When it comes to Europe’s security architecture, “Something’s clearly not working,” Jared Kushner declared last week, following talks on revising that architecture as part of a potential end to the Ukraine war. Kushner’s right — there is a problem. But does the White House fully grasp what it is? At root, the issue is Russia’s self-declared right to empire, which is incompatible with Ukrainian and European security. Russia’s Maximalist Demands Kushner spoke after a burst of shuttle diplomacy. He and fellow envoy Steve Witkoff met first with Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Abu Dhabi, then with the Russian and Ukrainian presidents in Moscow and Dublin, respectively. Preparations for a second round are in the works. To Kyiv, these talks are about locking down post-war security guarantees from the West. The Kremlin has other ideas. Moscow laid out its objectives in a position paper circulated before the talks. It closely resembled — and, in some cases, exceeded — a set of ultimatums the Russians issued ahead of their 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Among other things, Russia insists that NATO not only foreswear further enlargement but also roll back its military presence on the territory of eastern-flank allies. It also rejects Western military aid to Ukraine as well as European plans to deploy forces in Ukraine after the war, arguing instead that Russia, the aggressor, should guarantee Ukraine’s security. In short, Moscow wants a wholesale redrawing of European security, or what a Russian delegation chief Vladimir Medinsky called a new “Yalta and Potsdam.” The White House has downplayed these terms as merely an opening position. It asked Russia to draft a new proposal incorporating both its “desires and fears” as well as “symmetrical steps” for deescalation. But, in Moscow, the fact that Washington is finally even entertaining Russia’s demands, despite European objections, is celebrated as a “revolutionary … first step.” Putin may conclude that persistence pays. The Kremlin, having seen prior diplomatic machinations derailed by European and Ukrainian opposition, now seeks to neutralize that resistance. The American envoys have requested that Putin allow European officials to join the next round of talks, but Moscow is resisting. It wants Washington first to push the Europeans to soften their stance. Band-Aids Won’t Satisfy the Bear The White House hopes that by addressing post-war security as part of peace talks, it can unlock a compromise on what it sees as the thorniest issue: Putin’s demand that Ukraine surrender the rest of its eastern Donbas region. American officials assert that both sides have now begun to show more “flexibility” on territorial matters. The Kremlin, however, has publicly indicated the opposite. The administration may soon discover that disagreements over Europe’s security order are an even harder nut to crack. According to Kushner, Washington is “exploring five principal goals: permanent security consultations, reliable crisis communications, greater military transparency, reciprocal measures to reduce escalation risks, and an enduring framework for long-term European security and stability.” One idea floated by American officials is to revive the NATO-Russia Council. To its credit, the White House insists that it intends to “build upon,” not replace, the NATO alliance, which “will remain central to European collective defense.” Confidence-building measures, arms control, and the like, certainly can be useful, especially when tensions are high. But the Russian invasion did not occur for want of such tools. From the Vienna Document to treaties restricting conventional forces, intermediate-range missiles, nuclear arms, and chemical and biological weapons, Russia has violated or withdrawn from almost every agreement designed to keep the peace after the Cold War. While each of those decisions had particular reasons, they all ultimately sprang from Moscow’s imperial aspirations. Russia’s 2022 invasion was the culmination of a decades-old cocktail of grievance and ambition that goes far beyond Ukraine. Putin, fancying himself a modern-day tsar, believes Russia must dominate its neighbors and deserves to decide European and global affairs alongside other big powers. He thinks the West wronged Russia by denying Moscow its supposed due and especially by daring to help Ukraine pursue its independence. In Putin’s mind, these are the war’s “root causes.” The current conflict, however it ends, is unlikely to resolve that struggle. Papering over it with new agreements on confidence-building measures and the like will not really solve anything. Worse, experience suggests they may simply create new points of friction as Russia pushes the boundaries and as disputes over compliance fuel mutual suspicion. Moscow itself argues as much, rejecting “band-aid” solutions until the “necessary conditions” are established. Containing Moscow’s Ambitions If negotiations cannot tame Moscow’s ambitions, deterrence can at least contain them. Europe’s current security architecture may be imperfect, but NATO has kept its members safe for nearly eight decades. Although Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, it has never dared invade a NATO member. That is no small accomplishment. Any deal that jeopardized NATO deterrence for the sake of a Russian promise of peace would be a poor bargain. Washington should therefore think very carefully before it makes any further cuts to U.S. forces allocated to Europe. Any commitments to Russia regarding U.S. or NATO force posture should have full buy-in from allies. Likewise, restrictions on the provision of Western arms to Ukraine after the war should be a non-starter. The same goes for any meaningful limits on the size or capabilities of Ukraine’s military. A third invasion will be a strong possibility, so Ukraine must have the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat that aggression. Washington is right to probe whether an acceptable settlement can be reached. But the White House must be clear-eyed about Putin’s revisionist ambitions — and prepared to walk away from a bad deal. John Hardie is deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from John and FDD, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD. Follow John on X @JohnH105. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
On European Security, Putin’s Imperialist Ambitions Are the Problem
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