South Asian governments should look east for opportunities for young workers

ISLAMABAD—South Asia has something the rest of the world needs: young people. As Japan, South Korea, and increasingly Thailand slide toward super-aged societies, Pakistan and Bangladesh sit on the opposite end of the demographic spectrum. Roughly six in ten Pakistanis are under the age of thirty. That equates to around 160 million young people in Pakistan. Of these, Gen Z alone accounts for eighty million—a number nearing the entire population of Germany. Bangladesh’s youth numbers tell a similar story, with roughly half its population under thirty years old. Together, Pakistan and Bangladesh have a combined youth population of 260 million. If that number were its own country, it would be the fifth largest in the world. Young people are among the few genuine strategic assets either country possesses. The conventional response to a youth bulge is to agonize about unemployment, underemployment, and restless cities. Such factors could lead to a generation that is unpredictable and prepared to revolt on a dime, as recently witnessed in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. That may all be true, but a youth bulge can also be an economic advantage because the young are a labor force that the aging world needs. Japan and South Korea are already recruiting foreign caregivers and factory hands by necessity, not preference. Thailand, for instance, has become a labor-importing country, relying on workers from Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. But Bangkok is witnessing this model come under strain because of increased need coupled with border tensions with Cambodia, which has disrupted one of its four traditional labor corridors. To mitigate this, Thailand is looking elsewhere for workers. Bangladesh’s new government has moved to take advantage of this opportunity. Since taking office earlier this year, Dhaka has been deliberate about seeking to make Bangladesh Thailand’s fifth labor-source country. In mid-August, a Thai Senate delegation sat down with Bangladesh’s expatriates’ welfare and overseas employment minister in Dhaka to work through the terms directly: recruitment through Bangladesh’s state-run employment agency, employer-borne costs, and standard contracts in workers’ own language. According to reports, the two sides have effectively agreed on the shape of an agreement and are now moving toward formalizing it. This breakthrough happened because officials in Dhaka—including senior officials I have spoken with directly, among them leaders now serving in the finance ministry and the ministry responsible for the diaspora—treated this as a priority. I wish I could say the same enthusiasm had translated into action in Islamabad. Whenever the issue has come up with Pakistani colleagues, the response is almost always positive. Everyone agrees it makes sense. But follow-through has been lacking. As far as I am aware, Pakistan has not made a comparable push toward Thailand, even though the logic that applies to Bangladesh applies just as forcefully to Pakistan. There are good reasons for labor-exporting countries to look east rather than only toward the Gulf, which has absorbed the majority of South Asian labor migration for decades. The Gulf will remain important, particularly as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Middle Eastern economies account for a large share of remittances to both Pakistan and Bangladesh. South Asian workers may face less competition from other labor-sending countries in Southeast Asian markets than in the Gulf. And the reception, in my experience, tends to be warmer. Thai employers and communities have a well-earned reputation for treating foreign workers with more decency than some of the alternatives on offer elsewhere. None of this displaces the Gulf as the largest market. Instead, it simply means that South Asian governments should stop treating it as the only one and build other labor corridors more deliberately. To make overseas labor migration succeed, countries need to go beyond focusing on just technical skills. Too often, South Asian governments tend to treat labor export as a matter of training. Simply teach someone construction trades, hospitality service, or elderly care, get them a contract, and send them on their way. But what gets neglected in such a process is the set of soft skills that determine whether a worker actually thrives once they land. These include a basic grasp of the local language, an understanding of the local cuisine, and a feel for the local rhythm of courtesy and communication. Thai culture, for instance, prizes a gentle, even-toned way of speaking and generally dislikes loud, confrontational talk. It may seem small, but such details can shape how a worker is perceived by an employer or a neighbor within the first week. The same goes for basic behaviors like hygiene, road discipline, work ethic and etiquette, and simply knowing what to expect culturally before arrival rather than discovering it on the ground. Workers who go abroad with even a modest cultural and linguistic orientation—alongside their technical training—integrate faster, cause fewer problems for their employers, and build the kind of reputation that keeps a labor corridor open and growing. Pakistan and Bangladesh should be building this into their pre-departure programs as seriously as they build vocational training, because a host country’s willingness to keep the door open depends as much on how workers integrate and how the hosts perceive them as on how skilled they are. None of the above recommendations require massive investment or a major strategic shift. What is required is a deliberate strategy and follow-through. Aging Asian countries need people, and millions of them. Japan, Korea, and Thailand are already courting workers from abroad. The countries that move first—those that turn a youth bulge into a negotiated pipeline of opportunity—will be the ones whose young people benefit most. Bangladesh has made strides already, and Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and others can learn from its efforts.