No Back Door for Rosatom: Stop Russia’s Entry Into Nuclear Fuel Production in Germany

Germany no longer operates any nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, a decision taken by the federal government last Wednesday would turn the country into a production site for nuclear fuel using Russian technology. The permission for the Lingen project raises profound questions regarding Europe’s long-term energy security and strategic sovereignty. In Lingen, Lower Saxony, the French nuclear technology company Framatome plans to produce nuclear fuel in cooperation with Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear corporation. Through its subsidiary TVEL, Rosatom is the world’s leading supplier of fuel for Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, which were originally designed to use fuel produced by Rosatom. Such reactors are in operation in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. We have to be clear: This is not simply a technical licensing issue or an ordinary business relationship. The German government took a political decision with direct security implications for Europe. Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to turn long-term energy partnerships into a means of exerting pressure. This pattern is evident not only in the natural gas sector but also in the nuclear industry, where Rosatom has established and continues to support nuclear power projects throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, thereby creating decades-long technological, operational, and economic dependencies. Other Topics of Interest Kim Jong Un Reaps $22 Billion Windfall from Russian Alliance North Korean leader Kim Jong Un secured up to $22 billion in foreign revenue between 2022 and 2025, largely driven by the mass export of artillery and troops to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine. Once these dependencies are established, they provide Moscow with opportunities to exert political influence and maintain strategic pressure on partner countries. Rosatom links civilian nuclear activities to the strategic goals of the Russian state and thus serves as its geopolitical instrument. Against this backdrop, the expansion project in Lingen creates a mechanism through which Rosatom remains anchored in the European energy system while operating under the guise of a trustworthy industrial partner – Framatome. Instead of breaking away from Russia, Germany, the Czech Republic and more European countries are becoming increasingly dependent on Russian technology, intellectual property, and know-how. This is extremely dangerous. The Czech example: Diversification or rebranding? The Czech Republic has taken real steps to reduce its dependence on Rosatom. ČEZ selected Westinghouse and Framatome as fuel suppliers for Temelín, while Westinghouse has also been contracted to supply fuel for Dukovany. However, the Lingen project raises a serious concern: if Framatome’s VVER fuel is manufactured, at least in the initial phase, on the basis of Rosatom/TVEL technology, licensing, know-how or equipment, Russian technological dependency could re-enter the Czech and European fuel supply chain through a supplier that was selected precisely to reduce dependence on Rosatom. This would not be real diversification, but a politically more convenient rebranding of dependency. The monopoly argument doesn’t hold water Proponents of the project often argue that Europe should not replace Rosatom’s monopoly with a Westinghouse monopoly. This concern must be taken seriously, but it leads to false conclusions. If the monopoly is the problem, then a new cooperation with a Kremlin-directed company at the centre of the European nuclear fuel chain surely is not the solution. The debate is often mistakenly portrayed as an either/or decision, whereas the reality is more complex. Through its collaboration with Westinghouse, the Spanish company ENUSA has already established fuel production capabilities for one of the Soviet-designed reactor types. Ukraine has successfully diversified its nuclear fuel supply and is also developing a production line for such fuels. This shows that European companies can acquire the necessary expertise and industrial capacity through partnerships with Western technology providers, rather than with Russian state-owned enterprises. It is a political scandal that a leading European company has opted to cooperate with Russia instead of seeking partnerships with Western suppliers. Real safety risks The risks of the project go far beyond conventional nuclear safety. The 2023 legal assessment commissioned by the Federal Ministry for the Environment and Nuclear Safety concluded that the expansion in Lingen should not be viewed solely as a technical licensing process. It highlighted concerns regarding sabotage, influence on safety-related decisions, technology procurement, and the potential circumvention of future sanctions. Recent cases involving attempts to procure dual-use goods for a nuclear weapons facility affiliated with Rosatom provide a concrete example of such risks. Research by the think tank DiXi Group uncovered Rosatom’s procurement of dual-use goods that could potentially support Russia’s military-industrial complex. One of the most controversial aspects of the project is the involvement of Russian personnel. In the spring of 2024, approximately 20 specialists from Rosatom travelled to Lingen to deliver equipment and train staff in preparation for the planned production of fuel assemblies based on Russian technology. At public hearings in November 2024, Framatome officially confirmed their presence. In subsequent public statements, however, the company denied that Russian specialists had physically entered the plant, leading to further controversy over the extent of Rosatom’s involvement. Rosatom is not simply an energy company – despite widespread international condemnation, it has played a key role in Russia’s military control and operation of the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. According to research by the investigative group Truth Hounds, Rosatom’s corporate, administrative, and financial structures were used to support Russian occupation and torture. The way out The fuel element plant in Lingen is far more than just an economic initiative. It is a geopolitical project of enormous strategic importance. We are worried to see how recklessly the German government is once again seeking to place key parts of Europe’s energy supply in the hands of the Kremlin. A country that has phased out nuclear energy now runs the risk of becoming a gateway for Russian influence in the nuclear sector within the EU. If this new era is to mark a historic break from strategic dependence on Russia – particularly in the energy sector – why should Rosatom be given the opportunity to expand its technological influence in Germany? The German federal government and the authorities in Lower Saxony must listen to the 11,000 people in Lower Saxony who have already filed objections to the permitting process. The German government must take back the permission and stop the Lingen project immediately, as long as it is based on Rosatom’s technology or involvement. Instead, European decision-makers should focus on and support strategies for genuine fuel diversification based on cooperation between trustworthy Western partners and the development of independent European capabilities. Rosatom does not belong in Europe’s critical infrastructure; it belongs on the sanctions list. Otherwise, Rosatom would give the Kremlin exactly what it needs within European critical infrastructure supply chains to advance its interests – a backdoor. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.