Japan and Australia: Toward a More Autonomous and Resilient Partnership

The security environment in the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a profound transformation. Cooperation among revisionist powers, including China, Russia, and North Korea, is deepening, while the strategic priorities of the United States — the country that has long underpinned the regional order — are also changing. At the same time, technological advances in areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, unmanned platforms, quantum technologies, and cyber capabilities are fundamentally changing the character of warfare and the sources of military advantage. Against this backdrop, Japan and Australia have deepened their comprehensive security partnership across military and economic domains. What matters increasingly is their ability to build both strategic autonomy and strategic resilience. Strategic autonomy does not mean “independence” from the United States. Rather, it means reducing excessive dependence on any single major power and preserving greater room for strategic choice and freedom of action. Strategic resilience, meanwhile, refers to the ability to withstand and recover from strategic shocks, whether they take the form of military conflict, economic coercion, supply-chain disruption, or energy crises. Together, these two concepts provide a useful framework for thinking about the current state and future direction of Japan–Australia cooperation. For much of the post-Cold War period, both Japan and Australia benefited from what might be called “dual dependence.” In security terms, both relied heavily on the United States, while economically they developed increasingly deep interdependence with China. This arrangement allowed them to enjoy security at relatively low defense costs while benefiting substantially from China’s economic growth. As U.S.–China rivalry and broader great-power competition intensify, however, this model is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Yet neither replacing dependence on the United States with dependence on China, nor pursuing economic decoupling from China, is a viable option for either country. Rather, the goal is to diversify dependence itself — to expand the range of partners and capabilities available so that neither country becomes excessively vulnerable to the decisions of any single major power. This is the direction the Japan–Australia relationship has taken over the past few years. While maintaining their respective alliances with the United States, Japan and Australia have strengthened their own capabilities and built a more autonomous bilateral security relationship — one that goes beyond simply “supplementing” the U.S. military presence in the region. The cooperation surrounding the Australian Navy’s acquisition of Japanese-designed Mogami-class frigates is a good example. Its significance extends well beyond the transfer of a particular platform. Developed into sustained cooperation across joint development, production, maintenance, and future technologies, it could strengthen the defense industrial bases of both countries — enhancing their ability not just to acquire military capabilities but to produce, maintain, and sustain them over time. Australia’s strategic depth is equally important. Japan is geographically located on the front line of the First Island Chain, whereas Australia can provide vast training areas as well as logistics, maintenance, and rear-area support. By developing these arrangements during peacetime, the two countries can build the capacity to sustain military operations over a prolonged period in the event of a crisis or conflict. This will also become increasingly important as the operational horizon of the Japan Self-Defense Forces expands beyond the First Island Chain toward the wider Pacific. The same logic applies to economic security. Building more diversified supply chains for energy, critical minerals, critical technologies, and other strategic goods can enhance the autonomy and resilience of both Japan and Australia. Importantly, however, such efforts are not limited to the bilateral relationship. One example is a regional initiative such as “POWERR Asia.” Through mechanisms for energy stockpiling, sharing, and emergency supply arrangements, Japan and Australia could help strengthen energy resilience across the wider Indo-Pacific. The objective would be to create regional networks capable of absorbing shocks rather than leaving individual countries vulnerable to sudden disruptions or external pressure. A similar logic should guide engagement with Pacific Island countries. Assistance to these countries should not be viewed solely through the prism of strategic competition with China; instead, Japan and Australia have focused on strengthening resilience in areas such as infrastructure, energy, communications, and economic security. The aim should be to create an environment in which smaller states are not forced to “choose” between the United States and China simply because they lack viable alternatives. Ultimately, this strategy is neither about achieving “independence” from the United States nor about “containing” China. The U.S. military presence will remain indispensable to regional stability, while economic and diplomatic relations with China will continue to matter greatly. The challenge is therefore not to eliminate dependence, which is neither possible nor desirable, but to diversify it in ways that preserve greater freedom of action. This logic should eventually be extended to the region as a whole. By building networks through which regional countries complement one another’s capabilities across defense, energy, technology, infrastructure, and economic security, the Indo-Pacific can become more resilient to strategic shocks and less vulnerable to sudden changes in the policies or preferences of major powers. The ultimate purpose of Japan–Australia cooperation, therefore, extends beyond conventional alliance management or burden-sharing with the United States. It should contribute to building a region in which countries of the Indo-Pacific possess greater agency and a greater capacity to sustain stability and order. In this sense, Japan–Australia cooperation should evolve from a partnership designed primarily to adapt to an order dominated by great powers into one that enables regional countries to play a greater role in shaping the regional order themselves.