[Just Saying] Phantom judges in the impeachment court

The Senate holds the exclusive power to try impeachment cases, requiring Senators to take an oath and be physically present to participate in the trial. The term 'sitting for that purpose' signifies both the legal capacity to act as a judge and the necessity of physical presence during the trial proceedings. The interpretation of 'all the Members of the Senate' must include only those Senators who have taken the oath and are actively participating, ensuring judicial fairness and accountability. This is AI-generated. Read the article for full context. Report any errors. Article XI Section 3(6) of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When SITTING FOR THAT PURPOSE, the Senators shall be on OATH OR AFFIRMATION. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of ALL MEMBERS OF THE SENATE. A. The Transformation: Oath and Sitting Status A senator does not automatically become an impeachment judge by virtue of holding legislative office. Section 3(6) mandates a structural metamorphosis: Senators become trial judges only when they take a separate oath or affirmation and officially convene by “sitting for that purpose” — specifically, “to try and decide.” Therefore, the phrase “all the Members of the Senate” qualified to vote on conviction must refer exclusively to the pool of Senators who accomplish two elements: 1. Taking their oath and 2. actively sitting in the impeachment court. Both must concur. Non-accomplishment of one excludes a senator or a senator judge from “all members of the Senate.” Because Section 3(6), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution was directly transplanted from prior constitutional texts, its construction does not depend on the speculative intent of the 1986 Framers, but on the plain, ordinary understanding of the People who ratified it. And even if there were deliberations regarding the provision, still the so-called intention of the framers must yield to the understanding of the people. To the ratifying public, the choice of the word “sitting” in the phrase “sitting for that purpose” was not casual legalese; it is a deliberate, everyday term chosen because it naturally conveys a dual purpose: 1. The Dual Meaning of “Sitting” The term “sitting for that purpose” seamlessly captures both the legal capacity and the physical act required of an impeachment adjudicator: Capacity to Act as a Judge (De Jure Authority): In popular understanding, a judge “sits” on the bench when invested with jurisdiction. When a senator takes the required special oath or affirmation, they undergo a constitutional metamorphosis — stripping off their pure legislative identity to assume the legal capacity of a judicial officer. “Sitting for that purpose” marks the assumption of this distinct judicial office. Mandated Presence in Conducting the Trial (De Facto Exercise): Simultaneously, “sitting” is a factual descriptor. An ordinary citizen understands that a court cannot “sit” in a vacuum. To be “sitting” means to be physically present, in the chair, actively conducting and hearing the proceedings. A judge who is absent is not “sitting.” By fusing these two concepts into a single term easily understood by the public, the text establishes that legal capacity without physical presence does not constitute “sitting,” and therefore cannot qualify a Senator to be counted among the baseline of “all the Members of the Senate” who “try and decide” the case. Simply, judicial power of a court which is a “trier of facts” which, in turn is the attribute of an impeachment court cannot be divorced from its exercise. And its exercise requires presence. B. Elucidation Across Four Perspectives Historical perspective Historically, Anglo-American trial tradition — from which this constitutional text was borrowed almost verbatim — treats a tribunal as a body that operates only when its members physically “sit” in court. To the public that ratified the Constitution, the term “sitting” carried the settled historical weight of court sessions: a tribunal “sits” when its judges gather in person to take evidence. The phrase was retained precisely because its historic, dual meaning — signifying both judicial session and physical attendance —was well established in public consciousness. Constitutional perspective Synthesizing the text, Section 3(6) creates a strict operational sequence: 1. The Oath/Affirmation: Grants the senator the capacity to act as a judge. 2. Sitting for the Purpose: Combines that judicial *capacity* with actual presence in the tribunal. 3. To Try and Decide: Dictates the action permitted only to those who are currently “sitting.” If “all the Members of the Senate” were interpreted as a raw count of all elected legislators regardless of presence, the phrase “sitting for that purpose” would be rendered redundant surplusage. Constitutional interpretation dictates that every word must be given effect. “Sitting” qualifies the baseline of senators to only those who possess both the judicial capacity and the active presence during the trial. Practical perspective From a practical and common-sense perspective — the exact lens through which the ratifying public viewed the text — a person cannot “try” a case they did not watch or hear. The duty “to try” requires observing witnesses, evaluating demeanor, and weighing live evidence. The word “sitting” vividly communicates this physical necessity. The ordinary voter understood that you cannot judge a trial from afar; “sitting” requires being in the room where the trial takes place. Political perspective Politically, the double meaning of “sitting” prevents a grave constitutional abuse: the participation of “phantom judges.” If capacity alone were enough without mandated presence, politically aligned Senators could skip the trial, avoid hearing damaging evidence against an ally or opponent, and emerge at the final hour merely to vote. The requirement of “sitting” — meaning both holding the sworn capacity and maintaining actual presence — ensures that only those who endured the burden and public scrutiny of the bench are empowered to render judgment. Conclusion The ratifying people understood “sitting” in its common, intuitive sense. By retaining this exact word from previous Constitutions, the text enshrines a clear rule: to be counted among “all the Members of the Senate” who decide an impeachment, a senator must have taken the oath to gain the capacity of a judge, and must be actively present (“sitting”) in the trial court. Constitutional provisions must never be fragmented and parsed into isolated words and phrases, each assigned a standalone meaning detached from the whole. A text adopted verbatim across generations must be construed as an integrated, seamless structure, interpreted continuously in the light of the Constitution’s enduring principles — chiefly due process, which demands that those who decide must actually hear the evidence, and participatory democracy, which requires active, transparent, and accountable engagement rather than passive partisan head counts. It is entirely understandable that the ouster of a high official elected by the sovereign people should carry a heavy measure of difficulty. However, difficulty must never be equated with absurdity. The claim advanced by some sectors — that fixing the two-thirds threshold to an inflexible 16 senator-judges saves the impeachment process from political manipulation — may sound superficially plausible. Yet, if applied, forcing such a rigid number regardless of how many senators actually qualify, take the oath, and sit for the trial produces an irrational implementation that is far more destructive of the constitutional process itself. Isolating the phrase “all the Members of the Senate” from its constitutional anchors — “sitting for that purpose” and the requirement of a distinct oath — shatters this holistic design. Departing from these fundamental rules of interpretation produces an obviously absurd result: an impeachment court where non-attending, unsworn, or non-participating legislators can decide the fate of a trial they never witnessed. Such an outcome subverts the foundational guarantees of judicial fairness and democratically accountable governance, yielding a practical impossibility that only a clever manipulation of semantics can ostensibly justify. – Rappler.com Mel Sta. Maria is former dean of the Far Eastern University Institute of Law. He teaches law at FEU, the Ateneo School of Law, the University of Sto. Tomas, Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, University of Makati, and Manuel L. Quezon University. He also hosts shows on both radio and YouTube, and has authored several books on law, politics, and current events.