Strategy trumps scandal as West goes easy on India

Western governments are rebuilding ties with India even as they accuse it of foreign interference and of running intelligence operations against people on their soil. The contradiction was on display October 13, when Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney and India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, reaffirmed plans to expand trade and security cooperation, though underlying security concerns remain unresolved. Their renewed engagement shows how strategic interests can blunt the diplomatic fallout from serious disputes. India’s economic weight, military strength and Indo-Pacific position give Western capitals compelling reasons to keep New Delhi close. Washington sees India as a partner in countering China’s growing regional influence. Ottawa sees a way to diversify trade and reach one of Asia’s largest markets. Canberra counts India as a significant player in Indo-Pacific security. Those interests have created a clear order of priorities. Intelligence allegations can prompt investigations, diplomatic protests and security reviews, but they do not by themselves set the course of broader relations. Governments can pursue accountability through legal and intelligence channels while continuing trade talks and strategic partnerships. That separation helps explain why Western pressure on India has remained limited. Strategy over grievance Canada offers the clearest example. In its 2025 public report, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service named India among the main state actors engaged in foreign interference and espionage in the country. The agency described past efforts to cultivate covert relationships with politicians, journalists and diaspora communities, along with surveillance and intimidation of critics of the Indian government. The findings followed the diplomatic rupture over the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist, in British Columbia. Canadian authorities alleged Indian involvement, which New Delhi denied. The dispute badly damaged relations and raised hard questions about foreign interference and the safety of people on Canadian soil. Even so, Ottawa has shifted toward re-engagement. During Carney’s March visit to India, the two governments agreed to deepen cooperation on trade, energy and national security. Their joint statement promised closer law-enforcement coordination, information-sharing and regular talks between national security officials. The economic motives became clearer in October. On October 13, Carney and Modi reaffirmed their commitment to conclude negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, part of an effort to double bilateral trade by 2030. Carney’s office also said it welcomed expanded cooperation on defense, artificial intelligence and security. The leaders noted that dialogue between their national security advisers, held in India the previous week, and Modi’s planned visit to Canada in December underscored their political commitment to repairing ties. Canada’s calculus is largely economic. As Ottawa looks to reduce its dependence on the United States amid American protectionism, India has become an increasingly important prospective trading partner. The aim is less about diplomatic reconciliation than about creating room to maneuver in an uncertain world. That logic explains why Canada is negotiating trade and security in parallel. Reopened diplomatic channels may help address unresolved concerns, but they do not show that the earlier allegations have been settled or that anyone has been held accountable. The United States faces a similar, though slightly different, dilemma. In October 2024, the Justice Department charged Vikash Yadav, an Indian government employee, in connection with an alleged plot to assassinate a Sikh separatist and US citizen in New York. An indictment contains allegations, not a finding of guilt. Still, the case raised pointed questions about possible intelligence operations aimed at people inside the borders of a major security partner. Washington’s response shows how the two tracks can run apart. Criminal proceedings can go forward independently while American policymakers weigh India’s value for regional security, technology cooperation and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The US wants partners that can help stabilize the region without joining a formal military alliance, and India’s military scale, geography and independent relationship with Moscow make it an important, if sometimes difficult, partner. Broad punitive measures could complicate defense cooperation, slow efforts to diversify supply chains, and make it harder to engage New Delhi on regional security. Australia has faced similar concerns. In April 2024, ABC News reported that India was behind an espionage network that Australian intelligence authorities disrupted in 2020, whose reported activities included trying to obtain sensitive defense information, cultivate political contacts and monitor diaspora communities. Canberra nonetheless maintains a robust strategic relationship with India, bilaterally and through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which also includes the US and Japan. The Canadian, American and Australian cases differ in their evidence, legal status and institutional response, and without further proof they do not establish a single coordinated Indian policy. But they present the same challenge: Governments must confront intelligence-related concerns while protecting relationships they regard as vital to their wider security. Western pressure limits India’s foreign policy complicates matters further. Its doctrine of strategic autonomy lets New Delhi maintain ties with rival powers rather than align with any one bloc. Russia is a telling example. Despite Western sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine, Indian refiners kept buying large volumes of Russian crude. According to Reuters, imports reached about 2.6 million barrels a day in June and held near 2.47 million in July. India argues that affordable energy is essential to its economic stability. The purchases have strained relations with Western governments trying to choke off Russian revenue, and they show New Delhi’s readiness to protect its economic options under outside pressure. These disagreements differ from allegations of unlawful intelligence activity. Buying Russian oil is a commercial decision that reflects differing approaches to sanctions. An alleged assassination plot or coercive interference raises separate legal questions about sovereignty and individual rights. Western governments have handled the two kinds of problems through different channels. Trade and defense cooperation can proceed while intelligence investigations and diplomatic negotiations continue, allowing governments to protect strategic relationships without abandoning legal or security concerns. Canada’s reset shows both the benefits and the limits of that approach: Renewed security dialogue could help address the interference allegations, but it is no substitute for accountability. Washington and Canberra face the same tension. India’s economic scale, military power and strategic location give Western governments strong reasons to stay engaged, and competition with China raises the stakes further, making broad diplomatic isolation unappealing to most policymakers. Prosecutions, intelligence restrictions and diplomatic protests can continue even as economic and security partnerships grow. The central test is whether Western governments can preserve valuable relationships without weakening accountability. Strategic necessity may limit how hard they are willing to push, but lasting partnerships will depend on respect for sovereignty, the rule of law and the safety of individuals. Saima Afzal is a researcher specializing in South Asian security, counterterrorism, and broader geopolitical dynamics across the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific. She is currently a research scholar at Justus Liebig University, Germany.