Nepal’s Tibet Conference Controversy Is About More Than Chinese Pressure

The cancellation of the in-person 17th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies (IATS), scheduled for Kathmandu from August 23-29, is being portrayed in Nepal and abroad as the country caving in to China’s undue pressure. That is not wrong — but it is an incomplete analysis. The cancellation also reflects the Nepal government’s troubled ties with Beijing, inadequate diplomatic outreach, and, just as importantly, the Nepali state’s lack of confidence in its ability to manage politically sensitive events. The government of Balendra Shah, Nepal’s current prime minister and senior leader of the ruling Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), got off on the wrong foot with China. The September 2025 Gen Z uprising, which overthrew the K.P. Sharma Oli government and cleared the way for the RSP’s rise to power, saw the participation of some youths wearing clothes with the insignia of “TOB.” According to a popular narrative, the acronym stood for “Tibetan Original Bloodline.” Its members supposedly wanted to “hijack” the movement for the “Free Tibet” cause. Though there was no hard evidence to establish this link, the narrative gained traction in pro-Beijing circles. So did the related speculation that the Gen Z protests were the handiwork of Western spy agencies. Then there is Sudan Gurung. The current Nepali home minister has been persistently linked to the Free Tibet movement and the alleged TOB protestors. There were still other reasons for China to doubt the Shah government’s adherence to the “One China” policy. In a rare move, the Dalai Lama had congratulated the erstwhile government of Sushila Karki, the ex-chief justice who had been picked by Shah to lead the interim government formed after the Gen Z uprising. Then, when Shah became the prime minister after the March 2026 elections, the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile officially extended his good wishes. In both these instances, the Nepali side did not respond to the congratulatory messages, yet Beijing certainly took note. More recently, four months into the Shah government’s tenure, many Western diplomats openly attended the Dalai Lama’s birthday celebrations in Kathmandu, which China again interpreted as a sign of Nepal’s lack of commitment to “One China.” Amid these developments, Shah refused to meet Chinese officials, as part of his broader policy of refraining from holding one-on-one meetings with foreign officials. It added to the misunderstanding. The IATS conference, which had been planned for four years, was to host around 700 delegates from around the world. Yet the in-person event was canceled at the last minute (and subsequently moved online). Many interpreted this as yet another sign of China’s growing clout in Nepal. Since Xi Jinping became China’s president in 2013, Chinese representatives in Kathmandu have become increasingly vocal on the “nefarious” designs of Western forces and the need for Kathmandu to do more to protect Chinese interests. They are also not averse to putting pressure on their Nepali counterparts to curtail even the limited rights of Tibetan refugees. They try to suppress critical coverage of China and Xi. And yes, they were apprehensive about the Tibet conference. But China has always been sensitive about possible pro-Tibet activities on Nepali soil, by far its biggest concern in its relations with Nepal. Its anxieties have only grown as the issue of the eventual succession to the aging Dalai Lama becomes more pressing. China fears that Western countries, and particularly the United States, could use this sensitive time to corner Beijing. From Beijing’s perspective, while the Nepal government has been accommodating the concerns of the U.S., “a distant relative,” it has been rather averse to protecting the interests of China, Nepal’s “close neighbor.” With mutual suspicions mounting, the government may have viewed accommodating Beijing over the IATS conference as a way to ease tensions. Nepal also failed to establish the associated security risks. A section of Nepali media quoted senior security officials as saying that the event had been canceled despite there being no such risk. Yet a government assessment feared possible clashes between pro-China and anti-China elements during the conference and even broader protests among the Tibetan community in Nepal. Kathmandu evidently concluded that the risk was not worth taking. Nepal prides itself as a haven for free speech in South Asia. This is one reason it hosts regional conferences and events that cannot be held in, say, India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh. And the country should do everything to protect this freedom. Preserving the country’s image as a rare venue in the region for open discussion of regional and global issues is a worthy goal. But doing so requires deft diplomacy. The country also needs strong institutions that can independently assess and address genuine security risks without allowing geopolitical pressure to stifle open debate.