The Mecca Agreement – Q&A

Q? So why the Mecca Agreement, what are the key drivers?Answer – Quite obviously, I think the main driver for the Mecca Agreement (MA) is the newfound insecurity felt by all three signatories, but particularly by Saudi Arabia, in the context of the ongoing Iran war. MBS has developed the Vision 2030 for Saudi Arabia to transform the country economically, but I think also as a means to cap social and political risks within the system; the key requirement for successful social and economic development of Saudi Arabia is security. MBS had assumed that he had assured security for Saudi Arabia via cementing the existing US military backstop – by pandering to Trump’s desires for big investments into the US, and through economic engagement and normalization with Iran. The latter was brokered by China in the landmark Saudi – Iran deal in March 2023. MBS wrote big cheque commitments to Trump to invest in the US economy and he assumed that when push came to shove the US military would provide a defensive shield for Saudi Arabia as it had during the Gulf War. Never did Riyadh imagine that, not only when Iranian missiles began to head to Saudi Arabia, the US would fail to provide adequate air defense for Saudi Arabia, but that US belligerence had in many ways pushed the region into war – the US & Israel attacked Iran in the midst of peace talks in February 2026. Even prior to that, though the fact that the US failed to stop Israel in its missile strikes against Hamas officials in Qatar, I think, demonstrated to Riyadh that for the US, Israel came first, and that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states fell low down its pecking order, while there was actually little restraint in Israel. Israel could attack anywhere in the Gulf unconstrained, and many saw Israeli policy as actually favoring a zone of instability around it, which suggested rolling attacks across the region – which would be counter to MBS’s core need in Vision 2030 for security. All this further affirmed by limited provision by the US of air defense missiles for Saudi Arabia et al, at their hour of need, while supply to Israel was prioritized. Other Topics of Interest Out of Patriots, Dead Generals, and a Reform From the Top Stefan Korshak, Kyiv Post’s military correspondent, shares his perspective on recent developments in Russia’s war in Ukraine. JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official.And when it came to the normalization with Iran, the war proved that even that had limits, and when Tehran faced an existential threat – spelled out by the US and Israel in their prior call for regime change – the Islamic Republic would do whatever it needed to do to survive, and to take the war to the US, which meant causing global economic impact through retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, and blocking the Straits.The writing had already been on the wall for efforts by Saudi Arabia to diversify its security arrangements, as seen by the Saudi – Pakistan strategic defense agreement concluded just after the Israeli strikes in Qatar, but before the latest Iran war, but the Mecca Agreement looks to go beyond and expand that, creating a new regional defense arrangement for Muslim Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia.More broadly I think the agreement signals that former US allies are no longer trusting of the US and are looking to diversify their own security arrangements. I think in this the MA signatories are no different from US allies in Europe, or Canada, Japan and South Korea. In the war in Iran, the US, or rather Trump, acted in its/his interests, very much against the interests of key allies in Europe, Asia or the Gulf. The war elevated energy prices against the core economic interests of Europe or Asia. The war undermined security in the Gulf against the interests of Gulf states, Pakistan, or Turkey. The war depleted critical supplies of US munitions against the interests of all US allies – and as now seen with Ukraine’s mission critical shortage of Patriot air defense interceptor missiles. The US failed to adequately consult with key allies, aside fromIsrael, prior to launching its strikes on Iran, and seemingly where it did, it failed to listen to their best advice. So if the US fails to take the interests of key allies into account, they need to look after their own best interests which means developing greater defense autonomy, either alone or with new allies.Why the enthusiasm by Pakistan and Turkey?Answer – I think both share Saudi’s concerns around the regional security setting, and a nervousness over the reliability of the US, albeit I think the leaderships in both countries have done wonders in playing to Trump’s ego to keep him onside for their own national security interests. I think that is hedging: play nice with Trump, while looking for new defensive partners and alliances. In Pakistan and Turkey’s case though both have fragile economies, and the prospect of a defense pact that opens the way for potentially huge investments in their economies from KSA is a huge win for both. Pakistan is still recovering from a near default scenario a few years back, has large annual financing needs and limited FX reserve cover. Turkey is similarly coming out of a decade–plus of perennial balance of payments crises prior to the recent Simsek stabilization. Simsek has managed to stabilize the BOP, and rebuild reserves, but they are still not at comfortable levels. And a strong FX reserve backstop is central to the CBRT’s policy of using real FX appreciation as central to its disinflation drive, and inflation is the number one economic problem in Turkey. A big slug of investment, or financing from KSA, would go a long way to assuring Turkey’s financing position to hold the FX to enable inflation to push much lower, and that would certainly help Erdogan’s reelection chances. But for Turkey and Pakistan they face military threats on numerous fronts, and need financing to fund upgrades to their militaries and defense tech capability. In Turkey’s case Erdoğan has announced plans to invest $22 billion in a new Steel Dome air defense program, and an additional $140 billion in defense spending over the next decade but it is unclear how that will be financed. Turkey is developing the Kaan fifth–generation fighter jet, but needs to develop an indigenous engine, on par with the UK’s Rolls Royce, which will be hugely expensive. Plus Turkey wants to develop long–range ballistic missiles, and to cement its lead already in drone space. All this costs big bucks, which Turkey does not really have. But cooperation with Saudi Arabia could potentially provide that – imagine, KSA has huge sovereign wealth assets ($1 trillion plus in SAMA and the central bank), assets in Aramco of circa $1 trillion, and with a relatively lowly debt ratio and ability to leverage up further. And if MBS rationalizes the Vision 2030 program away from spending on social infrastructure to defense and logistics, then Turkey, and Pakistan potentially would be huge winners via new defense orders. And on logistics and energy, the room for cooperation is immense. Both Turkey and Pakistan are huge energy importers, but in Turkey’s case it offers KSA a chance of diversification of pipelines and logistics chains away from the Straits and to Europe.Actually, I think the core of the MA is the recognition by all three MA signatories that by cooperating they can all improve their individual military capabilities. In a way it is not like NATO where pooling resources, common procurement and standardization, and cooperation have, if anything, enabled NATO members to do more with less. I think with MA members that cooperation can moon shot their individual defense capability. Each wants their own autonomous air defense capability, their own fifth–generation fighter jet et al, but by using each other’s respective strengths in finance, or technology, or frontline battle experience, they can all get much better systems at a better price through cooperation.Financing linked, but for Turkey a deepening in ties with KSA offers the prospect of increased Saudi engagement in the peace process and reconstruction in Syria, potentially Iraq, as well as domestically in Turkey as the Kurdish peace process of rolled out.Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank are also areas where the three could further cooperate – albeit therein much to the consternation ofIsrael.Do you think other US allies will seek similar agreements to the MA?Answer – absolutely, particularly in Europe, and therein we are seeing a redesign of security architecture. Ukraine, I think, will be central to thinking therein in Europe, given the huge strides it is making in defense but also in defense technology, and particularly drones. But I think we are seeing efforts at more bilateral defense cooperation within Europe, and between Canada, Turkey, the UK, and Europe, as an alternative to the US. Autonomy and diversification are now the keys to a country’s defense.Why the need to sign the agreement in Mecca?True, it could have been signed in Riyadh, but I think by signing the agreement in the holy city of Mecca, the Saudis signaled both their own leadership of the entity as the protector of the Holy sites, but also that they want to lead a Sunni Muslim entity, and that certainly provides a strong signal to Iran.It is interesting though that Iranian officials seem to have reacted quite positively to the new MA – suggestive that they don’t see it as a direct threat to themselves but as a welcome reflection of reducing US influence in the region.Q? Is Egypt likely to be the next country to join the MA?Well, Egypt was part of the earlier strategic partnership talks, including KSA, Turkey and Pakistan, but seems to have pulled away from signing the tighter defense and security arrangement, and as Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s foreign minister, has argued, NATO Article 5-like commitments. Fidan has also suggested that Egypt is welcome, even expected to join, pending resolution of certain ‘technical issues’. There is recognition, I think, that Egypt brings a lot to the table, in terms of its weight of population, and scale of its military, plus its leverage with the US, and the wider region, and role in any Palestinian settlement. But I think Egypt likely is minded not to be seen to ally with a KSA-led group, as it has put much effort in building relations with the UAE, and has benefited therein from huge UAE financial support for its fragile economy and would not want to put these flows at risk. There are also long-running tensions and rivalries between Egypt and Saudi Arabia that are still grist to the mill in terms of Egypt signing up to a Saudi-led security entity.Q? What are the threats or dangers to the MA for the signatories?Answer – the mutual defense, the NATO Article Five, component is the key strength and weakness of the new arrangement. Signatories have made much of the new pact as a defensive arrangement, but if there is an Article Five component, then an attack on one is an attack on all. What does that mean in practice? If Houthis in Yemen attack KSA, as they have done in recent days, does that mean that Pakistan and Turkey will be dragged into the Yemen war? Similarly, what happens if Iran attacks Saudi Arabia? Do Turkey and Pakistan then have to take up arms for Saudi Arabia in such a conflict?Likewise, if India attacks Pakistan, would Turkey and Saudi then be drawn into such a future conflict? Signatories, I think, would hope that the MA, through its signaling, will act as a greater deterrence against future wars, so no need to be put in a place of deciding whether to honor the Article Five commitment. But say in the case ofIndia, if there are attacks in Indian controlled Kashmir againstIndian troops and Modi’s domestic politics suggests a response, is Modi really going to hold back for fear of a wider war against Turkey and KSA? I doubt it. But in any event I think Turkey, and China, both provided very significant support to Pakistan in the recent India – Pakistan war without directly joining the conflict, and I would assume the MA would suggest a similar high level of military support but a level, or levels, below direct military involvement. I guess as with NATO Articles IV and V, it’s for the country being attacked to determine when it invokes the requirement for mutual defense. That actually can be quite a high bar. In the case of an India – Pakistan war, at what level realistically would Pakistan seek to invoke the mutual defense clause with KSA and Turkey, knowing full well the ramifications of such a move, as a much wider global war? Again, I think it would be a high bar.Critics have also argued that in signing the MA, NATO member Turkey is tying the rest of NATO to security threats and risks for KSA and Pakistan. Again, note the bar for Turkey invoking Article Five in reality is likely quite high. And note there that various NATO members, including the US, have very close defense ties with other non-NATO members which could similarly risk dragging in the rest of NATO to broader conflict. In the end, who goes to war with whom is a bit subjective and depends on a much bigger geopolitical map of the world.Perhaps a good example of the above is the Falklands War. The territory of a NATO member, the UK, was attacked, but did it invoke Article Five? No, partly as it was unsure as to the response – would NATO members come to the defense of the UK for a disputed territory? Probably not, and the UK knew that invoking Article Five and failing to see a response would have been a body blow to NATO, a core pillar of UK defense, arguably more important than the Falklands. Indeed, during the Falklands war, even the US was less than enthusiastic about assisting its supposedly core allies, with a special relationship.I guess now even within NATO European members are questioning the reality of the Article Five assurance with respect to the US. If the Baltic states are attacked by Russia, would the US come to their defense? I doubt it under Trump, and I know many Europeans also doubt it. But the Article Five assurance still has some value, as the assumption is that Russia is still unsure as to whether the US would come to the Baltics’ defense, and while Russia is unsure, it might then not risk an attack. An Article Five assurance might no longer be cast iron, but its mere presence is a deterrence, I would think.Look, in summary of the above, the MA is a political, security, defense agreement with Article–Five–like elements, but in the end, whether or not members ride in to the defense of their newfound allies will depend on the situation. But the members see value in working more closely together in the defense and security field, and see benefit in signaling to others, potentially adversaries, that in taking on the members they could potentially risk confrontation with the wider group. But I would expect, for example, Turkey and Pakistan to assist Iran with air defense, and naval capabilities to assist it in its defense against attacks by Yemen. Do I expect Turkey and Pakistan to deploy ground troops in Yemen in support of KSA? Absolutely not. But they might deploy ground troops to KSA to free Saudi troops for deployment then to Yemen.The key here is that signatories signal to the wider world a new commitment to cooperate much more in defense and security, and come to each other’s aid in time of attack, and others have to figure out how seriously the Article 5-like assurance is in practice. But adversaries will have to take note.In the latter context, it is interesting that both Israel and India have seen the MA as a huge strategic defeat, and wins for Pakistan and Turkey particularly. And note above that Iran has been quite sanguine. Perhaps this is explained by the fact that both Israel and India see Turkey and Pakistan as enduring, primary threats, whereas for Iran I think the US and Israel rather than any of the three signatories to the MA are primary threats.Q? What about the US, how does it view the MA?Answer, well the Trump administration, rather like Iran, appears sanguine, strangely, even supportive of the MA. I think the view is that any structure where regional partners step up and assume a greater responsibility for their own defense is a positive, as it will mean less reliance on the US for their defense. Trump, personally, I think, as noted above, has strong personal bonds with leaders of all three MA signatory states and perhaps thinks that a strong MA organization or defense/security entity could help the US find solutions in places like Syria, Lebanon and Gaza, and the West Bank. Likely Trump would appreciate MA members’ participation in the security agency looking to deploy to Gaza to help implement the Trump peace plan. But likely that is whyIsrael is so unnerved by the new MA, as it could well bring forward the possibility of the nightmare scenario of the deployment of Pakistani, and especially Turkish troops to Gaza as part of a Trump peace process. Notable in the commentary from US deputy undersecretary for defense, Elbridge Colby, seemingly playing down prospects for middle-level power development and cooperation, suggesting that in the end there was no alternative to US power, so I guess Colby does not see entities such as the MA as a threat but a captive market for US military kit. And if the MA enables Saudi cash to connect with Pakistani and Turkish technology to improve the military capability of all three, as US allies, this has to be a good thing.Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog! See the original article here. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.