At 11am on Thursday, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will deliver its judgment in a case brought by Gambia against Myanmar. It will determine whether Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention in its treatment of the Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim minority subjected to a campaign of such extraordinary brutality that more than 700,000 people fled across the border into Bangladesh.It is a judgment that South Africans should be watching closely.First, because South Africa has brought its own case before the same court, alleging that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. The judgment may provide important clarification on what it takes to establish genocide in international law and, more particularly, how one proves the intention to commit it.Second, one of the judges sitting in the Myanmar proceedings is South Africa’s newest Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Navi Pillay. She has become the target of an absurd and pernicious series of accusations, including that she is attempting to manipulate the law of genocide to secure a finding against Israel. These allegations warrant further investigation. But first, the law.The difficulty of proving genocideGenocide is sometimes described as the crime of crimes. Its particular horror lies not simply in the scale or brutality of the acts committed, but in their purpose: the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.That requirement of specific intent distinguishes genocide from other international crimes, including crimes against humanity. Mass killing, forced displacement, torture, starvation and sexual violence may constitute the gravest violations of international law without necessarily amounting to genocide.To establish genocide, one also has to prove the intention to destroy the protected group. How is that intention to be established?Occasionally, perpetrators are obliging enough to record their intentions explicitly. More often, they aren’t. The law must then infer intention from what perpetrators say and do: the scale and systematic nature of the violence, the selection of victims, the methods employed, the conditions imposed upon a population and the persistence of the conduct in the face of its known consequences.The ICJ has previously insisted upon a particularly demanding test. In its judgments concerning Bosnia and Croatia, it held that where genocidal intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, that intent must be the only reasonable inference available from the evidence.There are good reasons for insisting upon an exacting standard. Genocide is an exceptionally grave allegation. We should not want the distinction between genocide and other international crimes to be collapsed, nor the term deployed indiscriminately whenever atrocities occur.But what happens when a state accused of genocide insists that its conduct was directed towards some other end? What if it maintains that its military campaign was intended to defeat an insurgency, eliminate a security threat or destroy an armed organisation? Does the existence of such an objective necessarily exclude genocidal intent?Surely not. Human beings, and the states through which they act, are capable of pursuing more than one objective at once. A military campaign may be directed at defeating an armed enemy while also being conducted with the intention of destroying a protected civilian population, in whole or in part.To recognise this is not to dispense with the requirement of specific intent. It is to recognise that specific intent need not be exclusive intent. Yet the court’s existing jurisprudence requires genocidal intent to be the only reasonable inference from a pattern of conduct. How that requirement accommodates the possibility of concurrent intentions is one of the questions Thursday’s judgment may help resolve.Why Myanmar matters for GazaThis is relevant in the Myanmar case, because Myanmar maintains that its military operations against the Rohingya were a legitimate response to attacks by Rohingya insurgents. It denies that its forces acted with genocidal intent.Israel, similarly, insists that its military operations in Gaza were directed at Hamas, following the atrocities of 7 October 2023, and towards securing the release of hostages and preventing further attacks. It denies South Africa’s allegation of genocide.The factual circumstances of the two cases are very different, as is the evidence. And no finding against Myanmar necessarily determines the outcome of South Africa’s case. But the legal principles applied must be the same.If a state can defeat an allegation of genocide simply by advancing an alternative military objective, even where the totality of the evidence establishes an additional intention to destroy a protected group, the Genocide Convention risks being rendered dangerously ineffective.Conversely, the mere fact that military operations have devastating consequences for civilians cannot, without more, establish genocidal intent. The work of the court is to carefully parse that distinction.Enter Navi PillayIt is against this background that what appears to be a coordinated campaign against Pillay is worth noting.Pillay was appointed by Gambia as a judge ad hoc in the Myanmar proceedings in 2019. That appointment preceded South Africa’s application against Israel by four years. She is also the former chair of the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel. In September 2025, that commission concluded that Israel had committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.Israel rejected those findings. Subsequently, some commentators have suggested that Pillay is seeking to engineer a change to the legal standard for proving genocide in the Myanmar proceedings, so that a more permissive test can subsequently be applied against Israel.Those aren’t ordinary commentators: In October, the US ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, insisted that Pillay was “tipping the scales on the ICJ’s current proceedings on Myanmar, intending to lower the legal threshold for proving genocide so that a [sic] weakened and false standard can later be weaponised against American and allied soldiers whenever they raise a finger against terrorists that hide behind civilians”.Consider just how strange the accusation: a South African judge, appointed years before the Gaza war to sit in proceedings concerning atrocities against the Rohingya, is apparently attempting to deliberately manipulate the jurisprudence of the world’s highest court so as to facilitate a future judgment against Israel.And this of a judge whose vote is only one among 17 judges who have presided in this matter, whose deliberations – and those of her colleagues – are confidential and whose capacity to dictate the outcome of proceedings is plainly limited.You’d imagine that given the gravity of this allegation there might be some attempt to substantiate it. But there has been none.And then there is this further difficulty for Pillay’s accusers. The commission of inquiry chaired by Pillay did not purport to dispense with the ICJ’s established test for inferring genocidal intent. It expressly applied it. It concluded that statements by Israeli authorities constituted direct evidence of genocidal intent and that the pattern of conduct supplied circumstantial evidence from which genocidal intent was the only reasonable inference.One can, of course, disagree with that assessment. Or argue that the commission gave insufficient weight to alternative explanations or drew conclusions that the evidence could not sustain. But those are arguments about the application of the existing legal standard, not evidence that Pillay has invented a different one.The stakes extend beyond either casePillay’s career has been devoted in substantial part to the development of international criminal justice. She served as a judge and later president of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, where she did develop its jurisprudence to establish that sexual violence could constitute an act of genocide. She subsequently served on the International Criminal Court and as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Nobel Committee rightly recognised that record last month in awarding her the Peace Prize.That does not place her beyond reproach. But the entirely unsubstantiated allegations concerning her supposed manipulation of the court’s deliberations is not fair criticism. Instead, it threatens something fundamental to the administration of international justice: the ability of judges to determine cases according to the evidence and the law, without intimidation by powerful states displeased by the possible implications of their judgments.The Rohingya have waited years for the court to determine Myanmar’s responsibility for the atrocities inflicted upon them. Their claims deserve to be decided on the evidence and the law, not treated principally as a rehearsal for litigation concerning Israel.South Africa’s case deserves the same consideration. And whatever the court decides on Thursday, the principles it applies must hold equally for Myanmar, Israel and every other state accused of genocide. Otherwise the promise of the Genocide Convention – that no state and no people are beyond its protection or its reach – is a hollow one. DM
Rohingya ruling is no rehearsal for Gaza, and Navi Pillay is no puppet master
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