Russia’s ‘Partial Mobilization’ Turns 4: Is Another Draft Coming?

On Monday, Sept. 21, 2026, exactly four years after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced “partial mobilization,” Moscow continues to insist that it can sustain its war against Ukraine without another mass call-up. However, an examination of Russia’s legal framework, official recruitment figures, Ukrainian intelligence disclosures, assessments by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), and independent reporting shows that Russia is not relying solely on conventional voluntary recruitment. Instead, it has replaced one highly visible mobilization campaign with a permanent system combining contracts, large financial incentives, digital surveillance, and varying degrees of administrative pressure.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. How Russia’s 2022 mobilization began Putin announced the mobilization on Sept. 21, 2022, shortly after a Ukrainian counteroffensive forced Russian troops to retreat from large parts of the Kharkiv region. Then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 300,000 reservists would be called up. The campaign quickly became chaotic, with reports of summonses being sent to men who were medically unfit, too old, or lacked the military experience the Kremlin claimed it was seeking. Members of ethnic minorities and residents of poorer regions were disproportionately affected. The uncertainty also triggered one of Russia’s largest wartime population movements. A EU Agency for Asylum estimate cited in an August 2026 UK government report said around 900,000 men left Russia after the announcement, although other estimates are lower. Other Topics of Interest Russia Hits 2 Gas Stations on Kyiv-Lviv M06 Highway Both gas stations were in the Zhytomyr region, along the M-06 highway, a major artery from western Ukraine to Kyiv. Shoigu declared the mobilization complete on Oct. 28, 2022, after the stated quota had been filled. Putin, however, never formally revoked the mobilization decree. The decree does not mean that Russia has continuously conducted mass call-ups since 2022, but it allows mobilized troops to remain in service until the mobilization period is formally terminated. Many of those called up four years ago therefore remain in the military unless discharged for narrowly defined reasons. Is Russia relying only on contract soldiers? No. Contract recruitment is now the Kremlin’s main public method of bringing new personnel into the military, but it represents only one part of Russia’s manpower system. The three main legal categories are different: Russia conducts routine compulsory military service for men aged 18-30. Around 300,000 are drafted annually for one year, according to the UK government’s military-service assessment. Mobilization applies primarily to reservists called into service during wartime. Contract service is officially voluntary and can include both first-time recruits and conscripts who agree to remain in the military. In practice, the lines have become increasingly blurred. The UK government report, which compiled evidence from European agencies, independent Russian media, and human rights groups, documented cases in which conscripts and other vulnerable men were deceived, threatened, or physically pressured into signing contracts. It stressed that this does not mean every Russian contract soldier was coerced, but it found that such practices were recurring. Russian legislation also allows people facing criminal prosecution or serving prison sentences to sign military contracts. Regional authorities have targeted debtors, unemployed men, migrants, and people living in poverty, while companies have faced pressure to help meet recruitment targets. A unified electronic military register now combines data from tax authorities, police, medical institutions, and other government systems. Electronic summonses can lead to restrictions on leaving Russia, receiving loans, conducting real-estate transactions, or holding a driver’s license. Therefore, Russia can increase military intake without announcing a repeat of the nationally televised 2022 mobilization. It can raise enlistment bonuses, assign recruitment quotas to regions and employers, pressure conscripts to sign contracts, expand prison recruitment, and selectively summon reservists. Is Russia’s recruitment system still working? It continues to recruit hundreds of thousands of people, but at a rising financial and political cost. Russian officials claimed that around 450,000 people signed military contracts in 2024. Deputy Security Council Chair Dmitry Medvedev said more than 422,000 did so in 2025, alongside around 32,000 recruits for volunteer formations, according to Reuters. Medvedev subsequently claimed that about 200,000 contract soldiers and 16,000 volunteers joined during the first half of 2026. These figures cannot be independently verified and may include categories that overlap. Russia’s reported 2026 target is approximately 409,000 contract recruits. In July, ISW assessed that Moscow was not on track to meet it. The Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine offered an even more pessimistic assessment. It said Russia recruited approximately 232,000 contract personnel between January and July while suffering about 240,000 casualties, including at least 140,000 “irreversible” losses. Total casualty figures also include wounded soldiers, some of whom may return to duty, so they cannot be directly compared with recruitment totals. The broader trend is clear: Russia is still finding recruits at scale, but recruitment is becoming more expensive and may no longer provide enough personnel to replace losses and expand the military. Some regional enlistment packages reached approximately 4.1 million rubles (around $49,000) in 2026. Continued increases in payments suggest that the pool of people willing to sign at previous rates is shrinking. Is the Kremlin preparing another mobilization? Ukrainian intelligence says it is preparing the option, but there is no evidence that Putin has issued a final order. In August, Ukraine’s military and foreign intelligence agencies said the Russian General Staff had developed a plan to mobilize an additional 600,000 people – 300,000 during 2026 and another 300,000 in 2027. Kyiv Post previously reported that the plan would prioritize replenishing units already fighting in Ukraine and staffing newly formed units. The intelligence briefing cited several preparatory measures: tighter military-registration controls, expanded prison recruitment, possible quotas for law-enforcement agencies, and additional coercive penalties for ignoring electronic summonses. It also said more than 2,500 job advertisements for employees responsible for military registration and mobilization work had appeared at Russian enterprises by late July. President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had prepared the infrastructure to recruit at least 300,000 more people, either through an open call-up or a less visible campaign. He predicted that Moscow would deny such plans until the State Duma election was over. Putin denied the reports before the vote. “As of today, there is no scenario that would require a mobilization,” Putin said on Sept. 3, according to Le Monde. Medvedev later supported his claim saying Russia had “absolutely no need for mobilization.” Why the State Duma election matters Russia held its parliamentary election from Sept. 18-20, the first State Duma vote since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to Reuters, with more than 95% of ballots counted, the Kremlin-backed United Russia party received 57.83% of the vote and was projected to take 355 of the Duma’s 450 seats, preserving its constitutional majority. AP also reported that the result should not be treated as reliable evidence of popular support for a new mobilization. The election was conducted in a tightly controlled political system, with genuine opposition suppressed, anti-war candidates excluded or marginalized, and voting also staged in occupied Ukrainian territories. United Russia already controlled parliament, while the nominal opposition parties normally support the Kremlin on major military legislation. The vote therefore did not give Putin a power he previously lacked. Another mass call-up before voting could have revived memories of the panic and exodus of 2022. With the election over, that immediate political constraint has disappeared. The Kremlin can also portray the official result as public approval of its wartime course, regardless of whether the vote accurately reflects Russian opinion. Ukrainian intelligence said the most likely time for a decision would be after the election. That was an assessment, not confirmation that a mobilization order had already been signed. Analysts interviewed by Novaya Gazeta Europe argued that selective regional call-ups and increased recruitment quotas may be more likely initially than another simultaneous nationwide campaign. As the 2022 decree remains formally in force, Russian legal experts cited by the publication said the Kremlin might not require an identical new decree to broaden call-ups. Moscow could instead use regional administrations, employers, military commissariats, and the digital register to mobilize people gradually. What would another 300,000 troops change? A call-up of 300,000 people would not place 300,000 combat-ready soldiers on the battlefield immediately. New personnel would have to be processed, trained, equipped, organized into units, and transported. Ukrainian intelligence estimates that Russia could provide only 15-60 days of training to many mobilized recruits. Larger numbers could also strain training grounds, commanders, equipment stocks, and logistics. The additional manpower could still allow Russia to replace casualties, rotate exhausted formations, fill assault units, and release more experienced soldiers from rear-area duties. It could also support longer-term offensive planning. According to Ukrainian official Pavlo Palisa, in August Russian commanders had been instructed to prepare possible operational plans toward Kyiv and Chernihiv. He stressed that Ukraine had not observed a strike force forming in those directions and that military planning did not mean an attack was imminent. Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletsky has also warned against assuming that more Russian troops would automatically produce major territorial gains. “More infantry means more losses,” he said, arguing that drones, sensors, and rapid strike systems now shape battlefield effectiveness. Nevertheless, Biletsky acknowledged another mobilization would create additional pressure on Ukraine. Would mobilization mean Russia is preparing to attack NATO? Not necessarily. European officials have issued increasingly serious warnings about Russian provocations. Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka told The Guardian that Moscow could test NATO within “months, not years” through drones, missiles, a limited incursion, or a false-flag operation. Other Baltic officials offered a more cautious assessment. Latvian State Security Service chief Normunds Mežviets said there were no indications of an imminent conventional attack and noted that Russian resources remained stretched by the war in Ukraine. Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs similarly predicted that Russia could increase mobilization after the election and use the winter to intensify pressure on Ukraine and its supporters. However, he said he would rule out a conventional Russian incursion for now, while warning about sabotage, cyberattacks, and drone or missile incidents. French OSINT analyst Clément Molin argued that Russia currently lacks the forces for a conventional war with Europe because most of its military resources remain committed in Ukraine and its force posture around Kaliningrad is insufficient. In his assessment, another mobilization would more likely replenish forces fighting Ukraine, while hybrid attacks against Europe remain a more realistic near-term scenario. Earlier, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said intelligence assessments indicate Russia’s plans in its war against Ukraine include “hybrid” drone and missile strikes against countries supporting Kyiv, including Poland. He warned there was a “real risk” that drones or other missiles could enter the territory of one or several NATO countries on the alliance’s eastern flank and cause damage. A new mobilization would primarily strengthen Russia’s ability to continue or expand its war in Ukraine. Over time, however, it could also help Moscow rebuild forces available for pressure against NATO, particularly if fighting in Ukraine decreases. How mobilization currently works in Ukraine Ukraine remains under a formally declared general mobilization and martial law, both extended through Oct. 31, 2026. Unlike Russia’s preference for avoiding the politically sensitive word, Ukraine’s mobilization is publicly acknowledged as a continuous national process rather than a sequence of separate “waves.” In general, medically fit men liable for military service between the ages of 25 and 60 may be mobilized if they do not have a legal deferment or official reservation. Men aged 18-24 who have not previously served and are not in the reserve generally join voluntarily under military contracts. Those who already have military experience, officer status or another legal status making them liable for service, can be mobilized before turning 25, according to a review of the current rules. No new Ukrainian mobilization “wave” or general reduction of the mobilization age has been announced. What is most likely to happen next? The available evidence supports three conclusions. First, Russia’s contract system is still producing large numbers of troops. Claims that Moscow has already exhausted its human resources are not supported by the available data. Second, the system is becoming more expensive, coercive, and less effective at creating additional forces beyond replacing battlefield losses. Third, Russia has created the administrative and digital infrastructure required for another call-up, but preparation does not prove that Putin has decided to order one. The most plausible immediate scenario is an expansion of hidden or selective mobilization: higher regional quotas, intensified pressure on conscripts, broader prison recruitment, electronic summonses, and targeted reserve call-ups. A public nationwide campaign becomes more likely if those methods fail to satisfy battlefield requirements.