The Military Strategic Drivers Behind China’s Nuclear Expansion

The Military Strategic Drivers Behind China’s Nuclear Expansion

In June 1993, a group of Second Artillery Corps senior leaders gathered at the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. The organizers brought Li Xuge, recently retired commander of the Second Artillery, as a special guest for the event. Li had watched the Second Artillery develop from its infancy to this day, when China finally tested a ballistic missile capable of striking anywhere within the United States. However, Li had received significant pushback on the program in the years prior to this launch. In the early 1990s, China’s military strategy was shifting to focus on war with Taiwan. In that environment, senior leaders questioned the value of a global-ranging missile: Who would they even target? Li managed to receive approval for the development, but only because it did not require extra funding and had initially been an objective of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decades earlier. As in Li Xuge’s time, China’s nuclear forces today are one of many elements of the country’s military power that support its broader military strategy. To properly understand Beijing’s approach to nuclear weapons and the drivers behind its recent nuclear expansion, analysts need to place developments within the context of China’s overall military strategy. China’s nuclear force has changed significantly since the early 2000s and especially since 2019, fielding a larger array of intercontinental systems, shifting towards a launch-on-warning posture, and developing precise-regional range systems. However, China’s general approach to nuclear strategy has remained relatively consistent — China’s nuclear force deters nuclear attacks and prevents nuclear coercion. What has changed is less about China’s nuclear strategy than about the military strategy China’s nuclear weapons support. Shifts to China’s military strategy in 2004, 2014, and 2019 have increasingly focused on the need to counter intervention by a nuclear-armed United States during a Taiwan conflict. Shifting preparations towards fighting the United States includes the need to develop credible nuclear response options to deter U.S. nuclear employment. Beijing has increasingly prioritized the nuclear component as it perceives the United States is lowering its threshold for nuclear use and integrating nuclear weapons into its Taiwan war plans. In developing credible response options, China seeks to take nuclear weapons off the table for the United States, deterring a perceived key element of U.S. military strategy and thus limiting its ability to intervene. Policymakers should examine the overarching objective that China’s nuclear forces are meant to serve and focus their efforts on the best way to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Origin StoryChina’s military strategic guidelines determine its military strategy, which guides the overall objectives of its military and the wars it is preparing for. Beneath this level sit the various forms of military force in China’s employ, each serving unique roles in pursuit of these larger military strategic objectives. These include theater strategies, which guide China’s military theater commands in charge of employing its military forces to achieve these goals; service strategies, which guide the military services responsible for manning and equipping those forces; and other areas such as nuclear strategy. People’s Liberation Army texts establish that China’s nuclear strategy serves the country’s overall military strategy, rather than operating in isolation. The 2012 textbook Lectures on Combat Force Development, for example, states “strategic nuclear forces tasks are determined primarily by the state’s military strategy, along with the nuclear policy and nuclear strategy formed under the guidance of that military strategy.” Nuclear weapons, as with all other elements of the Chinese military, are one tool of many, performing specific tasks in pursuit of China’s broader military strategic objectives. In 1993, China’s military strategic guidelines pivoted to Taiwan. Subsequent changes in 2004 and 2014 maintained a Taiwan focus while assigning a steadily increasing role to counter the United States, as concern grew that it would intervene in a Taiwan conflict. While the objectives of China’s nuclear strategy remained relatively consistent, these changes in military strategy shifted the conflict China’s nuclear strategy would operate in, making the United States its primary target. Thus, China’s nuclear forces needed to deter U.S. nuclear attacks and coercion during a fight over Taiwan. However, China’s nuclear force was ill-suited to assure retaliation against the United States in a Taiwan conflict. In the early 2000s, China primarily possessed a small array of regional-range nuclear systems that could not reach the continental United States, with only 18 silo-based DF-5A missiles capable of striking the U.S. mainland. These were stored unfueled and without warheads. China’s nuclear force was vulnerable to preemptive strikes and posed almost no threat to the United States. As China’s military strategy began realigning its efforts toward the United States, the service strategy of the military services tasked with training and equipping forces to meet these goals also began to change. The People’s Liberation Army sought to ensure it could execute the tasked nuclear strategy in the context of the conflict it had to prepare for. The 2006 Science of Service Strategy noted increasing nuclear risks from the United States as confrontation grew, with the country’s superior nuclear force and missile defenses undermining the credibility of China’s response. It called for improvements to China’s intercontinental-range nuclear force, particularly in mobility. During this period, China began deploying the DF-31 class, providing a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile capability and increasing its number of intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. As time marched on, Chinese leadership grew increasingly concerned about the extent of U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict. As such, the requirement to deter U.S. nuclear attacks during that conflict also grew more urgent. The 2013 Science of Military Strategy highlights a growing nuclear threat from the United States and notes the need to focus on intercontinental-range missiles given the distance from “China to its main strategic opponent.” The text notes the need to develop a wide range of capabilities — including defense penetration, readiness, and multiple warhead technology — to execute its assigned nuclear strategy. Following that same logic, the 2013 text Lectures on Service Strategy states that China should accelerate the replacement of nuclear forces with intercontinental systems, keep optimizing force structure, strengthen strategic ballistic-missile early warning, push the development of a new generation of nuclear missiles, appropriately increase the number of nuclear warheads, and strive for a qualitative leap in combat performance. By 2019, China had introduced a wide array of mobile intercontinental missiles, some with multiple warheads, and had shifted to a nuclear force of roughly 90 missiles capable of targeting the continental United States. These missiles were increasingly mobile and survivable, with significantly improved defense penetration technology and operating at higher readiness levels. That same year, China revised its military strategic guidelines once again, unveiling the “Military Strategic Guideline for a New Era”. These new guidelines kept Taiwan as the primary strategic direction but shifted China’s focus to more directly confronting the United States. In one of a special series of authoritative essays on the new guidelines from the Academy of Military Sciences’ Military Art, Deputy Eastern Theater Commander Wei Gang explained the “profound adjustment of the international strategic landscape” that had driven the change in military strategic guidelines. In the essay titled “Some Thoughts on Strategic Guidance for the Struggle against the Powerful Adversary,” Wei described a stark environment, fueled by a “fundamental difference in development paths” between the two countries. Wei claimed the United States was undertaking a whole-of-government strategy to undermine China, which it regarded as a “long-term, primary, and comprehensive strategic competitor.” U.S. actions included employing a wide array of new military measures designed to “encircle and provoke” China, while noting General Secretary Xi’s view that the United States “may charge at us at any time.” These “new situations” required a strategic shift from simply “responding to intervention by the powerful adversary” to instead “directly crossing swords with the powerful adversary,” a strong statement indicating that a war fought over Taiwan would put the People’s Liberation Army in direct conflict with the United States. The struggle against the United States became the “strategic task that underpins national rejuvenation,” a concept describing China’s rise to its perceived rightful global position and explicitly requiring unification with Taiwan. The text called for a long series of military measures to “enhance the capability to counterbalance the powerful adversary,” including increased investments in nuclear forces. As China’s conviction hardened that it would need to directly confront the United States in a war over Taiwan, so did its concerns that the latter would employ nuclear weapons to deny its capability to succeed. Around 2018, Beijing became increasingly concerned that the United States was lowering the nuclear threshold and was willing to employ nuclear weapons against a Chinese invasion fleet of Taiwan. Recent Chinese sources show a continuation of this trend as well as concern about U.S. nuclear first strikes. Writing in a 2025 Military Art article titled “An Analysis of Development Trends in International Nuclear Forces,” writers from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force described a further lowering of the U.S. nuclear threshold, particularly with the United States “accelerating the research, development, and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.” Authors from the Academy of Military Science described U.S. actions to “balance against the development of China’s nuclear forces” and “break the existing strategic balance” in a 2026 World Military Review article titled “An Assessment of the International Nuclear Strategic Posture.” They claim the United States intends to “raise the number of deployed nuclear warheads to over 3,000” and is “reactivating the concept of ‘limited nuclear war,’” further lowering the nuclear threshold. As these concerns grew, China increasingly prioritized the role of nuclear forces in accomplishing this broader military strategy to ensure that U.S. nuclear first strikes could not deny China a victory over Taiwan. In an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 2019, China developed the 2027 goals for the People’s Liberation Army, organized under the “three major strategic capabilities” — the capability to achieve “strategic decisive victory” over Taiwan, to “strategically counterbalance” the United States, and to achieve “strategic deterrence and control” to limit horizontal escalation. These goals accelerated key aspects of the People’s Liberation Army’s existing modernization that China needed to prioritize in pursuit of its military strategy. Observers of China’s nuclear force have highlighted the role of “strategic counterbalance” within China’s approach to nuclear weapons. The term represents a core task of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and includes a wide array of nuclear and conventional capabilities geared toward confronting the United States. What’s new is the importance and acceleration of these capabilities. Following these changes, Xi Jinping has repeatedly called for accelerating a strong system of strategic deterrence to meet China’s 2027 objectives, with nuclear weapons as a core, but not the only, element of China’s strategic deterrent. War on the Rocks Membership Newsletters. Podcasts. Analysis. Exclusive members-only dispatches, premium shows like The Russia Contingency with Michael Kofman, and expert analysis of the conflicts shaping national security. Military, government, and students 33% off with a .mil or .gov email50% off with a .edu email Choose annual, then sign up with that email address. No code needed. A Nuclear Shield for Conventional AttackObservers should understand China’s nuclear force today and its continued developments as one element within the context of China’s broader military strategy. First and foremost, China’s military focus is developing a force that can succeed in a fight over Taiwan. This involves a wide array of tools necessary for overwhelming Taiwan and succeeding in an amphibious landing and occupation. Particularly after 2019, this also increasingly includes the ability to directly confront a perceived increasingly belligerent United States during that operation. Nuclear weapons are one of the many instruments that serve this purpose, alongside a growing role for capabilities such as space, cyber, long-range strike, and far-seas naval operations among others. The specific task of China’s nuclear force in confronting the United States and limiting intervention is to prevent nuclear use and coercion against China during that fight. In other words, China’s nuclear strategy is geared toward creating a “nuclear shield” that deters the United States from using nuclear weapons to defeat an invasion force or target China’s cities and industry during operations against Taiwan. To do this, China believes that it is essential to possess a survivable, intercontinental and regional-range force that operates at higher readiness levels and can credibly respond to any threat the United States can muster. China wants to take nuclear weapons off the table for the United States in a fight over Taiwan and thus accelerated the development of its nuclear force. Chinese military writings are increasingly clear on the role nuclear weapons will play in counterbalancing the United States in pursuit of unification with Taiwan. Educational lectures contained in an October 2022 edition of Rocket Force News describe nuclear weapons as a prominent feature of great-power competition, stating that possessing a stronger nuclear force would be necessary to regulate adversary “nuclear provocations” in pursuit of the goal of national rejuvenation. Speaking directly to achieving “complete reunification” with Taiwan, an author in a key journal on Chinese Communist Party ideology stated that “China is building a strong system of strategic deterrence forces in order to resolutely oppose interference by external hegemonic forces.” Over recent years, Chinese strategists have increasingly come to believe that in developing a force that can deter U.S. nuclear attack, they can also deter U.S. conventional operations as the United States integrates nuclear weapons more deeply into its conventional war planning. There has long been some understanding within China that nuclear forces play a role in deterring broader military interactions. However, military writings over the past few years have grown more candid regarding the role Chinese nuclear weapons can play in directly deterring U.S. conventional actions. This appears to stem from a growing belief that nuclear weapons are central to U.S. military planning for a conflict with China and thus deterring their use constrains a key element of American strategy. In a 2023 textbook titled Introduction to Missile Weapons Systems, cadre at the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force University of Engineering — the military academy that trains Rocket Force cadets — added preventing “military interventions from other countries” as a direct objective of Chinese nuclear deterrence, a departure from traditional writings on the topic. Writings from prominent authors in Military Art across 2024 to 2025 discuss this in even more explicit terms. For example, a series of Academy of Military Science authors in a 2024 article titled “The U.S. Proxy War Model and Countermeasures” discuss the “‘Ukrainization’ of the Taiwan question” and perceived U.S. plans to turn a war to unify with Taiwan into a U.S.-China conflict. As the leading countermeasure, the authors describe the need to build a “powerful strategic deterrence force system”, specifically calling out further developments in a wide array of nuclear forces, to “prevent external forces from intervening in the war of reunification”. The authors claim that “only if we possess the strength and will that the U.S. military dreads can we snuff out its idea of military intervention.” In an article titled “Research on the Asymmetric Operational Employment of Navy Submarine Forces,” a group of Chinese Navy authors discussed “using the nuclear to curb the conventional” to deter U.S. military intervention. They claim they need the nuclear capacity to retaliate under all circumstances, so that the enemy is convinced that, in the event of being struck by its nuclear and conventional weapons, we still have the capability and the determination to resolutely carry out nuclear strikes, thereby achieving the aim of overawing and halting military intervention against us by the powerful adversary and guaranteeing our right to freedom of military action in safeguarding core interests in the course of the great rejuvenation. Finally, in a 2025 article titled “Making Combined Efforts to Raise the Quality of Preparations for Military Struggle in the Maritime Direction,” People’s Liberation Army Navy authors insisted on the need to use “nuclear forces to check conventional ones,” in response to the United States’ increasing integration between nuclear and conventional force planning. They claim China should accelerate the construction of a credible and reliable nuclear counterattack force as nuclear and conventional operations became further blurred and a more prominent component of great-power competition. The emerging use of nuclear weapons to deter U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict is the primary area where analysts might identify specific evolutions of the objectives of Chinese nuclear strategy. Despite this, the mechanism used to deter intervention—a survivable retaliatory force that can counterattack under any conditions—remains identical to previous Chinese thinking on the topic. Beijing believes that American strategists are more deeply integrating nuclear weapons into a wide range of military planning, citing as evidence conventional-nuclear integration and the use of tactical nuclear weapons to support military operations in the Pacific. In facing a combined conventional-nuclear threat from the United States, maintaining a strong and reliable nuclear counterattack force becomes central in responding to that challenge. Thus, by deterring the nuclear force that is perceived as increasingly central to U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, you support the objective of deterring American intervention. The writings discussing the topic are still geared towards a traditional, retaliatory model to achieve the desired effects, instead of threatening nuclear first strikes to deter U.S. conventional actions. Since Chinese strategists believe that U.S. nuclear weapons are increasingly central to U.S. plans for intervention in a Taiwan conflict, taking nuclear options off the table for the United States helps deter American intervention writ large. Writings discussing the topic still favor a traditional, retaliatory model to achieve the desired effects, rather than threatening nuclear first strikes to deter U.S. conventional actions. As with any problem in international affairs, the drivers behind China’s nuclear expansion are multi-faceted. International status has a long-standing role in China’s views of nuclear weapons, and Chinese concerns of a U.S. first strike or conventional counterforce options are longstanding concerns and key areas that China would need to prepare for within a Taiwan conflict. But understanding the growth of changes to China’s nuclear force as one component of a broader pattern of evolutions in military strategy paints a more complete and coherent picture while aligning with the way the People’s Liberation Army discusses the role of its nuclear force. On the other hand, explanations such as China planning to employ nuclear first strikes or attempting to surpass U.S. nuclear force size contradict the robust discussion on the role of China’s nuclear force in deterring the United States as China’s military and political leaders describe. When trying to understand China’s growing nuclear force and develop effective responses, defense planners would be wise to examine the best means of countering strategic military objectives over Taiwan as opposed to narrowly reviewing symmetric responses. Understood properly, U.S. nuclear forces are one of many elements of U.S. national power and may or may not be the best means of deterring an invasion of Taiwan. If Beijing believes it can now launch on warning of a large-scale U.S. strike and respond proportionally to control escalation in the face of a limited U.S. first strike, it may no longer believe the United States has credible nuclear options to threaten it during an invasion of Taiwan. In this case, it seems unlikely that additional U.S. nuclear forces would alter this situation, and thus they may not provide significant benefit from a deterrence perspective. This outlook would be different if China were instead seeking a posture geared towards preemptive first strikes or damage limitation, where additional U.S. nuclear forces could complicate Chinese nuclear targeting. U.S. defense planners should examine the cross-strait security dynamic as a whole, weighing which investments across the force would best disrupt China’s attempts at an amphibious landing and credibly complicate its planning. Gerald C. Brown is an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. His research focuses on Chinese military and security issues, cross-strait security, and strategic deterrence. Brown was previously an analyst in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has spent time as a researcher supporting the Department of Defense and served in the United States Air Force. All opinions are his own and do not represent those of any current or former employers. Image: Tyg728 via Wikimedia Commons

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