The Kremlin Is Doubling Down on Its Maximalist Negotiating Strategy

The Kremlin Is Doubling Down on Its Maximalist Negotiating Strategy

Trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States resumed last week after a nine-month hiatus. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner participated in two days of talks in Abu Dhabi followed by meetings with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, and subsequently with President Volodymyr Zelensky in Dublin. Witkoff and Kushner expressed confidence in the progress made, pointing to another round of multilateral talks as early as this week. The parties also reached an agreement in principle on a large-scale prisoner exchange.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. While these developments demonstrate the potential utility of continued negotiations, the most important takeaway from the Abu Dhabi round of talks is that the Kremlin is doubling down on its maximalist negotiating strategy. Ukraine and its partners will need a conscious, coordinated effort to avoid playing into Moscow’s hands and undermining the prospects for a durable peace. Over the course of ceasefire negotiations since 2025, the Kremlin has pursued a strategy centered on four lines of effort. First, cling to maximalist demands. These have included the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Donbas region, a prohibition of foreign military presence on Ukrainian soil, restrictions on the number and type of weapon systems Ukrainian forces may possess, resolution of political level issues before a ceasefire, and non-NATO and non-nuclear status for Ukraine. Other Topics of Interest About 500 Ukrainians registered for Invictus trials in Lviv, where Prince Harry met veterans preparing for Birmingham 2027. Second, increase the costs imposed on Ukrainians in an effort to wear down their resolve. This translates to attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and residential areas. Third, wait for Ukraine’s partners to withdraw their support or compel Kyiv to concede more. Fourth, entice the White House with economic deals that encourage Washington to increase pressure on Kyiv. One example was the so-called “Dmitriev package,” a proposal involving trade and investment that Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev pitched to Witkoff earlier this year. The aim of the strategy is straightforward: withhold concessions on the Kremlin’s core demands while fueling internal and external pressures meant to force Kyiv to make concessions. What the Abu Dhabi talks revealed Russia’s conduct during this round of negotiations and in the weeks preceding it demonstrated both an intensification and an expansion of its maximalist strategy. The Kremlin has exploited the White House’s desire to improve US economic conditions, especially in energy markets. This was most clearly evidenced in last month’s diesel deal between Moscow and Washington. Moscow has also expanded the scope of its demands beyond Ukraine, bringing NATO-related issues and the so-called “European Security System” into the negotiations. Following the Abu Dhabi talks, Russian lead negotiator Dmitry Medinsky argued that the conflict demonstrated the dysfunction of the existing system and that a “comprehensive cure” was necessary. It was later reported that the Russian team called for NATO to return to its 1997 membership levels and posture. One difficulty in recognizing the expansion of Moscow’s maximalist strategy is that some recent developments can create the impression that the Kremlin is softening its stance. Last month, the parties agreed to a localized ceasefire in Oleshky to facilitate humanitarian evacuations. The Kremlin also released US prisoner Stephen Hubbard after four years of detention. At Abu Dhabi, negotiators reported progress on the protocols and monitoring mechanisms that would govern a postwar ceasefire. Ukrainian lawmaker David Arakhamia, a longtime member of the ceasefire negotiating team, said that the Russians had arrived with “very, very strict directives,” describing the session as “one of the toughest” since the first rounds of negotiations in 2022. He acknowledged, however, that structuring discussions around postwar protocols “opened up a dialogue.” This week’s negotiations also signaled further movement on humanitarian issues. The three parties reportedly made progress toward another large-scale prisoner exchange, while Putin proposed another localized ceasefire, this time in Kostiantynivka, based on the Oleshky model. Progress on postwar protocols and humanitarian issues are important, but they should not be mistaken for evidence that the Kremlin has changed its fundamental strategy. Such measures come at little cost to Moscow and can help the Kremlin curry favor with the White House, project an image of sincerity in the peace process, and, as in the case of the Kostyantynivka proposal, reinforce its broader maximalist objectives. When proposing the localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka, Putin made clear that he intended for it to demonstrate Russian control of the municipality. As he put it himself in meeting with Witkoff and Kushner: “Let us invite representatives of the foreign press, including the American media, alongside the Russian media… We will see who actually controls the town.” Zelensky has subsequently rejected the proposal based on Russian malintent, identifying other frontline settlements where localized ceasefires could help preserve civilian lives. Why the Kremlin is doubling down Several factors are shaping the Kremlin’s negotiating behavior, many of them originating in Washington. Moscow sees a White House reeling from a significant defeat in the US midterm elections and facing mounting pressure to deliver on President Donald Trump’s campaign promises. Trump pledged to end the war “within 24 hours,” and 24 months after being elected president, that promise remains unfulfilled. The White House also faces pressure to address oil prices. Trump has blamed the Russo-Ukrainian War for higher diesel prices while demanding that Kyiv reduce its strikes on refineries. The Kremlin has watched Trump decline to follow through on congressional action. He waived provisions of the Lindsey Graham Sanctions Act that was meant to increase pressure on Russia, and Moscow well understands that Trump retains veto power over any legislation that Congress may introduce. The Kremlin sees a White House unlikely to impose any meaningful costs on Russia going forward. Moscow has also been closely observing the Trump administration’s approach to “NATO 3.0” and the realignment of US forces. The White House’s criticism of the status quo in Europe presents Moscow with a window of opportunity to exploit divisions and uncertainty. Finally, developments this past week suggest that Washington is increasingly accommodating Moscow’s desired negotiating framework. Zelensky disclosed that U.S. negotiators had asked whether Ukraine would trade Donbas for NATO membership, placing pressure on Kyiv to link territorial concessions to security arrangements. For the Kremlin, these developments point to a logical conclusion: its maximalist negotiating strategy is working, and it should double down. Moscow is therefore likely to stay the course. The way ahead That the Kremlin is employing a maximalist strategy does not obviate the utility of negotiations. Ukraine and its partners must continue negotiating the rule sets and monitoring mechanisms necessary for governing a postwar ceasefire. A durable peace agreement must be specific and comprehensive, and the only way that happens is through sustained negotiations. Progress on humanitarian issues is also valuable. Even if the Kremlin uses localized ceasefires for propaganda purposes, these arrangements can still protect lives and livelihoods. The same principle applies to prisoner exchanges. Thus, the answer to a maximalist negotiating strategy is not to abandon negotiations, but to recognize the strategy for what it is and adapt accordingly. For Ukraine, this means holding the line, both literally and figuratively. On the battlefield, Ukrainian forces must continue to repel Russian advances while seeking their own gains along the front lines. In diplomacy, Kyiv must hold firm on its indispensable interests, close any divisions forming among European partners, and strengthen its relationships with supporters across the US government. For European partners, this means sustaining military and political support to Ukraine while maintaining their commitment to postwar security arrangements. The Kremlin can exploit seams among European governments and undermine support for the third-party security guarantees, defense assistance, and monitoring mechanisms needed to deter renewed aggression, mitigate overreactions to incidents, and oversee the implementation of peace agreements. For the United States, this means a reversal of its current “carrots for Moscow, sticks for Kyiv” approach. If the US government genuinely seeks a just and lasting peace, it must counter the Kremlin’s maximalist negotiating strategy by increasing support for Ukraine and imposing greater costs on Russia. Washington must also resist Moscow’s efforts to expand the scope of negotiations beyond Ukraine. Doing so would only frustrate efforts towards achieving what these negotiations are supposed to be about: ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

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