Russian Drones Over Kyiv – War of Speed and New Deep Strike Tactics

Russia’s “Shahed / Geran” drones are attacking Ukraine’s civilian cities almost continuously. Their targets of choice include shopping malls, gas stations, energy infrastructure, food warehouses, office centers and other civilian facilities. They increasingly deploy jet-powered Geran 4 and 5 variants of the drones that have replaced the so-called “mopeds” – powered by piston engines. Ukraine recorded around 180 uses of jet-powered drones in the whole of 2025. In August this year alone, they launched around 2,800 – Russia used 15 times the annual total of jet-powered drones in a single month. Russia’s once experimental weapon, that it occasionally launched to test Ukraine’s air-defense capabilities is now one of mass deployment.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. nd this creates new challenges for Ukraine. Having learned relatively quickly to effectively intercept conventional Shaheds – open-source data shows interception rates reached 90-95%. These jet-powered targets present a more complicated challenge for Ukraine with currently only around 60% interception rates. The success Russia is currently achieving with jet-powered drones clearly demonstrates one of the fundamental principles of modern warfare – the race to implement new technologies faster than the enemy. Each side constantly probes the other’s vulnerabilities and can rapidly scale up a technology or tactic that works. Other Topics of Interest Russian Drone Attack on Kyiv Kills 2, Injures 22 as Explosions Rock Central Kyiv Kyiv came under a Russian drone attack Wednesday morning, with at least five explosions reported near the Central Railway Station area. Changes in Russian tactics Russia has not simply increased the number of attacks; it has constantly changed how those attacks are conducted. These changes likely have several objectives: to overwhelm Ukraine’s air-defense system, forcing it to use expensive missiles against relatively cheap targets, create prolonged panic, and ultimately identify areas where Ukrainian defenses are weaker. Where Ukraine’s defenses are thinnest, Russia tries to scale up its attacks. Constant attacks on civilian as well as military infrastructure in major cities serve to disrupt the functioning of the country. When air-raid alerts last for hours, logistics are disrupted, people move to shelters and businesses suspend operations. Even if a drone does not hit its target, the threat itself creates an economic impact and reduces the country’s financial capacity. This effect is especially visible in Kyiv. When air-raid alerts are repeatedly declared, the capital simply cannot operate in a normal way which, in my view, is one of Moscow’s objectives: not simply to destroy something, but to gradually paralyze normal life. Russia is also trying to destroy residents’ morale by striking warehouses in an attempt to cause shortages and disruption to food and other essential supplies. There is another aspect to these air attacks. They do not necessarily have to end with a strike against a specific target. The use of aircraft for reconnaissance can provide data about Ukraine’s response: where and how air defenses operate, which routes are being blocked, how quickly Ukraine responds to a target, and which systems are used to intercept it. Even though not every drone launched by Russia is designed to explode, the objective ultimately remains the same: to destroy Ukraine. Energy infrastructure, military and government facilities, communications towers, telecommunications infrastructure, media offices, gas stations, shopping malls – the list of potential targets is endless. Drones can be manually controlled and switch between targets in real time. Every single attack can serve several purposes simultaneously: inflicting physical damage, overwhelming air defenses, collecting intelligence or simply keeping up constant psychological pressure. Nighttime attacks disrupt sleep and reduce productivity of Ukrainians throughout the following working day. Why jet-powered drones are difficult to Intercept? Conventional Shaheds fly relatively slowly allowing Ukraine’s air-defense forces time to detect them and assign the appropriate weapon system to destroy them. A jet-powered that flies twice as fast or more aircraft significantly reduces that window. Speed is not the only factor; flight altitude, trajectory, terrain, buildings and the number of simultaneous targets present air defense with an entirely different and more complex problem. Jet-powered drones operate at altitudes above 3.5 kilometers (2.2 miles), meaning that some of the conventional tools – mobile fire teams, machine guns, Gepard anti-aircraft systems and MANPADS – become ineffective. This leaves three main tools: fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems and interceptor drones. Russia does not rely on a single design with various types of jet-powered drones emerging, with some already approaching the capabilities of cruise missiles. The Geran-5, for example, reportedly has a range of around 950 kilometers (590 miles) and a warhead of up to 90 kilograms (198 pounds). The Bandrol develops a speed of approximately 500-560 km/h (310-350 mph) and can go even faster during an attacking dive. The Dan-T drone-missile has a payload of up to 135 kilograms (298 pounds). “Mother Drones” – another new Russian tactic Recent attacks on Kyiv involved the use of so-called “mother drones.” These are Shaheds acting as carriers for smaller, faster and more maneuverable first-person view (FPV) drones which are released closer to and can be directed on to a potential target deep behind the front lines – distances that would otherwise be beyond the FPV drone. The limited use of the tactic so far suggests it is yet another Russian testbed prior to mass deployment What new threats could emerge? Ukrainian defense engineers today must identify trends, understand the direction of technological evolution, and anticipate the direction Russian technology might take and develop countermeasures before they become a “game changer.” When assessing the threat, it is not just technical or tactical capability that is important – scale. We have already seen that Russia was able to rapidly increase the production of relatively inexpensive guided munitions. It is not solely important to be able to effectively intercept a particular target but also in sufficient numbers. Even the world’s best interceptor will not suffice if production is limited while the enemy can manufacture thousands of cheaper targets. We need asymmetry. The countermeasure should preferably cost significantly less than the target it faces or Ukraine could literally be exhausted by the financial cost of war. Ideally Ukraine should make mass attacks economically unattractive to Russia. The future will be largely defined by a war of quantity – more missiles, more UAVs, more types of munitions opposed by more countermeasures – with lower cost being essential for both offensive and defensive systems. Just as essential as quantity and price alone the decisive advantage will see a struggle for quality and autonomy with artificial intelligence (AI) inevitably becoming part of that process. As the number and type of munitions increase, they will by necessity become “smarter,” requiring fewer external commands for guidance. They will be able to analyze their surroundings, adjust their routes, and independently select the moment or direction from which to approach a target. With hundreds or thousands of different targets flying simultaneously, it will be impossible to train and field the same numbers of pilots. Both sides will rely on decisions being delegated to algorithms. AI will be used to both strike targets and launch countermeasures. Systems will be able to analyze the airspace more quickly, predict flight paths, filter out decoys, allocate weapons to genuine targets, and operate without constant human intervention. Future warfare will increasingly see humans defining the rules, while machines perform most of the work. This is already happening in civilian life. Vehicles can now operate without drivers, and AI systems are capable of independently analyzing enormous volumes of information. The next logical step is greater autonomy in military systems. What Ukraine needs to do to protect its skies The technological race is already underway – at full speed. If Ukraine is not to lose, it needs to prepare for this race now. In 2023, when the first Shaheds appeared Ukraine could only counter them effectively by using expensive missiles, which were already in short supply. Kyiv went through a rapid and productive evolution – from detecting drones with searchlights to effectively destroying them over Ukraine. When conventional “mopeds” stopped delivering the results Russia needed, jet-powered unmanned aircraft began to appear. Ukraine cannot afford to simply catch up with Russia every time it introduces a new technology. It needs to develop its own solutions in advance – both offensive systems and countermeasures. In no time at all fast, high-flying drones will be able to independently decide where to fly, what to attack and how to circumvent its defenses. Several Ukrainian companies are already developing and combat testing jet-powered interceptor drones. The next steps will be scaling up production which should significantly improve Ukraine’s ability to intercept jet-powered UAVs. Ukraine needs to think more broadly. It needs domestic production of jet engines and to avoid becoming dependent on third countries, including China. Similarly it should also increase the number of radars, protection for aircraft and strike drone bases and production facilities to manufacture its own jet-powered drones combined with strong intelligence capabilities and sufficient strike assets. At the same time, Ukraine will have to adapt to the new reality of round-the-clock air threats and attacks. It is impossible to live for months in a situation where every air-raid siren automatically means a complete halt to normal life. It needs a much more precise system for understanding where the danger actually exists and how immediate it is. Where life can safely continue, the country should keep working. Where there is an immediate threat, people should receive a clear warning and be able to move to shelters. Kyiv has already introduced different levels of air-raid alert. The same principle applies not only to protection, but to active defense as well. This calls for the introduction of a range of countermeasures as new types of target appear. Air-defense effectiveness is not only about the number of targets destroyed but also the cost of interception. If an attacking munition costs $10,000 while the defensive system used to destroy it costs $100,000, the engagement may be won but the overall economic race will be lost. Electronic warfare is another critical element of this development. For example, BlueBird Tech is constantly improving its Hrets systems in close cooperation with the military to respond quickly, because tactics and technologies are changing every day. As long as electronic communications exist, there will be ways to detect, intercept, jam or protect against them. Even if some systems become autonomous, warfare will not become fully automated overnight. In addition electronic warfare itself will gradually move toward greater automation. Systems will be able to analyze the electromagnetic spectrum independently, identify signals, determine their source and select an appropriate response. AI will be an integral part of the electronic warfare system itself. However, it is important to understand that Russia will not stop with jet-powered drones. By the time we learn how to intercept them effectively, Moscow may already have the next iteration: cheaper weapons, greater numbers, new tactics or increased autonomy. Ukraine’s task, therefore, is not simply to catch up with every new threat as it emerges. It is to build a system capable of adapting faster than the adversary – and staying one step ahead. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.