Putin can’t beat Ukraine. He’s betting he can outlast America

The future of Russia’s war against Ukraine no longer depends solely on what happens along the front line. It depends just as much on whether Europe continues to believe that Ukraine can prevail.Today, two very different scenarios are taking shape.The optimistic one is increasingly visible. Russia’s economy is slowing under the pressure of war, Ukraine’s long-range strikes continue to disrupt Russia’s oil industry and military infrastructure, and the Kremlin is being forced to conceal growing domestic problems rather than celebrate military successes. The longer these trends continue, the more difficult it becomes for Russian President Vladimir Putin to sustain both the war and the illusion that Russia is winning it. The pessimistic scenario is political rather than military. If governments hostile to Ukraine, or simply indifferent to its survival, gain influence across Europe, Western support could gradually erode. Ukraine would face not only military pressure but also demographic decline, economic exhaustion, and the prospect of an endless war of attrition.Paradoxically, the Kremlin appears to understand this better than many Europeans do. Russia no longer relies exclusively on battlefield victories. Instead, it increasingly invests in a hybrid strategy designed to weaken European unity while hiding its own failures from the Russian public. The objective is straightforward: If Moscow cannot defeat Ukraine militarily, it hopes to persuade Europe that supporting Ukraine is futile.That explains why the Kremlin has recently tightened control over domestic reporting. Russian state media have reportedly been instructed to minimize coverage of Ukrainian strikes inside Russia while highlighting supposed Russian successes instead. The order reflects a simple reality: Ukrainian attacks are no longer isolated incidents, but a growing strategic problem that Moscow prefers its citizens not to see.The same strategy extends beyond Russia’s borders. While concealing its own setbacks, the Kremlin continues systematic attacks on Ukraine’s information infrastructure. After yet another missile strike on Kyiv, the offices of Channel 5 television were damaged for the second time in a year. Television studios, equipment, and journalists’ workspaces were destroyed. This was not collateral damage. It was another reminder that independent journalism remains one of Russia’s deliberate military targets.Russia’s growing censorship is not merely an attempt to control public opinion. It is becoming an economic necessity. Over the past year, Ukraine has transformed its long-range drone campaign from symbolic retaliation into a sustained strategy aimed at Russia’s energy infrastructure. Oil refineries, fuel depots, logistics hubs, and military-industrial facilities have become regular targets. The cumulative effect matters more than any individual strike.Each successful attack forces Moscow to divert additional resources to air defense, repair damaged infrastructure, reroute fuel supplies, and compensate for production losses. The costs extend far beyond the battlefield. They ripple through the civilian economy. The consequences are becoming increasingly difficult to hide.Fuel shortages have appeared across numerous Russian regions, forcing local authorities to impose restrictions on gasoline and diesel sales. Domestic fuel prices continue to rise despite the Kremlin’s attempts to regulate the market administratively. Even Putin has publicly acknowledged disruptions to fuel supplies, an admission that would have been almost unthinkable only a year earlier. The pressure reaches far beyond the energy sector.Russia’s federal budget has come under growing strain as oil and gas revenues decline while military expenditures continue to rise. Large companies have postponed investment projects, many businesses have frozen expansion plans, and thousands of enterprises report financial losses. Regional governments are increasingly struggling with budget deficits, forcing Moscow to consider new taxes and additional fiscal measures simply to keep local administrations functioning. None of these problems alone is sufficient to end the war.Together, however, they create something far more dangerous for the Kremlin: a slow but persistent erosion of Russia’s economic resilience. Modern wars are won not only by armies, but by economies capable of sustaining them. Every refinery taken offline, every disrupted supply chain, and every additional budget deficit gradually reduce Russia’s capacity to finance a prolonged conflict.This explains why the Kremlin now treats information almost as carefully as oil. Russian citizens are expected to hear about missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, but not about successful Ukrainian attacks hundreds of miles inside Russia. They are encouraged to believe that sanctions have failed while hearing little about factory closures, shrinking investment, or mounting regional debt. Information itself has become another battlefield.That battlefield extends beyond Russia. The Kremlin’s objective is no longer simply to convince Russians that victory is inevitable. It is equally determined to convince Europeans that continued support for Ukraine is hopeless. Every political crisis inside the European Union, every election that strengthens anti-Ukraine forces, every dispute over military aid serves Moscow’s broader strategic goal.In other words, Putin does not need Europe to support Russia. He merely needs Europe to stop supporting Ukraine.The outcome of this war will not be determined solely by military advances or territorial gains — it will also be decided by political endurance. For more than three years, Ukraine has demonstrated that it can resist one of the world’s largest armies. It has adapted faster than many expected, developed long-range strike capabilities, and increasingly brought the costs of war back onto Russian territory. These achievements matter not only for Ukraine’s security but for Europe’s as well.The question now is whether the West can demonstrate the same capacity for endurance. History shows that authoritarian regimes often survive military setbacks far more easily than democratic societies survive political fatigue. Democracies debate, argue, hold elections, and change governments. Those are strengths, not weaknesses, but they also create opportunities for adversaries who understand how to exploit division.That is precisely what the Kremlin is trying to do. Russia’s strategy today is remarkably simple. Conceal failures at home. Magnify disagreements abroad. Encourage every political movement that questions support for Ukraine. Turn every debate over military assistance into a debate over whether Ukraine is worth defending at all.CONSERVATIVES ARE FINALLY FINDING OUT LINDSEY GRAHAM WAS RIGHT ABOUT PUTINThe battlefield, therefore, extends far beyond eastern Ukraine. It runs through European parliaments, election campaigns, television studios, and social media platforms. Every delay in military assistance, every political crisis inside NATO or the European Union, every manufactured controversy becomes another opportunity for Moscow.This is why the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are not determined primarily by events on the battlefield. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s economic and military weaknesses continue to accumulate faster than Europe loses its political resolve. The pessimistic scenario is that Europe loses confidence before Russia loses capacity. If that happens, Moscow will achieve through political exhaustion what it has failed to achieve through military force. The future of Ukraine, and of Europe’s security, depends on ensuring that this does not happen.Igor Bondar is a Ukrainian writer and columnist based in Kharkiv. He has been publishing regularly for over four years, with a focus on culture, politics, and the intersection of war and society. His columns appear in major Scandinavian newspapers, including Aftenposten and Klassekampen, where he writes about Ukraine’s cultural and political landscape during wartime.