The election that never happened, and why Washington needs a new strategy toward Nicaragua

WASHINGTON—Nicaraguans were supposed to go to the ballot box on November 8, 2026, but the date came and went with no election. Earlier this summer, Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega and his wife and co-dictator Rosario Murillo dashed hopes for millions of voters that they would relinquish power. In September, the National Assembly passed a reform to push out elections indefinitely, including the general elections that had been planned for this week, all while excluding the opposition in an overt attempt to institutionalize permanent family rule. The missed election should mark the end of business as usual in Washington’s economic relationship with Managua. Nicaragua has moved from manipulating illegitimate elections to dispensing with elections altogether under US President Donald Trump’s watch. This does not mean military intervention or a kinetic strike. It means turning Washington’s economic leverage into political leverage. The United States is Nicaragua’s largest export market, giving Washington significant influence over the regime’s economic interests. The objective should be to compel democratic change in the country, not reward cosmetic concessions. Washington already has the appropriate tools to do so. What it needs is a clear goal: to restore democracy in Nicaragua. To begin, the United States should review Nicaragua’s preferential access to the US market under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). When the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) concluded its Section 301 investigation in 2025, it determined that Nicaragua’s labor and human-rights abuses and its dismantling of the rule of law burden US commerce. Suspending some or all CAFTA-DR benefits was on the table. Ultimately, the USTR adopted a lighter and gradual tariff schedule, with tariffs on goods that do not qualify as originating under CAFTA-DR set to rise to 10 percent on January 1, 2027. Suspending Nicaragua outright from CAFTA-DR would punish thousands workers in or around export industries in the free-trade zones where most companies are foreign-owned and disrupt regional supply chains, especially for textiles and apparel. Instead, the USTR could work with the US Treasury Department to examine what specific preferences disproportionately benefit sectors and companies linked to the regime, and target those entities specifically. Washington could then draw on Executive Order 14088, which authorizes restrictions on certain imports and investment in specific sectors. Rather than adding new sanctions just for the sake of it, Washington needs a roadmap that links increased repression in Nicaragua to increased political and economic costs, and democratic concessions to relief. Those concessions could include releasing political prisoners, restoring citizenship and confiscated rights, reopening civic spaces, establishing a credible electoral calendar, and accepting meaningful international observation. Together with regional partners, the United States should help prepare possible off-ramps for officials not implicated in the most egregious human-rights abuses, or those who help halt repression or support a negotiated democratic opening. And, just as importantly, Washington should formalize its engagement with Nicaragua’s democratic opposition. This would not require recognizing a government in exile, choosing a presidential candidate, or privileging one faction over others. It would instead mean treating recognized democratic leaders and organizations, both inside Nicaragua and in exile, as legitimate political interlocutors and consulting them systematically on the country’s future. The Organization of American States (OAS) has already created a structure through which to coordinate these efforts. Its October resolution established a Ministerial Follow-up Group on Nicaragua, now composed of ten countries including the United States, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, and Canada. Its mandate includes engagement with Managua, assessment of compliance with specific democratic demands, and consideration of coordinated diplomatic, political, economic, financial, and multilateral measures. Additionally, the framework calls for engagement with political, social, religious, and business actors, including the opposition, civil society, and Nicaraguan communities in exile. The group was created only a month ago, but could be the platform through which the United States works in Nicaragua. November 8, 2026 passed without a vote or even candidates on the ballot. January 1, 2027 should not pass with US policy simply proceeding to the next scheduled tariff increase or round of sanctions without a broader strategy. Washington should assemble its economic leverage, diplomatic tools, and regional partners to make continued political repression costly and democratic adjustments worthwhile. If, for now, eliminating an election carries no meaningful consequences, then the conclusion for Ortega and Murillo is obvious: Washington and the world may condemn their actions, but they will ultimately accommodate them. And for the sake of Nicaraguans, the region, and the United States, this is a calculation that Washington must prove wrong.