Just How Likely Is Le Pen to Win?

Marine Le Pen no longer needs an electoral breakthrough to reach the second round of France’s presidential election. What she needs is for the rest of the field to remain divided. France will vote on April 18, 2027, with a runoff between the two leading candidates on May 2, according to France’s official election calendar. President Emmanuel Macron cannot seek a third consecutive term.JOIN US ON TELEGRAMFollow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official. A Paris appeals court has shortened Le Pen’s electoral ban, allowing her to run despite upholding her conviction for misusing European Parliament funds. She has appealed to France’s highest court, which is expected to rule before the election, Reuters reported. The latest Elabe polling places Le Pen at roughly 35% in the first round. Her nearest rival, former Prime Minister Edouard Philippe, remains below 21%. In a runoff, she narrowly leads Philippe and defeats every other tested opponent by a wider margin. What a Le Pen presidency can mean for Ukraine For Ukraine, the election is not an abstract contest between French parties. France is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the EU’s two indispensable political heavyweights. The president is commander-in-chief, represents France internationally, and negotiates treaties. Parliament controls budgets and most domestic legislation, but the Elysee has exceptional influence over defense and foreign policy. Macron has moved France well beyond general declarations of solidarity. Paris supports weapons deliveries, sanctions, Ukraine’s EU accession, and postwar security guarantees. France and Britain are also leading preparations for a multinational force that could deploy after a ceasefire, according to the Coalition of the Willing declaration. Other Topics of Interest Russia Appears to Break Its Own Three-Day Kyiv Truce Before Deadline Russian drones targeted Kyiv and the surrounding region hours before Moscow’s own timeline said its three-day pause was due to expire. That makes the 2027 election central to two of Kyiv’s most important strategic objectives: maintaining military support and keeping its EU membership path open. As Kyiv Post previously reported, France’s political position could be decisive for any attempt to move Ukraine toward membership in 2027. An accession treaty would ultimately require unanimous approval from every EU member state. A French president would not need to abandon Ukraine publicly to damage its position. It would suffice to restrict how French weapons may be used, opposing a postwar force, weakening sanctions, or slowing EU decisions would be enough. That is why Le Pen’s shift on Ukraine since 2022 matters, but so do the limits of that shift. Le Pen changed her language, not her policy Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Le Pen openly promoted closer relations with Moscow. She treated Ukraine as part of Russia’s sphere of influence, refused to describe the annexation of Crimea as illegal, and argued that Europe should eventually build a strategic partnership with Russia. Her party borrowed €9 million ($10.5 million) from a Russian bank in 2014. Le Pen met Putin at the Kremlin shortly before the 2017 French election. Her 2022 campaign printed 1.2 million leaflets featuring a photograph of that meeting. Russia’s invasion turned the image from proof of international stature into an electoral liability. In a 2022 Kyiv Post interview, European policy expert Georgina Wright said Le Pen’s messaging about her closeness to Putin “died overnight.” Le Pen condemned the invasion, supported accepting Ukrainian refugees, and publicly backed Ukraine’s sovereignty and its right to political, financial, and military support. The change was real – but it wasn’t complete either. Le Pen still opposes sending French military personnel to Ukraine. She has said Kyiv should not be allowed to use French long-range weapons against targets inside Russia. In 2024, she said a National Rally government would block such strikes, a position that would reverse Macron’s policy. She has also warned against sanctions that impose high costs on French households and presents negotiations, rather than Ukrainian military leverage, as the principal route to ending the war. In May 2026, she reiterated that France should leave NATO’s integrated military command while remaining a member of the alliance, Reuters reported. Her rhetoric has occasionally moved further in Ukraine’s favor. When the Trump administration suspended US military assistance in March 2025, Le Pen called the decision “very cruel” for Ukrainian soldiers and emphasized the importance of American intelligence and technical support. Where the other candidates stand on Ukraine Edouard Philippe is the most electorally competitive pro-Ukraine candidate. During a May 2026 visit to Kyiv, he supported Ukraine’s accession to both the EU and NATO and backed deploying European forces after the fighting ends to deter another Russian attack. He would broadly preserve France’s current alignment with Kyiv. Gabriel Attal offers even clearer continuity with Macron. As prime minister, he defended French deliveries of ammunition, air defenses, and long-range weapons. His presidential platform supports allowing Ukraine to use supplied weapons against military targets inside Russia. He has also advocated using frozen Russian state assets for Ukraine. Raphael Glucksmann offers the strongest pro-Ukraine position on the left. He supports continued military aid, a harder European approach to Russia, and greater European defense capacity. His difficulty is electoral: he must unite moderate left-wing voters while attracting centrists without alienating supporters of Jean-Luc Melenchon. Melenchon is the principal exception. He condemned the full-scale invasion but previously defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea and repeated Kremlin-aligned claims about Ukraine. He now prioritizes negotiations and French non-alignment while resisting a more NATO-centered European defense policy. His record, which Kyiv Post examined after France’s 2024 parliamentary election, makes him difficult for many pro-Ukraine Socialists, Greens, and centrists to support. Bruno Retailleau, the candidate of the traditional conservative Republicans, has also backed Ukraine and chose Kyiv for his first foreign campaign trip. Green leader Marine Tondelier supports continued military assistance and stronger European security guarantees. The result is a strategic imbalance. Le Pen has one consolidated party and a dominant position. The candidates most firmly committed to Ukraine are divided across the center, center-left, Greens, and traditional right. Russian-linked disinformation networks have already targeted Glucksmann, Philippe, and Attal with fabricated stories and imitation news reports. France’s Viginum foreign-interference agency identified several operations, while Attal accused Moscow of trying to weaken Le Pen’s opponents because of the National Rally’s history of support for Russia, Le Monde reported. That political conclusion has not been independently established. Le Pen is already through the first gate France’s presidential election has two rounds. A committed base can secure a place in the runoff, but victory there requires a broader coalition. Le Pen appears to have solved the first problem. She received about 18% in 2012, 21% in 2017, and 23% in 2022. She then took more than 41% against Macron in the 2022 runoff. She now polls at roughly 35% in the first round, close to twice the support of the best-placed alternative. A major legal, political, or personal shock would probably be required to keep her out of the runoff. The second-round barrier has weakened as well. Macron defeated her by more than 10 million votes in 2017. Five years later, his margin fell to about 5.5 million. Current polling places Le Pen narrowly ahead even of Philippe, the opponent who performs best against her. The 2022 gap was about 5.5 million votes. Le Pen could close it through a combination of new supporters and anti-Le Pen voters staying home. The Le Pen name no longer produces the same reaction Marine Le Pen’s father, the late Jean-Marie Le Pen, showed how France’s two-round system could produce a political earthquake and then contain it. In 2002, the left split across multiple candidates. Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin missed the runoff by fewer than 200,000 votes, allowing Jean-Marie Le Pen to face incumbent President Jacques Chirac. France mobilized against him. More than 3 million additional voters participated in the second round, and Chirac won more than four out of every five valid votes, according to the official results. That response became known as the front republicain, or republican front: mainstream voters supporting almost any democratic opponent to block the far right. Marine Le Pen has spent years weakening it. She expelled her father from the party, changed its name from the National Front to the National Rally, and shifted its public emphasis from its extremist origins toward purchasing power, public services, migration, and opposition to Macron. The firewall still exists, but it is no longer automatic. Macron received two-thirds of the runoff vote against her in 2017. In 2022, his share fell below three-fifths. Current polling suggests that no prospective opponent can count on the overwhelming cross-party support that carried Chirac or even Macron to victory. France has already seen this erosion in parliamentary politics. After the 2022 legislative election, Kyiv Post noted that gains by both Le Pen and Melenchon would make French policy more difficult and unpredictable for Ukraine. The presidential race has now concentrated that same problem around control of the Elysee. The electoral map has moved in her favor Le Pen’s original strongholds were concentrated in the deindustrialized north and northeast and along the Mediterranean coast. Those regions remain important, but the National Rally is no longer confined to them. In 2022, Le Pen finished first in more than 20,000 communes, compared with fewer than 12,000 for Macron, according to a commune-level analysis. By the 2024 European Parliament election, the National Rally led in more than nine out of every 10 French municipalities, according to Reuters. Its support has spread through rural France and small and medium-sized towns, particularly in areas with lower incomes, less formal education, higher unemployment, and longer journeys to work. Melenchon dominates a different France: major cities, working-class suburbs around Paris, parts of the southwest, and overseas territories. Glucksmann draws more support from educated, urban, and strongly pro-European voters. Philippe can compete across the center and traditional right. Le Pen, however, has built the broadest geographical base of any opposition candidate. Her rivals remain stronger within narrower social and regional blocs. Turnout could decide the election France’s 2022 runoff showed how much of the electorate remained available but unconvinced. More than 13.6 million registered voters stayed home. Another 3 million cast blank or invalid ballots. Those voters were not evenly distributed. In the first round, almost half of voters aged 25 to 34 abstained. Among people in their sixties, only about one in eight did, according to Ipsos. Le Pen performed strongly among workers, employees, and voters who described themselves as disadvantaged. Macron dominated among managers, affluent voters, and people over 70, according to the Ipsos runoff study. This creates both a weakness and an opportunity for Le Pen. Parts of her working-class and younger electorate are less reliable at the polls. But many voters who oppose her are also becoming less willing to support whichever candidate faces her. In 2022, roughly four out of every 10 Melenchon voters did not cast a valid ballot for either runoff candidate. Current polling suggests that transfers between the left and center could be even weaker in 2027. Le Pen therefore does not need France to become uniformly far right. She needs her opponents to remain divided into groups that increasingly refuse to vote for one another. Melenchon, Glucksmann, and the search for another Macron Melenchon came much closer to the 2022 runoff than is commonly remembered. He finished only 421,308 votes behind Le Pen, a gap small enough that a modest shift in urban turnout or support from other left-wing candidates could have produced a Macron-Melenchon runoff. He remains capable of reaching the second round because the left is divided. But reaching it and winning it are separate questions. His strength among younger voters, major cities, and overseas France is offset by intense opposition from centrists, moderate social democrats, and the traditional right. Elabe’s current runoff test gives Le Pen roughly two votes for every one cast for Melenchon. Glucksmann is more acceptable to pro-European centrists and moderate left-wing voters, but he does not yet have Macron’s 2017 opening. Macron entered a race in which the Socialist Party had collapsed and the center-right candidate Francois Fillon was damaged by allegations that members of his family had received public money for parliamentary work. Macron occupied the vacant center, reached the runoff, and then benefited from a much stronger republican front. No comparable lane exists today. Melenchon retains a large left-wing base. Philippe leads the center. Attal is competing for Macron’s former electorate. Tondelier represents the Greens, while other candidates draw smaller but potentially decisive shares of the vote. Philippe is currently the strongest challenger because he can attract centrists, moderate conservatives, and some Macron voters. But Attal divides that constituency. Glucksmann can unite parts of the center-left but must first overtake Melenchon without losing the voters he would need in a runoff. Le Pen has already assembled the coalition she needs to reach the final round. Her rivals are still fighting over which one of them will be allowed to face her. Le Pen is more likely to become president than at any previous point in her career. Her first-round position is dominant. Her legal path to the ballot has reopened. The National Rally’s vote is geographically broader, and the coalition prepared to stop her is weaker than it was in 2002, 2017, or even 2022. Yet, she is still not inevitable. An eight-month campaign can erase a narrow runoff lead. Her electorate includes voters whose participation has historically been less reliable. A single mainstream challenger could still consolidate the center, moderate right, and parts of the left. Her appeal before France’s highest court also remains unresolved. The difficulty is producing that challenger before the first round eliminates everyone else. The most important figure is not Le Pen’s roughly 35% but the much smaller share currently divided among Philippe, Attal, Glucksmann, Melenchon, Retailleau, Tondelier, and the rest. If that fragmentation survives until April, France’s republican firewall may not be defeated by a majority embracing Le Pen but by everyone opposing her separately.