Modern War Demands a Data-Centric, Cloud-Based Command and Control Architecture

Russia’s war against Ukraine is the first real-world test of how to master a battlefield overwhelmed by data, exposing how quickly modern forces must receive, process, and share information to survive. It has also highlighted the flaws of U.S. command and control systems, which are often siloed, archaic, and vulnerable. While the Department of Defense (DoD) is taking steps to address this, it must learn from Ukraine’s battle-tested command and control architecture, or risk learning the hard lessons on the battlefield. Across the military, the DoD uses an app-centric infrastructure in which the services each run their own tactical network, with limited interoperability between them. Tactical data networks like Link 16 and systems such as the Command, Control, Battle Management & Communications system provide cross-service connectivity, but these are narrow, purpose-built workarounds rather than a unified command and control architecture. Even where it exists, integration remains inconsistent across every service pairing, not just between any two branches. This fragmentation prevents data from being integrated at scale, having a direct impact on mission readiness and effectiveness. If the United States cannot seamlessly share information among components of its military, how will it be able to do so in a contested, and dynamic battlefield environment? A better, battle-tested model exists, and it comes from Ukraine. Facing an existential threat in its fight against Russia, Kyiv developed and implemented Delta, a C2 system that provides a real-time common operating picture of the battlefield. Open-source reports indicate that the Ukrainians are using Delta to integrate sensor feeds, drone video, battlefield reports, and geolocation data to display a common operating picture of the battlefield. Delta is built for rapid iteration and battlefield adaptation — a stark contrast to the United States’ model of multi-year acquisition cycles and rigid systems. The system continually upgrades, maintaining pace with the newest technology to gain battlefield advantage. In August 2025, Kyiv upgraded the system with an AI platform that allows for “automatic, real-time detection of enemy equipment.” Delta is not just a proof of concept for one nation. The system is interoperable with 15 different systems provided by 10 countries. One key development was Delta’s integration with TOPAZ, a Polish artillery fire control system that embeds in various strike systems. This integration illustrates how allied cooperation can evolve beyond operational coordination into true systems integration. This is the gold standard for combined and joint operations. In March, the Pentagon identified Palantir’s Maven Smart System (MSS), an AI-powered integration and decision support system, as a way to implement its Combined Joined All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) strategy across the joint enterprise. MSS displays a live view of the battlespace to provide decisionmakers with real-time understanding of the battlefield. According to the DoD, it does this by aggregating “thousands of discrete data streams into AI-enabled workflows, securing decision advantage across all domains.” While the adoption of MSS is a strong start toward enabling CJADC2, a platform alone does not immediately solve the interoperability puzzle. It is easy to focus on the new technology, but it is far harder to integrate the various existing service sensor systems that MSS is meant to connect, each with its own data standards, security protocols, and legacy architecture. Adding to this challenge is the need to provide appropriate training to approximately 1.3 million active-duty service members. Given the enormity of the challenges, the DoD needs a system to track CJADC2’s progress throughout the force. A 2025 GAO report noted persistent challenges in tracking the progress of CJADC2 over the past six years. To maximize the effectiveness of MSS, DoD must ensure alignment across the enterprise to prevent the system from being siloed within different service initiatives, ensuring that the millions of dollars invested are utilized effectively. Third, MSS must be interoperable with our allies. Given that the future fight will likely always be a joint effort, MSS must talk to and integrate with the systems our allies use. Delta set the standard for system integration, and the United States should expect nothing less than full interoperability with the allies it fights alongside. The DoD should treat Delta not as a foreign curiosity, but as an operational template to base MSS’s employment on. Ukraine built a battle-tested, continuously upgrading, and coalition-interoperable C2 system under wartime pressure. It worked. The U.S. has the money, the Ukrainian partners, and now the platform. What is necessary is the discipline to implement it correctly. The shift to a data-centric, cloud-based command and control system is the right call. But the Pentagon must be as deliberate about implementation as acquisition, or risk fielding a capability that the force is not equipped to use. Jessica Ho is a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army currently interning at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies‘ CCTI, where she is researching the United States’ domestic cyber response enterprise. The views expressed or implied in this commentary are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense. Mark Montgomery is a retired U.S. Navy rear admiral and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He was formerly a policy director at the Senate Armed Services Committee.