Prabowo gains upper hand as Gibran’s exit weakens Widodo’s grip

Indonesian Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation may mark a turning point in the balance of power between President Prabowo Subianto and his predecessor, Joko Widodo. In 2024, Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, helped carry Prabowo to the presidency, and his son’s elevation to vice president gave him a direct presence in the new administration. That bridge has now collapsed. What this means for Jokowi’s network, often called the “Solo group” after the city where his political career began, is the open question. The network drew its strength from personal loyalty, access to state institutions, ties to political and business elites, and the assumption that Jokowi would keep shaping decisions after leaving the palace. Gibran was its most visible foothold in government. He submitted his resignation to Prabowo on November 11, after 120 lawmakers from eight parliamentary factions signed a proposal asking the House of Representatives to exercise its right to weigh in on his eligibility. The proposal isn’t an impeachment and must clear further parliamentary and constitutional steps. But its backing is broad: Opposition lawmakers joined members of Gerindra and Golkar, parties central to Prabowo’s coalition. The dispute centers on the educational documents Gibran used to qualify for the 2024 race. This is not the first time Gibran’s path to the ticket has been challenged. He was 36 when Prabowo picked him as running mate, four years below the minimum age of 40. In October 2023, on the eve of candidate registration, the Constitutional Court ruled 5-4 that younger candidates could run if they had held elected office, an exception that covered Gibran, then mayor of Solo. The court’s chief justice, Anwar Usman, is Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle by marriage. An ethics panel later found that Usman should have recused himself and removed him as chief justice, but it had no power to overturn the ruling, and Gibran stayed on the ticket. The pressure on Jokowi’s network extends beyond Gibran. Three police generals have been detained in an investigation into allegations that senior officers illegally wiretapped Prabowo and others. One is Listyo Sigit Prabowo, the former national police chief, who recently moved to the post of presidential chief of staff before being implicated. Some suspects have been linked to Jokowi’s circle, but that doesn’t prove the former president directed or knew about any surveillance. There has also been movement in the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), which is closely associated with Jokowi’s family. Raja Juli Antoni, Giring Ganesha and Isyana Bagoes Oka have resigned from party positions or membership, saying they want to concentrate on government responsibilities. That doesn’t mean the party has abandoned Jokowi, but it suggests how loyalties can shift toward a sitting president when government access becomes more valuable than party roles. Together, these developments point to an erosion of Jokowi’s bargaining power, though not to irrelevance. He retains name recognition, personal networks and a political following. But influence and leverage are different things. Influence draws attention or commands loyalty; leverage turns those assets into concessions from another actor. Jokowi may still have the first while losing some of the second. In 2024, Prabowo had reason to value Jokowi’s popularity, networks and endorsement. Two years into his term, he has his own electoral mandate, control of the executive and a broad parliamentary coalition. The more alternatives he has, the less he needs his predecessor. None of this shows that Prabowo engineered the Solo network’s decline, but the relationship is now less symmetrical. Gibran’s vice presidency was more than a family achievement; it was Jokowi’s channel into government. With that channel closed, Jokowi will have to lean more heavily on informal networks, alliances and public standing. Those may still matter in the 2029 elections, but they offer less direct influence than a son in the vice president’s palace. For Prabowo, Gibran’s departure could provide political insulation. The two men won the 2024 election on one ticket, but the resignation lets Prabowo separate his administration’s future from the controversy surrounding his deputy while keeping the presidency intact. Under Article 8 of the Constitution, the People’s Consultative Assembly will fill the vacancy from two candidates nominated by the president, giving Prabowo a central role in shaping the next configuration of power. For Gibran, resignation may be less damaging than removal by impeachment, allowing him to leave on his own initiative rather than after a prolonged constitutional confrontation. It doesn’t settle questions about his eligibility, however, and it doesn’t automatically end the parliamentary process already underway. Comparisons with Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia’s first vice president, deserve caution. Hatta resigned in 1956 over fundamental disagreements with President Sukarno about the republic’s direction. His departure was an ideological rupture, not a response to questions about the documents behind his candidacy. The two political projects that once reinforced each other are now separating. Prabowo’s administration is gaining autonomy, while Jokowi’s network is learning the limits of influence without formal authority. A former president can remain influential and can shape electoral calculations, but without institutional access, cohesive networks and credible bargaining power, his sway over the government is likely to shrink. The Solo network helped make Prabowo’s election possible. Its predicament shows how an alliance built on mutual need can weaken once one partner acquires alternatives. In Jakarta, the question is how much, if at all, Prabowo still needs Jokowi. Jannus TH Siahaan is an Indonesia-based social and political analyst. He holds a doctorate from Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia