Malaysia’s ‘alliance allergy’ and its eyes on Balabac

A Philippine think tank meets with counterparts in Kuala Lumpur to bridge gaps Malaysia is part of the Five Power Defense Arrangements and has the US as its biggest defense partner, indicating a complex security landscape. Malaysia was the first country to protest China's nine-dash line claim and has a nuanced approach to its relations with China, balancing its economic interests with regional diplomacy. The Philippines and Malaysia have different strategic orientations, with Malaysia being ASEAN-centric while the Philippines is more alliance-centric, affecting their responses to regional tensions. This is AI-generated. Read the article for full context. Report any errors. After three days of meetings with Malaysian think tanks, academics, and a few from the private sector in Kuala Lumpur, it dawned on me that I knew little about our neighbor. It turns out that my knowledge of this co-founder of ASEAN, an important member, is superficial. Here are four takeaways that give me a nuanced understanding of Malaysia, a more complex country than what some of us perceive it to be — as simply pro-China. Malaysia is part of the Five Power Defense Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Singapore. They agreed to consult each other in the event of an armed attack against Malaysia and Singapore. Every year, they hold joint military exercises. The US is Malaysia’s biggest defense partner. Malaysia was the first country, together with Vietnam, to protest China’s nine-dash line claim, a day after China submitted its nine-dash line map to the UN in May 2009. Malaysia was the first ASEAN member country to open diplomatic ties with China in 1974. A Philippine think tank, FACTS Asia, organized a visit to Kuala Lumpur to engage in Track Two diplomacy, an avenue where retired government officials, academics and analysts discuss issues—from the contentious to the benign—in an informal manner. The talks, governed by the Chatham House rule, were spiced up by provocative questions, straightforward and honest answers, and a sprinkling of humor. It was my first time to participate in such a mission. It gave me a glimpse of how two sides try to understand each other’s position and suggest paths forward, a way of bridging gaps and planting seeds of ideas that may eventually reach policymakers. Julio Amador III , FACTS Asia founder, led the delegation composed of retired Supreme Court senior associate justice Antonio Carpio, former ambassador Laura del Rosario , analyst Jesse Pascasio , Deryk Baladjay, lecturer at the De La Salle University international studies department, and myself. Balabac creates a stir A few days before we left for Kuala Lumpur, a story broke on Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim raising concern over Balabac, an island in Southern Palawan, where the US military has a rotational presence. It is close to Malaysia’s Banggi island, about 20 minutes by speedboat. Balabac is one of the sites under EDCA, the PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. A three-kilometer military airstrip has been reportedly constructed there, and Balikatan exercises with US and Australian forces have taken place there as well. “As a neighboring country closely affected by claims over Sabah [Banggi Island is in Sabah], we are somewhat concerned with the tension, even though our bilateral relations with the Philippines remain very good,” Anwar was quoted as saying in a budget event in the capital Putrajaya. He said that their “basic defense capabilities must be strengthened.” The Philippines is beefing up its defense capabilities in Balabac as part of its deterrence against China. As we know, the province of Palawan is a witness to the tension between the Philippines and China in the West Philippine Sea. I was surprised that Anwar viewed it through a different lens. A Malaysian think tank official said this concern was coming from the “possibility of miscalculation which may rope in Malaysia” which wants to stay neutral. The leading lights in our delegation explained the Philippine side. ‘Allergic’ to alliance I learned about Malaysia’s “allergy” to alliance from international relations professor Cheng-chwee Kuik of the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia). He told us they have a different “strategic DNA” from the Philippines. Malaysia considers itself ASEAN-centric and actively engages in ASEAN Plus (with dialogue partners) platforms while his country sees the Philippines as more “alliance-centric.” Among ASEAN member countries, only two — the Philippines and Thailand — are treaty allies of the US. The alliance between Manila and Washington, DC is rooted in security cooperation and appears more robust than that of Bangkok and Washington, DC. “As US and Thai regional strategies have fallen out of alignment, trust between the two partners has waned. The United States can increase security alignment by rebuilding trust with the Royal Thai Army,” the CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies wrote in 2021. This makes the Philippines stand out in ASEAN. Kuik made no value judgment on the Philippines’ position; each country is distinct. For our part, some of us perceive Malaysia as leaning towards China. As a South China Sea claimant country, it practices quiet diplomacy with China and keeps its protests against Beijing’s intrusion into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under wraps — vastly different from our approach. We shared this perception with the academics, analysts, and researchers we met. A number of them said they are concerned about China’s activities but are not alarmed. Success in Kasawari Malaysia has been successful in one area where we have failed, so far. Petronas, the state-owned oil and gas company, has drilled for gas in Kasawari field, a major offshore natural gas development in the South China Sea, off the coast of Sarawak and within their EEZ, but which China claims. Petronas has been no stranger to China Coast Guard vessels that have intruded into their EEZ. But it is common for Malaysia’s Navy and Maritime Enforcement Agency to keep watch and shadow the Chinese vessels. After all, this is a matter of economic survival for Malaysia, the second-highest producer of petroleum in Southeast Asia and the fifth-highest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) globally. Let me know what you think. You can email me at marites.vitug@rappler.com. Till next newsletter! 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