Tehran put a bounty on US troops. Why is Trump still playing defense?

The Iranian crisis has reached a point where Washington faces a strategic choice of historic importance. For decades, successive American administrations have sought to contain the Islamic Republic through sanctions, diplomacy, negotiations, and intermittent military pressure. The results have been mixed. Iran has continued developing its military capabilities, supporting armed groups across the Middle East, threatening its neighbors, taking hostages, attacking dissidents abroad, and challenging international shipping. The central question is whether the United States continues to manage the Iranian problem or begins addressing its underlying cause.The Islamic Republic itself is the source of the crisis. Recent developments have demonstrated the character of the regime with unusual clarity. The announcement by Maj. Gen. Amir Hatami, the Iranian army commander in chief, of a bounty for the killing or capture of American service members represents a chilling escalation. A government offering money for attacks on foreign soldiers is behaving like a revolutionary organization rather than a responsible member of the international community. For Washington, such threats require a response extending beyond diplomatic protest.The first requirement is sustained economic pressure. Iran’s economy is already under extraordinary strain. Inflation has surged, purchasing power has collapsed, and the currency has suffered a dramatic decline. Food prices have risen sharply while ordinary Iranians struggle with an economy distorted by corruption, military expenditure, sanctions, and decades of ideological mismanagement. Economic pressure should reduce the resources available to institutions responsible for repression, terrorism, and regional aggression, while making clear that the burden falls upon the ruling establishment rather than the Iranian people. The second requirement is freedom of navigation. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Its security cannot be treated as a bargaining chip available to Tehran whenever the regime seeks leverage over Washington or its allies. Any attempt to close or disrupt the waterway would affect energy markets, international trade, and the economic security of countries across the world. America, therefore, has a direct strategic interest in ensuring that freedom of navigation remains protected.Third, Washington needs to strengthen its campaign against the institutions through which the Iranian regime conducts its international activities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and associated financial and criminal networks provide the infrastructure for repression at home and coercion abroad. Iran’s activities increasingly extend beyond the Middle East. Dissidents have faced assassination and kidnapping plots in Europe and North America, while hostage-taking has become an instrument of state policy. These activities require a coordinated response involving intelligence agencies, financial authorities, law enforcement, and America’s democratic allies.Fourth, Washington should distinguish between the Iranian state and the Iranian people. This distinction is fundamental. The Iranian population has repeatedly demonstrated opposition to the theocratic system. Waves of protest have exposed deep public anger over corruption, repression, economic deprivation, and political exclusion. The U.S., therefore, needs a policy that applies maximum pressure to the institutions of dictatorship while maintaining maximum communication with the Iranian population. That means ensuring access to information, supporting internet freedom, and making clear that America has no quarrel with the Iranian people.The fifth issue is Iran’s political future. Pressure alone cannot determine what comes after the Islamic Republic, and military action cannot substitute for a political alternative. President Donald Trump should therefore recognize the political significance of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and Maryam Rajavi, whose movement presents itself as an organized democratic alternative to the clerical regime. The National Council of Resistance of Iran, which includes the PMOI, has developed a political program, while Rajavi’s 10-point plan sets out principles including universal suffrage, free elections, gender equality, separation of religion and state, minority rights, and a democratic constitutional order. The NCRI could provide an organized transitional framework following regime change, paving the way toward a new constitution and genuinely free elections.Ultimately, however, the legitimacy of any future government must come from the Iranian people. Rajavi has addressed numerous European parliaments and political institutions. An invitation to Washington to address meetings of the Senate and House of Representatives would give American lawmakers an opportunity to hear directly from one of the principal organized opposition movements to the Islamic Republic. It would also signal to Tehran that Washington is prepared to engage with those seeking a democratic alternative rather than perpetuating a relationship centered exclusively on the mullahs.The sixth requirement is coordination with Europe. European governments have frequently pursued a more cautious approach toward Tehran, partly because of commercial interests, geographical proximity, and concerns about regional instability. Yet Europe has also suffered directly from Iranian state terrorism, hostage-taking, assassination plots, and intimidation. America cannot solve the Iranian crisis alone. Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union possess important intelligence, financial, and diplomatic capabilities. A coordinated trans-Atlantic strategy would make sanctions harder to evade and increase the consequences for Iranian officials involved in terrorism and repression.Finally, Washington must decide what success means. If success means persuading Tehran to return temporarily to negotiations, the cycle can continue indefinitely. Agreements can be signed, suspended, violated, or replaced while the underlying system remains intact. If success means creating conditions in which the Iranian people can determine their own future, American policy acquires a clearer strategic purpose. That does not require Washington to dictate the identity of Iran’s future government. It requires the U.S. to recognize that the Iranian people themselves are the decisive factor.THE IRAN WAR AND $40 TRILLION DEBT JUST MADE CHINESE BONDS LOOK SAFEThe regime in Tehran has spent decades portraying itself as indispensable to Iranian stability. Its record suggests the opposite. It has exported instability while consuming the resources of its own population. It has built armed proxies while ordinary Iranians face economic hardship. It has pursued confrontation abroad while suppressing dissent at home. The present crisis is therefore more than another confrontation between Washington and Tehran. It is a test of whether the U.S. can develop a coherent long-term strategy toward a regime that has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use terrorism, hostage-taking, military threats, and economic coercion as instruments of state policy.America has considerable leverage. The challenge is to use that leverage strategically, alongside its allies, while keeping the Iranian people at the center of the equation. The ultimate question is simple: will Washington continue trying to manage the Islamic Republic, or will it help create the conditions in which the people of Iran can finally determine their own destiny?Struan Stevenson was a member of the European Parliament representing Scotland (1999–2014), president of the Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with Iraq (2009–14), and chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran Intergroup (2004–14). He is an author and international lecturer on the Middle East.