The Balkan Affair: Why Serbia and Bulgaria’s Elections Offer Little Comfort to Ukraine

Serbia’s Oct. 25 parliamentary election delivered a new political reality. The student-backed electoral list defeated Aleksandar Vučić’s coalition, securing 53.01% against 38.98% in final results published after repeat voting. Vučić had resigned the presidency in September to contest the parliamentary election. A week later, Bulgaria moved in a different direction. Iliana Iotova won the Nov. 1 presidential runoff with approximately 57.6%, strengthening the political camp of Prime Minister Rumen Radev, who backed her candidacy. Both favor negotiations with Moscow to end Russia’s war against Ukraine.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. One election promises to dismantle an entrenched political system while the other consolidates a governing camp increasingly reluctant to finance weapons for Ukraine. Neither spells much good news for Kyiv. Was Vučić really bad for Ukraine? There are clear reasons for Ukraine to welcome the defeat of Vučić’s coalition. His close relations with the Kremlin and refusal to impose sanctions on Russia repeatedly put Belgrade at odds with the European Union it seeks to join. Commenting on the student victory, investigative journalist Christo Grozev argued that Vučić’s departure could well undermine Russia’s intelligence presence in Serbia. “A very consequential fallout of the students’ victory in Serbia is that Russian intelligence will have to find a new home for its hundreds of spies parked at, or using support from the security apparatus of, or even using passports issued by, Serbia,” he wrote. Other Topics of Interest Democrats Sweep Both Chambers of US Congress as Trump Suffers Defeat Democrats seize both chambers of Congress, with Hakeem Jeffries poised to become the first Black House speaker as Trump’s Republicans suffer major losses. However, there’s also a flip side to Vučić’s departure. Despite his relations with Moscow and Russia-friendly politicians such as former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Serbia nevertheless supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and its ammunition reached Ukrainian forces. “It is an open secret that Serbia indirectly supplies Ukraine with weaponry, which explains the Ukrainian interest in expanding Serbia’s military industry,” Belgrade-based political analyst Alexander Djokic told Kyiv Post. Djokic made the comment during President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Belgrade in August. He described the engagement as an attempt by Vučić to demonstrate some alignment with European policy without taking the more politically difficult step of sanctioning Russia. “It is an attempt to soften the resistance of the EU’s eastern wing for at least a small step forward in Serbia’s accession negotiations,” he said. For Zelensky, Djokic argued, the visit offered an opportunity to engage a country often regarded as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. He also described it as an extension of the Ukrainian president’s diplomatic outreach to right-wing populists. The engagement came with its own political costs. In Belgrade, Zelensky reaffirmed Ukraine’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence. “The Kosovo question was Vucic’s request. Zelensky reiterates Ukraine’s position on the issue publicly, Vucic hosts him in Belgrade despite protests from Russia,” Djokic said. The statement provoked criticism in Kosovo, which has supported Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. Kyiv’s position was not new, but publicly reaffirming it alongside Vučić handed the Serbian leader a diplomatic success. Co-founder and Vice President of NGO United for Kosova & Bosnia and Herzegovina Matej Markič told Kyiv Post that Zelensky’s invocation of “international law” and “territorial integrity” to justify Ukraine’s continued non-recognition of Kosovo was “quite simply false.” He pointed to the International Court of Justice’s 2010 advisory opinion, which found that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. How can Russia reach the new government? The victorious Student List built its campaign around corruption and accountability, bringing together a broad mix of voters. While its supporters agreed on removing Vučić’s ruling party, that does not amount to agreement on a geopolitical break with Moscow. Although domestic reform dominated its campaign, its published positions also indicate continuity on important foreign-policy questions, including opposition to sanctions against Russia and rejection of Kosovo’s independence. The election therefore gives the winners a mandate to reform Serbia’s institutions. But it does not automatically translate into cutting ties with Russia, which retains a familiar means of exerting pressure: gas contracts. “I expect Russia to blackmail the new Serbian government with gas contracts, just as they did with the Vučić regime,” Djokic told Kyiv Post. He argued that short-term agreements keep Belgrade dependent on repeated negotiations with Moscow. The latest extension, agreed in September, maintains Russian gas supplies for three months, through the end of 2026. For an administration entering office as winter approaches, that leaves an immediate problem to solve. Djokic expects the next government to allow Russia much the same room to operate in Serbia as its predecessor. “So it is neutral for Putin or Russia, nothing changes in that respect,” Djokic said. Kyiv is seeking stronger ties across Europe, especially ahead of France’s presidential election in spring 2027. The main question is whether existing ammunition supply arrangements will survive Serbia’s transition and whether the incoming administration will be willing to expand them. Those supplies matter all the more as Bulgaria, another important source of ammunition, reduces its commitment to military assistance. Bulgaria’s retreat began before the election Bulgaria played a substantial role in helping Ukraine withstand Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. In spring 2022, Prime Minister Kiril Petkov’s government enabled deliveries through intermediaries despite opposition from its Socialist coalition partners. Petkov later estimated that Bulgarian supplies accounted for roughly one-third of Ukraine’s ammunition needs during the early phase of the war. Parliamentary authorization subsequently opened the way for direct military aid, alongside commercial exports. The April 2026 parliamentary election changed the scene. Radev’s government took office in May, inheriting years of practical support for Ukraine and a defense industry whose products were already reaching the battlefield. Radev’s arrival as prime minister turned his long-standing opposition to arming Ukraine into government policy. In June, his government announced an end to further weapons supplies from Bulgarian army stocks. On Oct. 21, it also approved “constructive abstention” from European Peace Facility measures financing purchases of new lethal weapons. Bulgaria’s contribution under those measures would instead support non-lethal assistance, without blocking other EU countries from proceeding. Private commercial exports were outside the army-stock restriction, leaving a route for Bulgarian ammunition to continue reaching Ukraine. But the state was pulling back from supplying and financing weapons itself. Iotova’s victory strengthens the political camp responsible for that retreat. She opposed military aid to Ukraine during the campaign and advocated dialogue with Russia. Her election also deprives the opposition of an opportunity to establish a counterweight in the presidency even if Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic. And the president does not independently determine military-assistance policy. For Kyiv, the consequence is narrower than a complete Bulgarian withdrawal from support, but still significant: Sofia is restricting what its contribution can pay for even if Bulgaria’s factories continue supplying ammunition. The reported drone attacks on merchant vessels in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone that sank ships and left sailors dead or missing did not change Sofia’s outlook. While Radev initially said their origin was unclear, later acknowledging that Moscow benefited from the attacks, he also stopped short of formally blaming it. On Oct. 29, he urged the EU and NATO to prioritize dialogue, describing a ceasefire and negotiations as the only sure way to stop further attacks on commercial shipping. So, what changes for Ukraine? Ultimately, the consequences of both elections will become clearer through government decisions in the months ahead. In Serbia, the incoming administration will have to translate its positions on sanctions, military exports, and EU relations into policy. Its handling of the next Russian gas negotiation will provide an early indication of how much room it has to depart from its predecessor’s approach. Djokic expects continuity in Moscow’s influence. However, Kyiv will need to test how far that continuity extends, particularly where Serbian manufacturers and European partners have reasons to maintain cooperation. In Bulgaria, the questions are more specific given Sofia’s already fully pro-Russian stance. Namely, how will the restriction on military-aid funding be implemented? Will commercial ammunition supplies continue? Will plans to expand defense production become signed agreements and working factories? Kyiv has little reason to write off either country. But it has equally little reason to assume that a democratic breakthrough in Serbia or Bulgaria’s current compromise will generate the support it needs.