In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the pressure was on the West to quickly find new sources of oil and gas to compensate for those from Russia that would be lost through initial supply-chain disturbances and then because of sanctions. The net was cast wide, as several major possibilities in the world’s main aggregate source of hydrocarbons had already moved more firmly in the run-up to the invasion into China’s and Russia’s sphere of influence. This included Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of whose de facto leaders refused even to take a telephone call from then-President Joe Biden to talk about helping to reduce spiralling oil and gas prices by producing more, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Qatar was a notable early exception in the region, becoming such a key supplier of liquefied natural gas to European allies of the U.S. that it was designated a ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’, as was Egypt, which had a multilayered strategic importance to the West, as it did to the East, as also detailed in the book. Perhaps the most unexpected country to which Washington and its allies directed their attention was Libya, but investment plans were made and money flowed in, helping to push its oil production up to a 13-year high of 1.4-1.5 million barrels per day (bpd). However, recent indications suggest that this Western rush may already be fading -- raising serious questions over what comes next for Libya’s oil sector.A key signal for concern was the distinctly underwhelming Western response to Libya’s February 2026 licensing awards -- the first since 2007 and specifically touted by Tripoli as likely to mark the beginning of a new upsurge of investment across the country’s oil and gas sector. As at the close of the licensing round, only five out of 22 blocks had been awarded, comprising Offshore Block 22 (Sirte Basin) going to Spain’s Repsol, Turkey’s TPAO, and Hungary’s MOL; Offshore Area 01 (Sirte/Cyrenaica) going to Italy’s Eni and QatarEnergy; Onshore Contract Area 106 (Sirte Basin) going to the U.S.’s Chevron; Onshore C3 (Sirte Basin) also going to Repsol and TPAO; and, Onshore M1 (Murzuq Basin) going to Nigeria’s Aiteo Group. It was triply disappointing because not only was the final number so small, but also because there had been 37 companies that pre-qualified, but many of them ultimately declined even to submit a final bid. Additionally, despite Libya’s state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) pitching the licensing round as also marking an historic return of Western supermajors, more than 75 percent of the blocks offered remained unsold, and heavyweights like Shell, TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil, and BP either sat out the round entirely or declined to submit binding bids. It is true that last week saw the NOC discuss exploration plans for the second quarter of 2027 with a consortium including Repsol, TPAO and MOL, but this only concerns Offshore Block 22 in the Sirte Basin, with first oil in such an ultra-deepwater site typically likely to take six to 10 years to emerge. Any jump in Libya’s oil production over the short- to medium-term towards the NOC’s stated 2.1 million bpd longer-term target would instead have to come from the rehabilitation of mature onshore fields, including Sharara, El Feel, Waha, and brownfield areas in the Sirte Basin. However, in both the latest licensing round and in separate negotiations, major Western oil firms are once again looking increasingly reticent to commit to long-term capital investment in Libya. The already entrenched European majors -- Eni (which dominates Libyan gas exports to Italy) and Repsol (heavily invested in Sharara) -- appeared to use the latest licensing round simply to hedge their existing exposure in Libya by taking deepwater offshore blocks that are physically insulated from onshore pipeline militias. Meanwhile, Chevron’s single onshore block looks more like a placeholder for potential future activities rather than a signal of major planned investment. In theory, it looks a compelling potential opportunity, with the country holding around 48 billion barrels of proved crude reserves -- the largest in Africa. Before Muammar Gaddafi was removed from the leadership in 2011, Libya had no difficulty sustaining output of roughly 1.65 million bpd of high-quality light, sweet crude. The flagship grades, Es Sider and Sharara, were especially prized in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe for their strong gasoline and middle-distillate yields. Production had also been on a steady upward path, rising from about 1.4 million bpd in 2000, even if still far below the more than 3 million bpd achieved in the late 1960s. Crucially, though, the NOC had already laid out plans before 2011 to deploy enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques across maturing fields. Its estimate that EOR could add around 775,000 bpd of capacity looked entirely credible, and Western interest in new upstream developments showed no sign of fading at the time.However, in practice, the key reason for the reticence of Western oil firms to become more deeply involved in the country remains the extraordinarily precarious security situation there. This all dates back to same basic problem of how the oil revenues in the country should be disbursed that were highlighted during the landmark peace agreement negotiated on 18 September 2020 to end the previous mammoth blockade of oil. At the time, Commander of the rebel Libyan National Army (LNA), General Khalifa Haftar, made it clear to the opposing side with which the deal had been struck -- Tripoli’s UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) -- that the agreement would be an interim arrangement only, while a solution was worked out on oil revenue distribution. The key to this in his view, and supported by the GNA back then, would be the formation of a joint technical committee, which would: “Oversee oil revenues and ensure the fair distribution of resources … and control the implementation of the terms of the agreement during the next three months, provided that its work is evaluated at the end of 2020 and a plan is defined for the next year.” To address the fact that the then-GNA effectively held sway over the NOC and, by extension, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) in which the revenues are held, the committee would also “prepare a unified budget that meets the needs of each party… and the reconciliation of any dispute over budget allocations… and will require the Central Bank [in Tripoli] to cover the monthly or quarterly payments approved in the budget without any delay, and as soon as the joint technical committee requests the transfer.” In this specific context, although Libya did sign its first unified national budget in 13 years on 11 April 2026 under U.S. mediation, the core institutional oversight Haftar had demanded back in September 2020 has repeatedly stalled. The joint technical committee, for example, never found its feet as competing political structures opposed different proposed structures and functioning, leading to repeated follow-up blockades (notably including in 2022 and 2024). Additionally, instead of transparent CBL transfers, eastern factions turned to parallel financing, as illustrated in a leaked March/April 2026 UN Security Council Panel of Experts report detailing how the Arkenu Oil Company -- linked to Saddam Haftar (General Haftar’s youngest son, and serving as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the LNA) -- diverted over USD3 billion in oil revenues outside CBL oversight between October 2024 and February 2026. Meanwhile, in August this year, CBL Governor Naji Issa submitted his resignation (although he was later pressured to stay on) amid competing rival spending pressures, warning in late October that a unified budget could not be achieved without a unified government. In mid-October 2026, the CBL and the NOC were engaged in a heated public row after the central bank stated that it had only received USD361 million in oil revenues for the first half of October -- USD839 million less than the USD1.2 billion the NOC claimed to have transferred. Given that the various armed groups and regional powerbrokers still do not trust that Tripoli’s CBL transfers will reach them fairly, and as parallel smuggling and diversion networks remain extremely lucrative -- localised oil shutdowns have continued, including most recently the 21-27 September ‘Sharara Valve 7’ blockade. This involved an armed group, backed by members of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (Southwest), closing a valve on the main crude pipeline linking Libya’s largest oilfield, Al-Sharara, to the coastal Zawiya export terminal and refinery. The shutdown caused daily production at Sharara to plunge by around 200,000 bpd, wiping out about 950,000 barrels of production, and costing approximately USD95 million in direct revenue losses. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.comMore Top Reads From Oilprice.comIllinois Ethanol Plant Bomb Is the Latest Threat to U.S. Energy SitesDiamondback to Buy Double Eagle’s Midland Stake for $5 BillionHouthi Advance Puts Saudi Crude Exports at Risk
Libya Has Africa's Biggest Oil Reserves, but Western Majors Aren't Biting
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