One year after Israel struck Qatar

A year later, the 9 September Israeli strike had altered how Qatar understands its own security, while prompting governments across the Gulf to reassess the Israeli threat and the limits of Washington’s security umbrella.A year ago, Israel struck a compound in Doha where Hamas leaders were meeting as part of negotiations aimed at ending the Gaza war.Five Hamas members and a Qatari security officer lost their lives.The operation was unprecedented in the sense that Israel had never before directly attacked a Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] member.The strike was particularly startling because of Doha’s close relationship with the United States.Qatar has been a U.S. major non-NATO ally since 2022, while the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM] has been based in al-Udeid for nearly two decades.Qatar has also long positioned itself as a key U.S. diplomatic and economic partner in the region.The attack therefore challenged longstanding assumptions about the security Qatar believed its relationship with Washington provided.A year later, the strike has altered how Qatar understands its own security while prompting governments across the Gulf to reassess the Israeli threat and the limits of Washington’s security umbrella.The rest of the GCC responded to last year’s attack on Doha with striking unity. Perhaps most notable was the United Arab Emirates’ reaction.Despite Abu Dhabi’s serious problems with Doha throughout the 2010s and early 2020s, its deepening ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and the Emirati leadership’s longstanding vitriol toward Hamas, the UAE unequivocally condemned Israel’s attack as a violation of Qatari sovereignty.Abu Dhabi expressed full solidarity with Doha and stressed that Gulf security was indivisible. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed’s visit to Doha the following day underscored that solidarity.In other Gulf Arab capitals, a disturbing question arose soon after the dust settled in Doha: If Israel could strike a target in Qatar, a country that had spent years cultivating close ties with successive U.S. administrations, what would stop Israel from attacking another GCC member?Qatar’s diplomatic strategy comes under strainFor Qatar, Israel’s rogue act struck at the foundation of its diplomatic foreign policy.Doha hosted Hamas leaders, maintained close ties with Washington, and developed pragmatic relations with Iran and other regional powers.Qatar’s influence as a mediator rested on its ability to bridge otherwise hostile political divides. Yet Doha was attacked while performing precisely the diplomatic role that had enhanced its value to both the United States and even Israel.The lesson was clear: Mediation that opens channels to Hamas can generate diplomatic relevance, but not necessarily security.The attack also forced Qatar to question the value of Washington’s security guarantees. If the United States could or, more accurately, would not prevent Israel from attacking a fellow U.S. partner, what, in practical terms, does the American security umbrella ultimately guarantee?U.S. President Donald Trump subsequently sought to reassure Qatar by publicly rebuking Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and prompting him to apologise to Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani over the phone. The episode, nevertheless, deepened doubts in Doha about the reliability of U.S. protection.Searching for security beyond WashingtonThe subsequent regional trajectory only reinforced those doubts.Saudi Arabia and Pakistan entered into a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement only eight days after the Israeli strike on Doha, followed eleven months later by the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye—an arrangement Qatar welcomed. For Doha, the emergence of overlapping regional security partnerships offers ways to reduce reliance on Washington without abandoning the U.S. relationship.Qatar’s relationship with Türkiye is particularly significant in this emerging security architecture.Doha and Ankara have built one of the Middle East’s most consequential partnerships, spanning defence, diplomacy and economic cooperation.Closer alignment with a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani security framework will allow Qatar to preserve its close relationship with Washington while reducing its reliance on the United States as an external security guarantor.The attack also reflected a wider deterioration between Israel and Qatar. For years, Israeli officials regarded Doha as a useful intermediary with Hamas.Yet Israel’s increasingly right-wing political discourse has in recent years increasingly portrayed Qatar as a nefarious Arab state rather than a useful interlocutor with a complicated foreign policy.Netanyahu’s remarks ahead of the strike’s first anniversary were revealing. His willingness to boast about the attack suggested that, in Israeli political discourse, the strike symbolises Zionist domination over the Arabs.Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s anti-Qatar rhetoric on the campaign trail points in the same direction.Israel’s attack appears to have strengthened Doha’s determination to embed itself more deeply in a broader Gulf and Muslim response to Israel’s borderless aggression. Events in 2026 only reinforced that lesson.The Trump administration’s decision to disregard Gulf Arab warnings and interests when it joined Israel in waging a reckless war of choice against Iran deepened doubts in Doha about the reliability of U.S. security commitments.Iranian attacks on Qatar, which began as soon as the U.S. and Israel’s war on the Islamic Republic began in late February, made those concerns even more immediate.A new Gulf security calculusA year after the Israeli strike on Doha, the most consequential legacy of 9 September may lie in the strategic conclusions drawn in Doha and across the Gulf.Israel demonstrated Qatar’s vulnerability, prompting Doha to respond by working to further diversify its security relationships while maintaining an exceptionally close partnership with Washington.The next phase of Gulf foreign policy may therefore be defined by a dual imperative: Preserving the relationship with the United States while building the regional partnerships needed to protect their countries from external aggressors—whether that be Israel or Iran—and prevent GCC states from being left standing alone.Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, an Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. This article is an opinion piece and does not necessarily reflect the views of Doha News, its editorial board, or staff.