[OPINION] BARMM post-elections: Building a coalition that needs to govern

After generally peaceful and democratic parliamentary elections, the region now faces a different — and perhaps more difficult — political challenge: how to govern after the votes have been counted. Based on unofficial results, four political parties out of 13 appear poised to cross the 2.5% threshold for regional political party representation. The Bangsamoro Federalist Party (BFP) leads with 16 party seats, followed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front-led United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) with 15, the clan alliance under the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition (BGC) with 8, and the Bangsamoro People’s Democratic (Raayat) Party with 1. For the 32 district representatives, incumbent chief minister Abdulraof Macacua of BFP won in Maguindanao del Norte while MILF chairman Ebrahim Murad’s son, Mansor, won the seat in the Special Geographic Area. BFP won a total of 13 district seats, UBJP had 10, and the Adiong-led local party SIAP of Lanao del sur got six. Three other local parties got one seat each. The six elected sectoral seats all went to the UBJP, thus affirming the sectoral and territorial dominance of the MILF’s UBJP. Two representatives from the indigenous peoples in BARMM were elected by them prior to September 14. Overall, the 80-member parliament is now comprised of the following: a total of 30 seats for the BFP, 29 seats for UBJP, and 19 seats for the clan-led political parties. This parliament will govern for the next five years. Many analysts would always equate the BARMM to the national government’s interests which is a given. The Bangsamoro Organic Law ties those interests due to national security risk management, natural resource management, devolution imperatives, and political economy. But that is another matter to discuss. The numbers in votes tell only part of the story. No party has a majority. And that means the first elected Bangsamoro government will have to be built through coalition, negotiation, compromise, and trust. It also should not lead to a super majority coalition where there is no credible opposition. What is needed is for a coalition to govern and not just forming a government. The former is difficult, the latter is easy. Building a unity government With no party dominating the elections, the arithmetic is straightforward. The transition party incumbent BFP’s 30 party seats are not enough to govern alone. An alliance with the UBJP’s 29 seats would produce a dominant majority. But that would leave out the clan-led political parties which is critical for governance. This is where the real politics begins. The Bangsamoro parliamentary system was designed to encourage representation and negotiation. Unlike a presidential system where the executive derives a separate electoral mandate, a parliamentary government depends on the ability of political forces inside Parliament to construct a stable governing majority. A government that survives by one or two votes on every major issue will be unstable. The new governing coalition should be dominant enough to survive disagreements, defections, political shocks, and difficult budget negotiations. The objective should be a stable parliamentary majority, not merely the minimum number needed to elect a chief minister. Coalition governments inevitably require some distribution of executive responsibility. But there is a danger. If Cabinet positions become rewards for delivering votes, the new government could reproduce the worst features of traditional Philippine politics. The BFP-led coalition should instead adopt three principles: representation, competence, and accountability. Coalition partners should have meaningful representation in government. But ministers must also be competent to manage public institutions. With the elections of the chief minister happening on the first day of convening parliament, a coalition government needs to be formed prior to that. In reality, the incumbent government under the BFP can initiate the formation. The goal should not merely be to find 41 votes to elect a chief minister. The goal should be to build a majority that can govern for five years. But the first substantive agenda in coalition negotiations would be a governance agenda for a coalition government. The BFP could propose a Bangsamoro Governance Compact 2026–2031, signed by coalition partners before the election of the Chief Minister. The compact could establish a common agenda around on peace, development and governance. This would shift coalition formation from “What position do I get?” to “What government are we going to build?” That distinction is crucial. The UBJP question There is another delicate issue. The electoral transition should not be interpreted as the end of the MILF’s political relevance. The Bangsamoro Parliament itself is a product of the peace process. The presence of former MILF leaders and representatives associated with the movement inside the elected political system is therefore not an anomaly. It is part of the transition from armed struggle to democratic politics. The challenge is to institutionalize that transition. The most consequential negotiation may be between the BFP and UBJP. With 30 party seats between them, the two parties could form the nucleus of the next government. But the relationship would carry a significance beyond parliamentary arithmetic. The UBJP represents a political tradition deeply connected to the Bangsamoro peace process and the transition that produced the BARMM. A BFP-UBJP coalition could therefore symbolize an important political transition: from the politics of the peace process to the politics of democratic parliamentary government, without abandoning the gains of the peace process itself. The two should not be framed as competing sources of legitimacy. The Bangsamoro needs both. The future government can draw legitimacy from the peace process, the ballot box, and the communities represented by elected district and sectoral leaders. The challenge is to bring these sources of legitimacy together. That would be a genuine measure of the success of the peace process. Don’t dismiss the clans The new parliament is likely to include representatives associated with powerful political families and local networks, including the Adiongs, Ampatuans, Gandamras, Hatamans, Mangundadatus, Midtimbangs, Sinsuat, etc. These representatives should not automatically be dismissed as “clan politicians.” They represent real constituencies. Their voters have concerns about roads, schools, hospitals, agriculture, fisheries, livelihood, security, local government, and access to public services. The question is not whether these representatives have local political interests. Of course they do. The question is how those interests are incorporated into a transparent regional development agenda. The new government should establish transparent criteria for allocating public resources, while giving district representatives a legitimate role in setting regional priorities. Representation must also mean geographic balance. The Bangsamoro is geographically and politically diverse. The composition of the executive should reflect this diversity. This is especially important for communities that historically have felt distant from the regional government like the Special Geographic Area carved out from the North Cotabato Province. A coalition government that promises inclusion but remains concentrated around the region’s established political centers will quickly lose credibility. Credible opposition matters There is another important principle. Not everyone should be brought into the government. A healthy parliamentary democracy requires a credible opposition. The BFP should resist the temptation to create an oversized coalition simply to eliminate opposition. This is what happened at the national level that should not be replicated. An opposition can strengthen government. It can expose weaknesses, question expenditures, scrutinize appointments, challenge policies, and force ministers to explain their decisions. A Parliament in which everyone is part of the government risks becoming a Parliament where nobody is accountable. The ideal arrangement is therefore: a broad governing coalition, a legitimate opposition, strong parliamentary committees, and active civil society. That is how parliamentary democracy becomes more than an institutional design. It becomes a political culture. The 2026 parliamentary election should ultimately be judged not only by whether it was peaceful. It should also be judged by what happens after the election. The most important question of all: can the government be seen, felt, and deliver tangible improvements in the lives of ordinary Bangsamoro?. – Rappler.com Tom Villarin is a political science professor at the Ateneo de Manila University. He served in the 17th Congress as Akbayan Party List representative. He also was former local government undersecretary under the Noynoy Aquino administration.