Kyiv’s Institutional Decay Deepens as EU Forces a Reckoning

“Whew, we got three through to the final. It wasn’t easy.” According to a prosecutor from Ukraine’s Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the remark above came from a conversation involving Olha Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s former deputy prime minister and recently dismissed ambassador to the United States who received a corruption notice. It was one of several exchanges cited by the prosecutor as evidence of an alleged attempt to influence the 2023–2024 competition for the leadership of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP).JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) has moved to transfer six judges from the disbanded and deeply controversial District Administrative Court of Kyiv (OASK) to another administrative court. Taken together, the developments point to a problem deeper than Ukraine’s latest contested government reshuffle as the European Union pushes Kyiv to reverse some of its backsliding by linking further financial assistance to reforms that Ukraine has repeatedly delayed. “Whom should we support?” The conversations cited by the SAPO prosecutor allegedly include discussions about how candidates for the NACP leadership should be scored and which of them should advance. “I gave the ‘reds’ a low score,” one exchange says. “Skomarov clearly shouldn’t be given 30 points. In fact, we should try to give him as few as possible,” another says, apparently referring to NACP leadership candidate Oleksandr Skomarov. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine’s New Commander Names Combat-Tested General to Number Two Job Serhii Sobko, a new generation officer with a background in leading volunteer citizen-soldiers in battle, has attended multiple US Army command courses and learned English in Canada. A further message concerned the leadership of the selection commission itself: “I think they’ll be choosing the head of the commission. Whom should we support?” According to the evidence described by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and SAPO, Stefanishyna and a senior aide identified as Bukhanovych allegedly discussed preferred candidates before the commission had completed its work. One message – attributed to Stefanishyna – reportedly contained four names: “Pavlushchyk [the current NACP head], Stepanyan [a Defense Ministry department head], Hatseliuk [now a member of the High Qualification Commission of Judges], Hupiak [the NACP deputy head and a former State Bureau of Investigation employee]. Hupiak is the priority.” Three of those named – Viktor Pavlushchyk, Serhii Hupiak and Serhii Stepanyan – subsequently reached the final interview stage. The official shortlist published by the NACP shows that 10 candidates advanced to the final interviews from an initial field of 51. Hatseliuk did not reach the final stage, although another exchange cited by prosecutors suggests that at least two government-appointed commission members tried to keep him in the competition. “He’s heading for elimination, but Natalia and I are doing everything we can to prove that he should go through,” a commission member allegedly wrote. The NACP monitors officials’ asset declarations, identifies conflicts of interest, oversees political-party financing and develops Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy. Its independence is particularly important when it scrutinizes senior government officials. Questions allegedly coordinated in advance The evidence presented by prosecutors also allegedly indicates that government-appointed members of the selection commission coordinated interview questions with officials outside the commission. Another message, forwarded by Stefanishyna, reportedly instructed two commission members not to support an open discussion of candidates before the final interview stage. “Regarding the competition, it is very important to say that Onyshchenko and Alla should not support an open discussion of the candidates for the purpose of selecting them for the final interview. Because this proposal is very harmful.” The message apparently referred to Natalia Onyshchenko and Alla Ivanovska, commission members selected under the government quota. The commission included members appointed by the government, and members nominated by Ukraine’s international donors. That structure was intended to protect the competition from political interference. According to the prosecutor’s interpretation, however, the exchanges suggest that government officials attempted to coordinate the conduct of the domestically appointed members, including their questions, scores and procedural positions. Pavlushchyk ultimately won the competition and was appointed NACP head by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2024. All six members of the selection commission supported his appointment. The material described by prosecutors does not, by itself, establish that Pavlushchyk knew about or participated in any alleged interference. Nor do the excerpts presented so far show that the commission’s international members were improperly influenced. The allegations instead concern an apparent attempt to steer the process through members appointed under the government quota. Six OASK judges move closer to returning The struggle over institutional control is not limited to the NACP. The HQCJ has moved to transfer six judges from the disbanded OASK to the Kyiv Regional Administrative Court. The six judges are Tetiana Balas, Kyrylo Harnyk, Ihor Ishchuk, Olena Patratii, Ihor Pohribnichenko, and Viktor Shulezhko. In January, the HQCJ determined that all six had previously passed qualification assessments and could therefore be considered for transfer to another court of the same level without a new competition. The resulting decisions are formally recommendations. Final approval rests with the High Council of Justice. In practice, however, judicial-reform advocates argue that the transfers would restore the judges to substantially the same work, only at a different address. Following the OASK liquidation, its cases were transferred to the Kyiv Regional Administrative Court pending the establishment of a new specialized court. The court therefore inherited much of the OASK caseload, including politically and financially significant disputes involving state institutions, public property, and land around Kyiv. Critics consequently describe the Kyiv Regional Administrative Court as OASK’s functional twin. The recommendations are particularly controversial because several of the judges have been associated with disputed rulings and scandals involving the OASK. An investigation by Slidstvo.Info documented the records of the six judges as the transfer process began. Pohribnichenko is a defendant in proceedings arising from the so-called “Vovk tapes” – recordings that investigators say documented attempts by former OASK chair Pavlo Vovk and other judges to influence government decisions and judicial-governance bodies. The recordings formed the basis of at least two criminal proceedings involving Pohribnichenko. In October 2025, the High Anti-Corruption Court closed the part of one charge accusing him of participation in crimes committed by a criminal organization after the relevant provision of the Criminal Code ceased to be in force. Other parts of the case continued. Harnyk has faced criticism over alleged drunk driving and a ruling that prohibited Kyiv residents from protesting against a visit by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. Shulezhko prohibited peaceful assemblies during the 2012 protests against legislation expanding the use of the Russian language. He also issued a decision allowing the transfer of nearly Hr.200 million ($4.47 million) to a company reportedly connected to the son of former pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych. Judicial-reform organizations have raised additional questions about rulings, property holdings, and possible links between members of the group and figures associated with the Yanukovych government, Vovk, and the late pro-Russian lawyer Andriy Portnov. None of those controversies automatically disqualifies a judge, and criminal charges do not constitute proof of guilt. Critics of the transfers nevertheless argue that Ukraine’s Constitution requires judges to demonstrate not only professional competence but also integrity. Is OASK returning under another name? The OASK was abolished by the Verkhovna Rada in December 2022 after years of scandals surrounding its rulings and the conduct of its leadership. The court had jurisdiction over disputes involving central government institutions and became notorious for decisions affecting elections, protests, state appointments, and major financial interests. The “Vovk tapes,” released by NABU, allegedly captured judges discussing political influence, control over other judicial bodies and the delivery of favorable court decisions. Vovk has denied any wrongdoing. The Ukrainian Supreme Court rejected Vovk’s attempt to regain his position in June 2026, upholding his dismissal for a serious disciplinary offense. The proposed transfer of six former OASK judges now raises a different question: whether liquidating a compromised court achieves anything if its judges return to adjudicate much of the same caseload elsewhere. HQCJ members have argued that failing to transfer the judges could expose Ukraine to adverse rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. They have also emphasized that all six previously passed qualification assessments. Judicial-reform advocates dispute that reasoning. According to them, no publicly known applications by the six judges are currently pending before the Strasbourg court. Critics also argue that an old qualification assessment cannot replace a substantive examination of whether a judge currently meets the constitutional requirement of integrity. The result, they say, is that the abolished OASK is rising from the ashes like a phoenix – in pieces, under another roof, but potentially returning to much of the same work. EU ties funding to Ukraine’s reform The timing is particularly significant because the European Union has made the return of independent international experts to the selection of HQCJ members one of the benchmarks under the updated Ukraine Facility Plan. The Council of the EU approved an amended plan containing 27 additional quantitative and qualitative indicators. The revision increased the total number of benchmarks from 146 to 173 and placed additional emphasis on the rule of law, anti-corruption policy and reforms connected to Ukraine’s EU accession. One of the new benchmarks requires Ukraine to establish, by the end of the fourth quarter of 2026, a properly constituted commission for selecting HQCJ members that includes independent international experts with a decisive voting role. The requirement is directly linked to EU financial assistance. More than €38 billion ($43.9 billion) available under the Ukraine Facility is tied to Ukraine’s implementation of reforms and investments contained in the plan. International experts have been absent from the HQCJ Selection Commission since their mandate expired on June 1, 2025. Under current legislation, future members of the selection body would instead be nominated by the Council of Judges, the Council of Prosecutors, the Ukrainian National Bar Association, and the National Academy of Legal Sciences. Civil-society organizations argue that these bodies have not undergone sufficient reform and remain vulnerable to corporate interests within the judiciary. Since June 2025, the Verkhovna Rada has had a potential solution before it: Draft law No. 13382 would restore international participation in the commission responsible for selecting HQCJ members. Despite repeated calls from the EU and Ukrainian civil society, the Verkhovna Rada has made little progress on the bill. Its official legislative record still lists it as under consideration by the relevant committee. Meanwhile, the Council of Judges has called for the selection process to begin under the existing rules, without waiting for the Verkhovna Rada to restore international participation. Judicial-reform organizations argue that this could allow entrenched interests within the judiciary to shape the body that will select the next generation of HQCJ members. The stakes are substantial. The mandates of 15 of the HQCJ’s 16 current members are expected to expire in 2027, meaning the next selection commission could determine almost the entire future composition of the body responsible for appointing and evaluating Ukrainian judges. Test of whether the decay can be reversed Restoring international experts is now a time-bound obligation linked to European financing. That places responsibility on the Verkhovna Rada, as well as Ukraine’s new justice minister and deputy prime minister for European integration. Their handling of draft law No. 13382 and the formation of the new HQCJ Selection Commission will provide an early indication of whether the latest government reshuffle represents a genuine institutional reset or simply another redistribution of positions and influence. In one case, prosecutors allege that senior officials attempted to influence the competition for the head of the NACP through government-appointed commission members. In another, international experts have been removed from the body that will select future HQCJ members while six judges from one of Ukraine’s most discredited courts move closer to returning to the bench. How Ukraine’s anti-corruption system is built to – and would – work Ukraine’s anti-corruption system was deliberately built around institutions intended to remain partially insulated from political authority. NABU investigates high-level corruption. SAPO prosecutes those cases. The High Anti-Corruption Court considers them. The NACP attempts to prevent corruption by monitoring officials, declarations, conflicts of interest and political financing. The HQCJ selects and evaluates judges who may ultimately rule on politically sensitive cases. Competitive appointments involving international experts were introduced because procedures controlled entirely by domestic political and judicial institutions had repeatedly produced dependent officials. Without addressing these issues, Ukraine risks not only delaying its EU accession, with several negotiation clusters now open, but allowing the continued decay of the institutions on which public trust in the state depends.