, with far less risk than flying a drone over a fence.” Marie Wilcox, vice president of market strategy at cyber security firm Binalyze, said: “Attackers love the path of least resistance. Why take the direct approach when you could target the power feeding the site, the remote access that keeps it running, or the employees themselves? “Weeks after the European fridge attacks, there’s still no definitive answer on who was responsible, and nobody is talking about Article 5.” What would the real-world impact be? The long-lasting damage caused by Iranian strikes to the AWS facilities in the Gulf – believed to be the first time commercial cloud facilities were targeted in a war – is seen as a watershed moment for data centre security. The impact of an attack – either drone or cyber – on a British data centre would depend on what sort of information the facility held. Jarnecki said major organisations like banks would have back-up facilities to boost their resilience. But he added that successful attacks, such as those in the Gulf, could dent confidence. He added: “The data centres that were struck [in the Gulf] in many instances, to the best of my knowledge, still haven’t been repaired fully, and we’ve seen diverse cancellations or sustained long-term pauses to the build-out more generally. “So I think that the potential impact on confidence from an economic perspective could be negative.” Wilcox said: “Major banks and financial institutions won’t rely on one data centre or building. “They’ll have backup locations and processes in place so systems and people can switch over quickly. An attack on one site would likely cause disruption for hours or at most days, but the priority will be switching across and bringing services back online, starting with the most critical.” Damage from a physical drone attack would be more easily identifiable, Wilcox said, whereas a cyber attack would be harder to predict and potentially take longer to recover from. She added: “First the organisation needs to know how far attackers have penetrated so it can respond appropriately. “Even then, systems that copy data between sites can carry damaged data or the attackers’ access across with it, so switching sites may simply move the problem. “Before a bank can safely bring services back, it needs to establish how the attackers got in, whether they’re still inside and what they’ve touched. “Until then, anything running from that site could be affected, from card payments and online banking to customer service chatbots and the systems processing mortgage and loan applications. Every hour of uncertainty adds to the financial and reputational damage.” Data centres are better protected than fridges Classifying data centres as CNI gives them extra protection, Bird said, both from the National Cyber Security Centre, which gives a firm priority access to help during an incident, and the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), which offers some physical protection such as perimeter security, under the umbrella of MI5. But Bird added: “The Critical National Infrastructure status cuts both ways. Naming a site as critical to the country also tells a hostile state where to aim. “As more of the UK’s data and services sit in a small number of facilities, each one becomes a bigger prize.” If a missile-bearing drone were fired towards a data centre hub, and was spotted in time, the UK military has ways to intercept it: either through ground-based missile interceptors or air defence systems on Type 45 Destroyers. But a small-sized drone fired from a shadow fleet vessel in the Channel could still slip through. The Armed Forces Bill, which is due to become law by the end of the year, will give military personnel new powers to shoot down drones near or over UK military bases. A power outage at a Google Cloud data centre in London caused serious network disruptions to its services (Photo: Ben Stansall/AFP via Getty Images) Yet similar powers do not exist for civilian CNI like data centres. Tom Hegel, distinguished threat researcher at SentinelOne, said: “Concentration could also expose risk in certain areas. “The United Kingdom’s data centres are concentrated largely around London and the Thames Valley, which accounts for roughly 80 per cent of the UK’s total data centre capacity. A small number of substations and fibre routes therefore carry much of the country’s digital activity.” What can the UK do to protect them? Experts agree that the government is alive to the risks that the data centre boom could attract. Wilcox said: “I can’t speak for the MoD or Cabinet Office, but hybrid threats are clearly on the radar. The bigger question is whether that attention reaches all the privately run infrastructure it needs to, and the suppliers who manage it remotely.” Asked about the risks to data centres, the government said it was constantly updating its response to the widest range of threats and scenarios to ensure the UK was fully prepared for every eventuality. It said it took the threat posed by hostile drones to critical sites extremely seriously, including the publication of the Home Office’s Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Strategy, and a national police counter-drone capability that helps protect major events and allows response to hostile drone incidents around the UK. This capability includes a range of specialist equipment, vehicles, and personnel to ensure a flexible and effective response. The NPSA provides guidance on how data centres and other CNI sites can improve their protective security against drone threats, and other national security advice. In February, the government established new restricted airspace areas over 44 critical defence sites in the UK, banning the use of drones. This will be expanded to a further 160 sites this autumn. Since taking office, the Labour government has quadrupled its spending on anti-drone kit, with the Defence Investment Plan investing £750m into counter-drone systems and protection for the armed forces, both at home and deployed overseas.

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