Opinion: Opinion | The Big Reset In How India Builds Its Defence Is Here

For decades, India's defence debate has been dominated by a familiar contradiction: ambitious military requirements but a slow acquisition system; a large scientific establishment but often inflexible project management; and a growing industrial base but insufficient access to cutting-edge technologies.That contradiction is now being confronted simultaneously at several levels.In a conversation with this author, Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh, who also holds charge as Secretary, Department of Defence R&D and Chairman of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), outlined a timeline that is more significant than a list of individual weapons programmes. It is, in effect, a roadmap for changing how India buys, develops, finances, and ultimately owns military technology.The first building block is Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2026.The draft DAP 2026 is intended to make acquisition shorter, cleaner, and more responsive to the speed of technological change. The proposed framework reduces procurement categories from five to four, introduces technology-readiness-level-based categorisation, allows greater delegation, provides for two-stage trials, and seeks to monitor timelines from the RFI stage. It also raises indigenous content under the Buy Indian-IDDM category from 50% to 60%. Buy (Global) now must have 30 % IC obligations.Further, DAP 2026 puts forth progressive indigenisation- Long Term Bulk Acquisition (LTBA), indigenous design capability, IP control-ownership. For example, Clause 26.1.1 demands the vendor to show/prove full design control, source code,In an era of drones, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, and rapidly evolving sensors, a five-year procurement cycle can mean buying yesterday's technology tomorrow.Singh's larger point is therefore important: the reform of acquisition must be about speed.But speed in procurement alone will not make India technologically sovereign. That is where the second reform becomes critical.From Procurement To R&DOne of the least-discussed constraints on India's defence technology ambitions has been the financing architecture for R&D.DRDO has traditionally operated many projects within a system designed around sanctioned milestones, expenditure procedures and predetermined project structures. That model can work for conventional engineering programmes. It becomes much harder when the technology itself is moving rapidly.A radar, propulsion system, AI architecture, autonomous platform or electronic-warfare system cannot always be developed according to a rigid linear timetable. Technology development is inherently iterative: test, fail, redesign, demonstrate, modify and test again.This is why the proposed Delegation of Financial Powers, or DFP-2026, could become as important for DRDO as DAP 2026 is for acquisition.The objective is to give laboratory directors and project directors greater financial flexibility so that promising technologies can move faster from laboratory development to demonstration and user evaluation.India cannot aspire to lead in defence technology while treating R&D finance as a conventional expenditure-control exercise.DRDO is awaiting its new full-time leadership through the Prime Minister-led selection process. Its next phase cannot simply be about managing laboratories. It has to be about managing technological missions.P-75I: Last-Minute Recheck, Final ApprovalProject-75I is perhaps the clearest test of whether India has learnt the difference between buying a platform and acquiring a capability.The programme for six advanced conventional submarines has been in the pipeline for years. The Finance Ministry has cleared the proposal. P75I is in the final leg, awaiting final approval from the highest authority, where some key aspects must be rechecked.The Strategic Partnership (SP) model was conceived precisely to combine Indian industrial capacity with global technology.P-75I, therefore, should not be treated as six submarines but India's next submarine technology ecosystem where Indian DPUSs like MDL can build without the support of foreign partners-Naval Group and TKMS.AMCA: Design To Industrial CapabilityThe Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme has moved from concept to industrial execution. The MoD issued the RFP in May 2026 to shortlisted private-sector contenders for the development of prototypes, with the programme being led by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) under DRDO. AMCA needs 15 GE F414 engines for five flying prototypes.MoD has issued RPF to L&T and BEL Consortium: Led by Larsen & Toubro, alongside state-run Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Dynamatic Technologies. Bharat Forge-Led Consortium includes public sector BEML (Bharat Earth Movers Limited) and private tech firm Data Patterns. Tata Advanced Systems is competing independently.However, the GE 404 engine remains an enigma with reported higher prices than the earlier quoted. The issue should be resolved at the earliest; otherwise, it will face similar challenges like Tejas Mk1A.And here lies the strategic significance of France.The Sixth-Generation OpportunityIndia cannot afford to finish AMCA in the 2030s only to discover that the world has already moved to the next technological generation.Singh's position that India is open to working with France on sixth-generation fighter technology therefore deserves close attention.The global combat-aircraft race is already moving beyond the fifth-generation paradigm towards networked combat, autonomous loyal wingmen, AI-enabled decision-making, distributed sensors, combat clouds and manned-unmanned teaming.France offers India an unusual proposition because it retains a relatively complete sovereign combat-aircraft ecosystem-Dassault in aircraft design, Safran in propulsion, Thales in sensors and electronic systems, and MBDA in weapons.The original European FCAS was conceived as a system-of-systems combining a next-generation fighter, unmanned remote carriers and a combat cloud. But the programme's manned-fighter component has run into big industrial and political differences between France and Germany, and Dassault is now pursuing discussions with the French government for a future combat-aircraft demonstrator, potentially flying around 2031-32.Joining a future French programme should not mean becoming a junior customer. India's objective should be co-development, co-design, co-production and co-ownership of technology wherever possible.The opportunity is not simply to acquire a sixth-generation fighter. It is to gain entry into the technology stack that will define sixth-generation air power.That includes propulsion, stealth, sensors, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, secure communications, combat-cloud architecture and human-machine teaming.The AMCA engine programme and potential French cooperation should therefore be viewed as complementary, not competing, tracks.End of L1 Obsession?There is another reform idea that could have profound implications for procurement.Singh has indicated that technical evaluation and operational judgement need to be better separated from the narrow fixation on price. The idea that the technically suitable option can first be assessed at the appropriate tender level, with operational suitability ultimately judged by commanders, points towards a larger question: should the cheapest technically compliant product always determine India's military future?The answer increasingly has to be no.The cheapest missile, drone, radar, or electronic-warfare system is not necessarily the most economical if it becomes obsolete faster, cannot be upgraded, lacks an indigenous supply chain, or performs poorly in a contested environment.India needs a procurement philosophy that evaluates life-cycle capability, upgradeability, technology ownership, operational effectiveness, and strategic resilience, alongside price.DAP 2026's emphasis on technology readiness, spiral development, and faster acquisition of emerging technologies is a step in that direction.Why PLI Can't Be A PanaceaSingh's assessment is that the conventional Production Linked Incentive model is not ideally suited to defence. "Defence is too diverse to be treated as one manufacturing category," he says. A fighter engine, submarine battery, AESA radar, artillery system, semiconductor, drone, and armoured vehicle have entirely different technology cycles, capital requirements, and production economics. "What defence needs instead is technology-specific incentivisation, Singh opines, looking at success stories of PLI in other sectors.The state should identify strategic gaps-propulsion, advanced materials, seekers, infrared sensors, electronic warfare, semiconductor components, batteries, underwater systems, secure communications, and autonomous systems-and build targeted incentives around them.In DDAP 2026, Clause 27 puts a provision for incentives, materials, local component development, and identification of critical tech locally. This is a good step in the absence of structured PLI.The Real Test Begins NowThe opportunity before Rajesh Kumar Singh and the MOD is therefore much larger than shortening procurement timelines.It is to create a defence ecosystem in which time becomes a strategic resource.If DAP 2026 can make procurement faster, DFP 2026 can make DRDO more agile, P-75I can transfer genuine submarine-design competence, AMCA can build a new aerospace ecosystem, and France can become a partner in sixth-generation technologies, then it will be a great deal of initiatives.(The author is a national security expert, defence editor, and the founder of the military think tank Strategic Insights)Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author